

Now, I submit (said Mr. C.) to every man of integrity and honor, whether we, in accepting the treaty after these repeated declarations, did not accept it subject to the condition which they implied; that is, whether, in point of fact, the stipulation of the French Executive ought not to be fairly construed, with these declarations made at the formation of the treaty, to amount simply to an engagement to use his best endeavors to obtain the assent of the Chambers to the appropriation. Such would certainly be the understanding in a similar case, between honorable and conscientious individuals; and such, I apprehend, will be the opinion hereafter, when passion shall have subsided, of every impartial inquirer after truth.

of marquis and reprisal in the event of the appropriation not being made—a measure, if not tantamount to war, leading to it by almost a necessary consequence. The message was received in France with the deep feeling of irritation which might have been expected; and under this feeling, with all the impediments which it was calculated to create, the bill to carry the treaty into effect had, the second time, to make its appearance in the Chambers. They were surmounted. The bill passed, but not without a condition—a condition which causes the present difficulty.

I deeply regret (said Mr. C.) the condition. In my opinion the honor of France did not require it, and the only vindication that can be offered for the Ministry in accepting it, is the necessity of its passage. But surely, in the midst of the difficulties which it has caused, we ought not to forget that the acts of our own Executive were the cause of its insertion. This (said Mr. C.) brings us to the present stage of this unhappy controversy. I shall not offer an opinion on the message and documents which have just been read, till I have had time to read them at leisure, and more fully comprehend their character and bearing. The Senator from Pennsylvania has probably had the advantage of me in knowing Messrs. Adams, Buchanan, and Mr. C., and I will not (said Mr. C.) make the remarks that I intended, but I am not satisfied with much that I have heard in the reading of the message and the documents. I am, in particular, very far from being satisfied with the reasons assigned by the Secretary of State why he did not accept the copy of the letter from the Duke de Broglie to the French Charge d'Affaires here, which the latter offered to put in his possession. I regret exceedingly that we have not that document. It might have shed much light on the present state of this unhappy controversy. Much mystery hangs over the subject.

There is another point (said Mr. C.) which requires explanation. There is certainly some hope that the message at the opening of the session may be favorably received in France. The President has in it expressly adopted the explanation offered by Mr. Livingston, which affords some hope, at least, that it may prove to be satisfactory to the French Government. Why, then, send this message at this time? Why recommend preparations and non-intercourse till we have heard how the message has been received in France? Suppose its reception should be favorable, in the absence of a representative of our Government at the French court, nothing could be done till the message which we have just received shall have passed the Atlantic and reached Paris. How unfortunate would be the consequences! What new entanglements and difficulties would be caused in the relations of the two countries? Why all this? Who can explain? Will any friend of the Administration rise in his place and tell us what is intended?

I might ask (said Mr. C.) for like explanation, why our Charge was recalled from Paris at the time he was? Why not wait until the annual message was received? Whom have we there to represent us in its reception, to explain any difficulty which might remain to be explained? All these things may have a satisfactory explanation. I cannot, however, perceive it. There may be some deep mystery in the whole affair, which those only who are initiated can understand. I fear, (said Mr. C.) that with the message which we have this day received, the last hope of preserving the peace of the country has vanished. This compels us to look forward. The first thing that strikes me, in casting my eyes to the future, is the utter impossibility that war, should there unfortunately be one, can have an honorable termination. We shall go into war to exact the payment of five millions of dollars. The first cannon discharged on our part would be a receipt in full for the whole amount. To expect to obtain payment by a treaty of peace would be worse than idle. If our honor would be involved in such a termination of the contest, the honor of France would be equally involved in the opposite. The struggle then would be, who should hold out longest in this unprofitable and, were it not for the seriousness of the occasion, ridiculous contest. To determine this point, we must inquire which can inflict on the other the greater injury, and to which the war must be most expensive. To both a ready answer may be given. The capacity of France to inflict injury upon us is ten times greater than ours to inflict injuries on her; while the cost of the war, in proportion to her means would be in nearly the same proportion less than ours to our means. She has relatively a small commerce to be destroyed, while we have the largest in the world, in proportion to our capital and population. She may threaten and harass our coast, while her own is safe from assault. Looking over the whole ground, I do not (said Mr. C.) hesitate to pronounce that a war with France will be among the greatest calamities, greater than a war with England herself. The power of the latter to annoy us may be greater than that of the former; but so

is ours, in turn, greater to annoy England than France. There is another view connected with this point, deserving the most serious consideration, particularly by the commercial and navigating portion of the Union. Nothing can be more destructive to our commerce and navigation, than for England to be neutral, while we are belligerent, in a contest with such a country as France. The whole of our commercial marine, with our entire shipping, would pass almost instantly into the hands of England. With the exception of our public armed vessels, there would be scarcely a flag of ours afloat on the ocean. We grew rich by being neutral while England was belligerent. It was that which so suddenly built up the mighty fabric of our prosperity and greatness. Reverse the position—let England be neutral while we are belligerent, and the sources of our wealth and prosperity would be speedily exhausted. In a just and necessary war, (said Mr. C.) all these consequences ought to be fearlessly met. Though a friend to peace, when a proper occasion occurs I would be among the last to dread the consequences of war. I think the wealth and blood of a country are well poured out in maintaining a just, honorable, and necessary war; but, in such a war as that which with the country is now threatened—a war of war of etiquette—a war turning on a question so trivial as whether an explanation shall or shall not be given—no, whether it has or has not been given, (for that is the real point on which the controversy turns) to put in jeopardy the lives and property of our citizens, and the liberty and institutions of our country, is worse than folly—is madness. I say the liberty and institutions of the country. I hold them to be in imminent danger. Such has been the grasp of Executive power, that we have not been able to resist its usurpations, even in a period of peace; and how much less shall we be able, with the vast increase of power and patronage which a war must confer on that department? In a sound condition of the country, with our institutions in their full vigor, and every department confined to its proper sphere, we would have nothing to fear from a war with France, or any other power; but our system is deeply diseased, and we may fear the worst in being involved in a war at such a juncture. I have (said Mr. C.) in conclusion, no objection to the message and documents going to the Committee on Foreign Relations. I have great confidence in the Committee, and have no doubt that they will discharge their duty to the Senate and to the country with prudence and wisdom, at the present trying juncture. But let me suggest a caution against the hasty adoption of the recommendations of the message. To adopt them, would be to change for the worse the position which we now occupy in this unfortunate controversy, and lead, I fear, directly to war. We are told that a French fleet has been sent to the West Indies, which has been considered as a menace, with the intention of frightening us into hasty measures. The French Government itself has said, in its official journal, that it acts on the defensive, and that there is no legitimate cause of war between the two countries. We would not be justified, with these declarations, connected with the circumstances of the case, were we to regard the sending the fleet as a menace. We must not forget that we, in this controversy, are, as my colleague said the other day in debate, the plaintiffs, and France the defendant. If there must be war, it must come from us, not France. She has neither motive nor cause to make war. As we, then, must declare the war, it is not strange that France, after what has passed, should prepare for the worst; and such preparation ought fairly to be considered, not as a menace, but as a precautionary measure resulting from our own acts. But should we in turn commence arming, it must be followed on the part of France, with increased preparation, and again on ours with a corresponding increase, till, at length, the pride and passions of both parties would be so wrought up, as to burst out to open violence. I have (said Mr. C.) thus freely expressed my opinion upon this important subject, feeling a deep conviction that neither justice, honor, nor necessity impels to arms; and that a war with France, at all times, and more especially at the present, would be among the greatest calamities that could befall the country.

Letter from Gerritt Smith of New York to Wm. Naylor of Virginia.
At last, we have the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Gerritt Smith is a man whom even slaveholders must respect, for the integrity of his life and the benevolence of his character—widely and fatally mistaken in its object in this instance, but none the less upright and sincere in its character. For a long time if we are not mistaken, he was a zealous Colonizationist and opposed to the Abolitionists, but yielded ultimately to the views of the latter. He has taunted the policy of Marcy's message. He proves it to be but a part of the system for hounding the South—for political and presidential schemes, misleading the Southern people as to the extent of the danger

which threatens from the North—and making professions never to be attempted to be realized, never intended to be realized, which, even if the professors desired, never can be realized. It also develops the real truth as to the march of Abolition—that it has abated, that it has yielded, not a jot of its designs, and that it has an actual accession of numbers in New York alone, of 500 a week!
None who read his letter will doubt its statement: And we call upon the People to read it most attentively, as the most authentic document which is before them: And when they have read it, to reflect upon the conduct of those in the Legislature and in Congress, who have treated this momentous question in "subordination to Van Burenism!" Let us be denounced as agitators and welcome. Virginia shall see, if we can show it to her, the true nature and extent of the appalling crisis which cannot long be deferred. "Forewarned, forearmed!"
Richmond, Va., Jan. 11, 1850.
From the Albany Evening Journal.
LETTER FROM GERRITT SMITH TO WM. NAYLOR.
FEBRUARY, JAN. 11, 1850.
Wm. Naylor, Esq. Henric county, Va.
Dear Sir—Your residence at the South, your excellence on the subject of Slavery, are my reasons for addressing this letter to you. You will probably say, about this time, the late annual message of the Governor of this State to the Legislature, I cannot expect, after having so completely identified myself with the "Northern fanatics," to have much influence with my Southern friends. Suffer me, however, to warn them of some of the misapprehensions into which the Governor's "discussion" of the final topic in his message is calculated to draw the South. Had this discussion proceeded from an obscure source, the grossness of its errors would make them harmless. As it is, the authority of his character and office will go far to give them currency.
On a subject so momentous to our Southern brethren, as that of the present movements in relation to slavery, great pains should be taken to trace out the real truth, and to spare them from the unhappy consequences of reckoning from the false premises. But Governor Marcy's efforts, though he may be unconscious that this is their character, are to shut out the truth from these brethren and to deceive them. He says, in this way, "to promote his political views;" but it will be a great and cruel exposure to those who are misled by him. Notwithstanding he esteems the "abolitionists" important enough to extend his account of them to more than a fourth part of his message, he nevertheless wishes the South to believe, that they are contemptible, both in number and character, and that few as they are, they are rapidly becoming few. Now, the truth on this point is, that the "abolitionists" are, for the most part, serious, substantial and wholesome citizens; that there is probably not one impertinent, nor one profane person in all their ranks;—that their number, so far from being small to be counted by tens and scores, is in Ohio and New England, and that, so far from undergoing a diminution, it is gaining. I doubt not, at the present time, in this State alone, a weekly accession, by actual connection with the Anti-Slavery Society, of not less than five hundred. Excepting the case of the unhappy gentleman from Marcy, who it is said, was frightened out of his abolition, whilst travelling in Virginia, I have heard of none, where a person has desired to have his name stricken from the roll of the members of the Anti-Slavery Society. The South should know, what is perfectly well known at the North, that the men, who compose the Anti-Slavery Society, are of the stamp of those, who "fight during the war," and "never let go their hold,"—and that they are men neither to be exiled nor menaced from the prosecution of their purposes. The only warrantable hope of the South in regard to these men is, that they will act prudently and kindly on the subject of slavery; but that they will cease to act on it, or that the power and efficiency with which they act, will not be rapidly increasing, is an utter improbability. Most deeply do I regret, that some of the proceedings have been marked by unkindness and imprudence—though, it is any thing but strange, that their tempers should have given way occasionally before the strong provocations addressed to them. But, do you not rejoice with me in the greatly improved spirit of abolition; and do you not see reason to believe, that this spirit will be entirely blameless?
It may, indeed, be that Governor Marcy's ignorance on this subject is so great, that he actually judges of the number and character of the "abolitionists" as contemptuously, as he speaks of them. I would rather suspect him of even this gross ignorance than to charge intentional deception on him. He is this, however, as it may, his sin, in this speaking of their number and character, is peculiarly obvious. It is to make the South believe, that the great wrongs they call for, are at the present unnecessary, though he implicitly admits for your consolation, that it may be, at the present only, that they are unnecessary.
The Governor knows full well, that, though the enactment of such laws by the Legislature might tend to consolidate some portions of the South in his candidate for the Presidency, the gain from the measure abroad would not equal the probable loss from it at home. He is not willing to hazard the vote of the Empire State for any advantage which might be likely to accrue from the measure at the South. He has not yet forgotten the signal defeat of his party in 1824, for their tyrannical contempt of the popular will; and, though he knows how well the voters of New York bear, to be mounted by demagogues, with whip and spur, he knows equally well, that there are provocations under which even these patient drudges will be easy to throw their riders. Moreover, the Governor may have the wisdom to argue, that should the North, to promote the success of her Presidential candidate, be guilty of obeying the South, and violating the great sacred right of free discussion, her only recompense for this unpardonable servility would be the deeper contempt of those who dictated it. The South is not entirely unaccustomed to make extravagant demands on the waverer principles and morality of the North, and to honor with the appellation of "dough faces," when we have responded to those demands. Let not the South flatter herself, by her not being flattered by Governor Marcy, or any other skilful politician, to believe that the North will ever enact laws to stop her citizens from talking and writing about American Slavery, or any thing else, which they may please to talk and write about. Or if there should be made as enough in any of