

# THE STAR AND NORTH CAROLINA GAZETTE.

Raleigh, N. C. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1837

VOL XXVIII. NO 47.

THOMAS J. LEMAY,  
EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR.

### TERMS.

Subscription, three dollars per annum—one half in advance.  
Persons residing without the State will be required to pay the whole amount of the year's subscription in advance.

**RATES OF ADVERTISING.**  
For every square (not exceeding 16 lines this size type) first insertion, one dollar; each subsequent insertion, twenty-five cents.  
The advertisements of Clerks and Sheriffs will be charged 25 per cent. higher; and a deduction of 3 1/2 per cent. will be made from the regular prices for advertisers by the year.  
Letters to the Editor must be post-paid.

**State Bank of North Carolina.**  
Pursuant to resolutions adopted by the Stockholders of this Bank this day, notice is hereby given that a final dividend of the capital stock holders or to their lawful representatives, at the Bank of the State of North Carolina, in this City, on and after the 1st Monday in December next, on surrendering the certificates of stock held by them.

Notice is further hereby given, that the notes of this Bank and branches (if there be any outstanding) will be redeemed at the Bank of the State of North Carolina in this city only, until 30 days inclusive, and no longer.  
WM. PEACE, Pres't.  
Raleigh, Nov. 5, 1837. 46 3/4  
Register and Standard Hill 1st Dec.

### BANK STOCK FOR SALE.

100 Shares of the Stock of the Bank of the State of North Carolina, (no so many of them as may be necessary for the payment of the debt for which they are pledged) will be sold at the door of the said Bank, on the 1st Monday in December next, for CASH—in lots of ten shares.  
C. DEWEY, Cashr.  
Raleigh, Oct. 30, 1837. 45 3/4

### COMMUNICATION.

(For the Star.)

TO AN "OLD BACHELOR—No. 7."

"To the nuptial bow,  
I led her blushing like the morn; all Heaven  
And happy constellations that hour  
Shed their electest influence; the earth  
Gave signs of gladness, and each bird,  
Joyous the birds, fresh gales and gentle airs,  
"Whisper'd to the woods; and from their wings  
Flung rose, flung odours from the spicy shrub,  
Disporting till the amorous bird of night  
Sung spousal, and hid haste the evening star  
On his hill top to light the bridal lamp."  
Thus sang the Celestial Minstrel—with "poet's eye in fine phrenzy rolling"—glancing from Heaven to earth and from earth to Heaven.  
And who, gentle reader, do you think, would presume to question Milton's judgment—when it is remembered that he was blessed with a better half of no extraneous excellence or amiability! But, perhaps say you, Milton spurns the aid of the immortals—his bold harp disdains eloquently in favor of primal nuptial bliss. Just so. But wherein consists the difference? Fair woman is yet—"led blushing like the morn" to the bridal altar—the joyous birds, fresh gales, and gentle airs, yet "whisper to the woods" in mingled measure, the soft meaning of that silken tie which binds two willing hearts; and if Milton's evening star may not "light the bridal lamp on his hill top" forever for immortals, still,

"Venus thrond' in clouds of rosy hue,  
Flings from her golden urn the vesper dew,  
And bids fond man her glimmering noon employ,  
Sacred to love, and walks of tender joy."  
But there are certain consequential, self-defined, "happily appropriate" (I like the term—it is happily appropriate) over whom the gentle feelings of love have ceased to exercise a sway; gentlemen in the full vigor of old age, who estimate happiness—not by the "long list of admirers whom they have discarded"—but by the many cold repulses they have been doomed to bear—who have so long and wishfully looked at and essayed in vain to gather the luscious grapes, that, like the faded fruit, they have concluded, with the most admirable ingenuity, that they are sour—and pocketed their lot with what pleasure they could! Verily, this is happiness with a vengeance! To them I would at present fashion a true, but civil and well-meaning discourse. What! True—and yet civil and well-meaning? Yes—why not! They will exhibit, if for the sake of nothing more than the contrast, a philosophy vastly different from theirs. They have either slumbered on, Rip Van Winkle-like, for years, awaking only to look around, rub their eyes and go to sleep again—or, mayhap have been wide awake and full of fun—and still floated on the stream of life, from the murmuring music of the pattered brook to the laughing cascade or sunny lake, gathering flowers from either bank that withered in the grasp, or anon sporting amid the bright whirl of waters—but constantly neglecting to gather the golden sand that glittered around, or take from the over-hanging rock diamonds that might have been bright and brilliant forever. Then, they chose rather to inhale for a moment the odour of "flowers" that floated in "scented fragrance on the desert air"—to admire for a moment some "gem of purest ivory" —and thus have glided on and swelled in the consequence of muddy creeds and babbling rivers that "rear you as gently as any sucking dove." It was once their privilege to kneel at beauty's shrine—to pour forth the eloquent strains of impassioned affection—or in one languid glance of the still more eloquent eye to convey volumes to the maiden's soul; and own,

"With rapture-mitten frame,  
The power of grace—the magic of a name."  
But how have they acted! How many maidens have they wooed and won! Or rather, how many did their manly beauty in sunny youth cause to love with the shy and silent affection of a delicate female! Recollect, I do not blame them for being handsome—that would be an arraignment of "the stamp of fate—the sanction of the Gods." But I do blame them for the many bright eyes that have grown dim—for the many rosy cheeks that have grown pale—for the many lovely forms that have faded away into the tomb, through their cold neglect. True, the flowers of each succeeding spring bloom with the same balmy freshness; but those who would enjoy them should remember that their beauties are evanescent—that they are winged with lightning-pinnions—without soap and pass together to the dim land of dreams. It is the lot of woman to be wooed and won. Gentlemen must know, from experience, that secret affections exist in the human heart ferocious as the tide of life. This untold love, especially in the female, is peculiarly blighting—"Joy sorrow drinks her blood"—and though all the radiance that health, and beauty, and intellect can give, may cluster upon her brow in youth, it is dimmed by the failure of a reciprocal affection, or perhaps forever quenched. And though the fond thought of her peerless and unclothed beauty may afterwards stir the wave of memory, and awake some buried voice from her soft repose, 'tis only to breathe of some "fair flower the winds have crushed too early to the ground." With reference to this hopeless love, I wish to be respectfully remarked: "As the dove will clasp its wings to its side, and cover and conceal the sorrow that is preying upon its vitals, so it is the nature of woman to hide from the world the pangs of wounded affection."

ment—a fund which was to be raised by each particular State in its own way, with a just regard to the different interests of each State which could best bear taxation, and not by the majority interests of the General Government, alike ignorant and reckless, as past experience has proven it to be, of the interest and circumstances of the respective States. If there were now a deficiency of resources, I should feel constrained, by the principles upon which I supported that bill, by plighted faith, and the peculiar interests of those I represent, not only to give back this fourth instalment, but all that we have received. No such case exists. I have examined the statement of the resources of the Government presented by the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Bell,) and have made the calculation in various forms; and, sir, I am satisfied that he has demonstrated (for it is a matter of figures) that there is no deficiency of funds. Charging the Government with all the demands upon it, including the fund of \$37,000,000 set apart to be distributed among the States, the unexpended appropriations of last year, and the appropriations of this year, and you have an aggregate of \$85,009,000. Of this sum the Secretary informs you that \$15,000,000 cannot be expended during the year, reducing the amount to \$70,000,000. The payments made, and the admitted resources of the Treasury, amount to \$64,000,000; to which add \$5,000,000 in the hands of disbursing officers, and you have \$69,000,000. In this estimate, the accruing revenue of the last half of the present year is taken, on the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, at \$7,000,000; whereas it has been proven to my entire satisfaction that it will exceed \$9,000,000. So that, instead of a deficiency, there will be a surplus, even if you do not withhold from the States this fourth instalment. I am unable to perceive why money in the hands of disbursing officers of the government is not as much the money of the government as if it were in the Treasury. It is only one step nearer being paid out—that is all. The Government can order these officers to pay it back into the Treasury, only to be paid again to the disbursing officers. If, then, sir, you withhold this fourth instalment, you leave in the hands of the government \$9,000,000 to which add the \$12,000,000 of Treasury notes, and you have a surplus of 21,000,000 of dollars—not to meet the wants of the government, but to be deposited in your sub-treasuries. I have another and an insuperable objection to this bill. The States will receive the fund in the bills of the State banks. The General Government will not, and cannot, receive it but in specie. The officers of the government will be constrained by law to demand it in specie. They will be constrained by that which, with them, is stronger than laws or constitutions—by party obligations and an irresistible necessity to play out the desperate game they have commenced. I will not arm them with this terrible power over the deposit banks in their mad and ferocious experiment of a metallic currency. I would sooner see the whole amount of the fund sunk in the ocean, than the wide-wasting ruin which a demand on these banks for \$12,000,000 in specie will produce. At the very moment that you are asked to adopt a measure which must lead to this pressure on the deposit banks and their debtors, it is recommended farther to indulge the merchants on their bonds. Why this discrimination? If you press the deposit banks, is not a corresponding pressure upon their debtors inevitable? Why, I ask, are they to be pressed, when the merchants are to be indulged on their bonds? I would at this time press neither. These considerations bring up at once the sub-treasury scheme and the metallic currency. They are all cognate branches of the same system of measures, and one of them cannot be properly considered disconnected with the others.

As to this new expedient of sub-treasuries, I am opposed to it in any and every form in which it can be presented. This new expedient, yes, sir, the old word experiment is somewhat odious; I have not heard it from the mouth of an administration man for some months. No, sir, it is an ugly word: I fear that if the present regime is to continue, one half of the words of our language will become equally odious. I like this new word better. It is singularly appropriate. It is one evidence of a better state of things—that the Jack Cade banner, which has been for eight long years floating over us, with the motto "hang all the school-masters," has been lowered. The meaning of this word "expedient" is "means employed in an exigency." If our whole language had been searched, a word more singularly significant could not have been found. But I cannot consent, by this dangerous expedient, to relieve our rulers from an exigency into which they have been led by confident folly and reckless ignorance. I have been too long denouncing this scheme of sub-treasuries as a tremendous engine of power and corruption to support it now, although

it may be called by another name. By giving to a coiled anaconda a harmless name, I will not be induced to lay my head upon it. It is said that this is not a sub-treasury system. Indeed! Will some gentleman inform me what has hitherto been understood by a sub-treasury system? Will he give some definition of such a system which does not describe that which is proposed to do? It is the very system which was first suggested by a very worthy gentleman with a very savage name, (Mr. Gouge,) with the exception that it does not specially direct the sliding shelves and hydrostatic balances. In every important particular, in every point of political danger, in surrendering to the President the unlimited control of the public purse, it is the precise system which, a few short months since, was so generally and justly denounced. It is, sir, a sub-treasury system; I go farther—it is not only the embryo, it is the living form and shape and substance of a government bank, and that in its most dangerous form. Sir, it is one of the most melancholy signs of the times. The sword of the government was absolutely surrendered to the late President. The present incumbent not being exactly the man to wield the sword of Achilles, as if in the very wantonness of a surrender of every guaranty of public liberty, it is now proposed to surrender to him an instrument more compatible, but not less powerful—the purse of the country. Is any patriot willing, on the eve of a warmly contested election, (in the city of New York for example,) upon which the destiny of the republic may depend, to trust five millions of the public money, with the power and the temptation to use it, in the hands of one man—and that one man the appointee of the President, whose very bread may depend upon the result of that election, as it may turn in favor or against the administration? Suppose a wicked and ambitious man filling the Presidential chair, (and these are things to be looked to and guarded against, for confidence is not a republican virtue,) will he not place at the head of these treasuries his own corrupt minions and parasites? Are you willing to place in his hands twenty millions, to corrupt your people and perpetuate his power? I said, sir, that it was in fact a bank. I care not by what name you may designate it. It is admitted to have that character, as a place of deposit. Will the system not also necessarily involve the business of discount on exchange? How are your funds to be transferred from places where they are redundant, to places where they are none? By hauling money from New York—says to Pittsburg? No, sir, but by drafts or bills. These bills will be bought at a premium, when above par; at less, when below par. What power of speculation and fraud do you not thus place in the hands of your agents? How many losses shall we not suffer, from bills thus purchased and not paid? Who is to lose, in such cases—the government or the agent? We shall have hundreds of applications to release our agents from such liabilities, of the same character as the famous Purviance claim. But it may be said that transfers will be made by drawing drafts on those places where the funds most accumulate. Does not every one see, by whatever name you may call it, that this will make of the agency in New York a great central power, around which the whole system must revolve, dependent upon it for light, heat, and motion? Then as to issue. It is not proposed that the drafts of these agencies, and the Treasury notes about to be issued, shall be the currency? It will then be a bank of issue, deposit, and discount, and in its worst form, with greater insecurity, greater power and temptation to speculation and dishonesty, and greater facility of using the government funds for corrupt electioneering purposes, than with a bank at Washington, with branches distributed all over the country; as the security against all these is greater with an institution with twelve men to manage it than with one.

Why, sir, shall we be driven into this dangerous and untried expedient, when, to say nothing of other plans, that of special deposits with the banks is better in every possible point of view? In Spain, where a system of sub-treasuries exists, it is estimated that not more than one fourth of the revenue received ever finds its way into the public treasury. In France, not more than half. The banks will be more cheap depositories, all will admit; more secure; as the responsibility of the banks will be greater than that which can be secured from a private individual. The facilities of transfers of the public funds will be greater, and the risk and the patronage less. Let me state a case; and stating it, furnishes the answer. Two millions are deposited with a sub-treasurer, who is the appointee of the President, of the same political party, and dependent for his support upon his salary—say \$3,000; and for that upon the President. The same amount is deposited with a bank of a million capital, receiving the same compensation, to be divided amongst a thousand stockholders;

ers; over which is the President likely to wield the greatest power? Would special deposits with the banks increase their power? I cannot, for the life of me, see how. But the banks, it is said, are not to be trusted. Is this true, sir? Will any man rise in his place, and say that he would fear to deposit his own money, jewels, or plate, in a bank, or that he would have the slightest doubt of having them restored to him on application? But the banks have stopped payment: they are therefore broken. Is an inability to pay specie equivalent to insolvency? Between man and man is it so regarded? Does he who holds the note of his neighbor for one hundred dollars, who is worth one hundred thousand, regard his debtor as insolvent, or his debt insecure, because he has not the hundred dollars in specie? The promise of a bank to pay is no more than that of an individual. It is a promise which places it in the power of the creditor, in both cases, to exact specie, or to sacrifice the property of the debtor if he fails to pay it; with this decided advantage on the part of the bank, that the creditor is fully informed of the condition of the bank, and well knows that the bank has more notes out than it has specie, and more than in times of panic and apprehension can, by any possibility, be commanded. The credit is not given on the faith of the bank having specie, but that it has property, or, what is the same thing, lies upon the property of its debtors, to meet its engagements; that property, being a measure of the value of which constitutes the great value of specie, and to buy which, specie is alone wanted.

Take as an example the condition of the deposit banks in the State of New York. They had, at the date of our last annual Treasury report, \$4,087,678 in specie, to meet demands upon them of \$4,737,475; and yet knowing this, the Secretary made his deposits, and gave to Congress the most confident assurances that the public money was safe. So it was, sir, not because the banks could pay all their obligations in specie, but because they could pay, and have paid, nearly the whole amount in that which alone was expected.

The banks not only acted wisely and honestly in stopping at the time they did, but they would not have acted thus if they had continued to pay until their last dollar was exhausted. It would have given a preference to some bill-holders and depositors over others—that very preference which it is the object of a bankrupt system to prevent; and might, besides, have put it out of their power to pay their other debtors any thing. No, sir, the banks are not only entitled to the approbation, but to the gratitude of the country; and that they have received both, is conclusively shown by the fact that every-where the people have abstained from the exercise of their power to coerce payments in specie. They have stood nobly have they stood—between the people and general bankruptcy. They have done more: they have enabled our merchants to save their own high character and that of the country from the infamy of paying their debts by wilful and fraudulent bankruptcy—a course recommended to them by those, and the organs of those, in high places.

But, Mr. Speaker, the insolent effrontery of these charges upon the banks must excite a just indignation, when it is seen that every single act imputed by the Government to the banks as a crime, has been committed by that very Government, not only without excuse, but with aggravated enormity. The Government has stopped paying specie, when it is unquestionably in its power to do it. It may at any day raise funds in specie by loan; the banks cannot. The Government, whilst it refuses to pay its debts in specie, demands specie of its debtors; the banks only demand the same currency that they pay. Take the conduct of the Government in the matter of the French indemnity; that indemnity, rather than delay which for three months, until the meeting of the French Chambers, we were well nigh being involved in war. After it was obtained, instead of allowing the claimants to draw for it, and have the premium of a foreign bill on their own money, it is delayed for a year, that it may be brought home in specie, at the expense of the premium, the delay, and the expense of transportation. When it arrives, it is paid in specie to the claimants by the Government, their mere agents? Oh no, sir, but in paper; and the very next day the man who was refused his own specific money, if he owes to the Government, (yesterday his debtor and refusing to pay specie,) is forced to pay his own debt to the Government in specie. If the banks had been guilty of conduct so flagrant and flagitious, what shouts of indignation should we not have heard from one end of the Union to the other? But the banks have shipped specie to England—a charge, I believe, wholly without evidence; but, if true, has not the Government done the very same thing? Has it not very lately paid a debt to the Barings in specie—to those odious Barings, who have been guilty of the

unpardonable offence of placing in this young and vigorous country, with its immense energies undeveloped, that capital which we needed, and giving the sole control of it to American citizens. But, at worst, it is but a discrimination between creditors; and a charge for it comes with an ill grace from a Government which pays us, who hold the rod over them, in gold, whilst they pay to the time-worn veterans of the Revolution, and to the soldiers in your Florida campaigns, bank gold.—Sir, impudence and effrontery can go no farther.

I am, if possible, still more opposed to the other untried expedient, of demanding the dues of the Government in specie. I will not venture on the experiment in the present condition of the country, how gradual soever the process may be. I will not take any more drugs from quacks who have reduced me, in their recklessness and ignorance, from a state of health to one of almost desperate disease. I will not venture on another and a violent and dangerous remedy in any state of the system, and especially in the present condition of feebleness and inanition. I will not now, by the slightest movement, shake public confidence, at a time when I regard it the first duty of a statesman to restore it. Especially I will not venture, upon a measure which I believe to be absolutely impracticable, and undesirable if practicable. If we were in a state of nature, and about for the first time to enter into social relations, and form a Government; or if we could, by a universal agrarian law, divide every thing equally—money & property—abolish debts, and to begin de novo, I should even then doubt about this metallic currency. But, taking the world as we find it, the thing is impracticable; or, if practicable, only to be attained by that universal change in the personal circumstances of men, that wide-wasting ruin which no people can or will bear. It is an old saying, that it is easy for bystanders to make observations. It may be, that those who owe no debts, or those who, having debts, are reckless of the moral obligation to pay, or beyond the reach of legal coercion, can look with complacency upon the scene of universal suffering and misery which will result from a return to a specie currency. I regard a depreciating or diminishing currency as one of the very greatest scourges of man. Patience has its horrors, but they are temporary: war has its toils, and its sufferings, but it has its glories and its triumphs too. But the misery produced by sweeping whole classes of society from ease and affluence, to a condition of poverty, helplessness, and despair, is deep, withering, & permanent. It does seem that philosophy has been teaching by example to little purpose. In every similar crisis in other countries, the conduct of Government has not been like that proposed to us—the cold, selfish, and heartless policy of the greedily miser sternly exacting his own dues, and careless of the universal suffering of others. No, sir, it has been kind, parental, wise, and efficient; taking their full share of the suffering and embarrassments of their people, rejoicing when they rejoice, sorrowing when they sorrow.

On the bursting of the Mississippi bubble in France, when the indebtedness of the people was more than the value of the whole property of the kingdom—a time of dismay and despair—the Government stepped forward and restored confidence and business, and gave repose and happiness to its people. The same was the course of England on the blowing up of the Mississippi scheme.

A more striking instance perhaps than either was the memorable year, in England, of 1793—a period of unprecedented embarrassment and difficulty. The Government came forward, not as a grinding creditor, but to relieve the general distress, by the issue of five millions of exchequer bills. The fiat of Omnipotence could not have been more instantaneous than the effects of this order. Before one week was issued, confidence was restored, and not more than half the sum ever was drawn. So would it be here.—Our Government has it in its power, by the simplest means, to re-establish confidence, and restore business to its accustomed channels. But it cannot do this by expressing its own distrust, by the demand of specie. Our whole disease has been more a disease of credit than of currency. It is the fashion to say that our currency is redundant. Will gentlemen, before they talk of redundancy, tell me what is their measure of the proper amount of currency—what proportion to the value of property, to importations, or internal commerce? When they shall have fixed upon this standard, they will have done what the ablest writers on political economy have hitherto failed to do. I venture the proposition, that, according to all the established indices of redundancy, our currency never has been redundant. Will you take as a standard the currency of France? By the last accounts I have seen, the specie alone of France was £120,000,000, or about \$600,000,000; if to this you add a million of paper,

ment—a fund which was to be raised by each particular State in its own way, with a just regard to the different interests of each State which could best bear taxation, and not by the majority interests of the General Government, alike ignorant and reckless, as past experience has proven it to be, of the interest and circumstances of the respective States. If there were now a deficiency of resources, I should feel constrained, by the principles upon which I supported that bill, by plighted faith, and the peculiar interests of those I represent, not only to give back this fourth instalment, but all that we have received. No such case exists. I have examined the statement of the resources of the Government presented by the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Bell,) and have made the calculation in various forms; and, sir, I am satisfied that he has demonstrated (for it is a matter of figures) that there is no deficiency of funds. Charging the Government with all the demands upon it, including the fund of \$37,000,000 set apart to be distributed among the States, the unexpended appropriations of last year, and the appropriations of this year, and you have an aggregate of \$85,009,000. Of this sum the Secretary informs you that \$15,000,000 cannot be expended during the year, reducing the amount to \$70,000,000. The payments made, and the admitted resources of the Treasury, amount to \$64,000,000; to which add \$5,000,000 in the hands of disbursing officers, and you have \$69,000,000. In this estimate, the accruing revenue of the last half of the present year is taken, on the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, at \$7,000,000; whereas it has been proven to my entire satisfaction that it will exceed \$9,000,000. So that, instead of a deficiency, there will be a surplus, even if you do not withhold from the States this fourth instalment. I am unable to perceive why money in the hands of disbursing officers of the government is not as much the money of the government as if it were in the Treasury. It is only one step nearer being paid out—that is all. The Government can order these officers to pay it back into the Treasury, only to be paid again to the disbursing officers. If, then, sir, you withhold this fourth instalment, you leave in the hands of the government \$9,000,000 to which add the \$12,000,000 of Treasury notes, and you have a surplus of 21,000,000 of dollars—not to meet the wants of the government, but to be deposited in your sub-treasuries. I have another and an insuperable objection to this bill. The States will receive the fund in the bills of the State banks. The General Government will not, and cannot, receive it but in specie. The officers of the government will be constrained by law to demand it in specie. They will be constrained by that which, with them, is stronger than laws or constitutions—by party obligations and an irresistible necessity to play out the desperate game they have commenced. I will not arm them with this terrible power over the deposit banks in their mad and ferocious experiment of a metallic currency. I would sooner see the whole amount of the fund sunk in the ocean, than the wide-wasting ruin which a demand on these banks for \$12,000,000 in specie will produce. At the very moment that you are asked to adopt a measure which must lead to this pressure on the deposit banks and their debtors, it is recommended farther to indulge the merchants on their bonds. Why this discrimination? If you press the deposit banks, is not a corresponding pressure upon their debtors inevitable? Why, I ask, are they to be pressed, when the merchants are to be indulged on their bonds? I would at this time press neither. These considerations bring up at once the sub-treasury scheme and the metallic currency. They are all cognate branches of the same system of measures, and one of them cannot be properly considered disconnected with the others.

**SPEECH OF MR. THOMPSON,**  
Of South Carolina, on the Bill to postpone the payment to the States of the fourth instalment of the Surplus Revenue, delivered in the House of Rep's., Sept. 23, 1837.

The bill to postpone the payment of the fourth instalment of the surplus revenue being under consideration—  
Mr. Thompson, of South Carolina, addressed the House as follows:  
Mr. Speaker: I shall vote for the amendment of my colleague, as it makes the bill more acceptable; but I shall vote against the bill, even if thus amended. Time and reflection have only served to confirm my first impressions of the wisdom and policy of the law depositing with the States the surplus in the Treasury. The chief recommendation of that law, to me, was not the money which it gave to the States—that was a small matter; but it was that a fund was provided to meet the future exigencies of the govern-

ment—a fund which was to be raised by each particular State in its own way, with a just regard to the different interests of each State which could best bear taxation, and not by the majority interests of the General Government, alike ignorant and reckless, as past experience has proven it to be, of the interest and circumstances of the respective States. If there were now a deficiency of resources, I should feel constrained, by the principles upon which I supported that bill, by plighted faith, and the peculiar interests of those I represent, not only to give back this fourth instalment, but all that we have received. No such case exists. I have examined the statement of the resources of the Government presented by the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Bell,) and have made the calculation in various forms; and, sir, I am satisfied that he has demonstrated (for it is a matter of figures) that there is no deficiency of funds. Charging the Government with all the demands upon it, including the fund of \$37,000,000 set apart to be distributed among the States, the unexpended appropriations of last year, and the appropriations of this year, and you have an aggregate of \$85,009,000. Of this sum the Secretary informs you that \$15,000,000 cannot be expended during the year, reducing the amount to \$70,000,000. The payments made, and the admitted resources of the Treasury, amount to \$64,000,000; to which add \$5,000,000 in the hands of disbursing officers, and you have \$69,000,000. In this estimate, the accruing revenue of the last half of the present year is taken, on the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, at \$7,000,000; whereas it has been proven to my entire satisfaction that it will exceed \$9,000,000. So that, instead of a deficiency, there will be a surplus, even if you do not withhold from the States this fourth instalment. I am unable to perceive why money in the hands of disbursing officers of the government is not as much the money of the government as if it were in the Treasury. It is only one step nearer being paid out—that is all. The Government can order these officers to pay it back into the Treasury, only to be paid again to the disbursing officers. If, then, sir, you withhold this fourth instalment, you leave in the hands of the government \$9,000,000 to which add the \$12,000,000 of Treasury notes, and you have a surplus of 21,000,000 of dollars—not to meet the wants of the government, but to be deposited in your sub-treasuries. I have another and an insuperable objection to this bill. The States will receive the fund in the bills of the State banks. The General Government will not, and cannot, receive it but in specie. The officers of the government will be constrained by law to demand it in specie. They will be constrained by that which, with them, is stronger than laws or constitutions—by party obligations and an irresistible necessity to play out the desperate game they have commenced. I will not arm them with this terrible power over the deposit banks in their mad and ferocious experiment of a metallic currency. I would sooner see the whole amount of the fund sunk in the ocean, than the wide-wasting ruin which a demand on these banks for \$12,000,000 in specie will produce. At the very moment that you are asked to adopt a measure which must lead to this pressure on the deposit banks and their debtors, it is recommended farther to indulge the merchants on their bonds. Why this discrimination? If you press the deposit banks, is not a corresponding pressure upon their debtors inevitable? Why, I ask, are they to be pressed, when the merchants are to be indulged on their bonds? I would at this time press neither. These considerations bring up at once the sub-treasury scheme and the metallic currency. They are all cognate branches of the same system of measures, and one of them cannot be properly considered disconnected with the others.

As to this new expedient of sub-treasuries, I am opposed to it in any and every form in which it can be presented. This new expedient, yes, sir, the old word experiment is somewhat odious; I have not heard it from the mouth of an administration man for some months. No, sir, it is an ugly word: I fear that if the present regime is to continue, one half of the words of our language will become equally odious. I like this new word better. It is singularly appropriate. It is one evidence of a better state of things—that the Jack Cade banner, which has been for eight long years floating over us, with the motto "hang all the school-masters," has been lowered. The meaning of this word "expedient" is "means employed in an exigency." If our whole language had been searched, a word more singularly significant could not have been found. But I cannot consent, by this dangerous expedient, to relieve our rulers from an exigency into which they have been led by confident folly and reckless ignorance. I have been too long denouncing this scheme of sub-treasuries as a tremendous engine of power and corruption to support it now, although

it may be called by another name. By giving to a coiled anaconda a harmless name, I will not be induced to lay my head upon it. It is said that this is not a sub-treasury system. Indeed! Will some gentleman inform me what has hitherto been understood by a sub-treasury system? Will he give some definition of such a system which does not describe that which is proposed to do? It is the very system which was first suggested by a very worthy gentleman with a very savage name, (Mr. Gouge,) with the exception that it does not specially direct the sliding shelves and hydrostatic balances. In every important particular, in every point of political danger, in surrendering to the President the unlimited control of the public purse, it is the precise system which, a few short months since, was so generally and justly denounced. It is, sir, a sub-treasury system; I go farther—it is not only the embryo, it is the living form and shape and substance of a government bank, and that in its most dangerous form. Sir, it is one of the most melancholy signs of the times. The sword of the government was absolutely surrendered to the late President. The present incumbent not being exactly the man to wield the sword of Achilles, as if in the very wantonness of a surrender of every guaranty of public liberty, it is now proposed to surrender to him an instrument more compatible, but not less powerful—the purse of the country. Is any patriot willing, on the eve of a warmly contested election, (in the city of New York for example,) upon which the destiny of the republic may depend, to trust five millions of the public money, with the power and the temptation to use it, in the hands of one man—and that one man the appointee of the President, whose very bread may depend upon the result of that election, as it may turn in favor or against the administration? Suppose a wicked and ambitious man filling the Presidential chair, (and these are things to be looked to and guarded against, for confidence is not a republican virtue,) will he not place at the head of these treasuries his own corrupt minions and parasites? Are you willing to place in his hands twenty millions, to corrupt your people and perpetuate his power? I said, sir, that it was in fact a bank. I care not by what name you may designate it. It is admitted to have that character, as a place of deposit. Will the system not also necessarily involve the business of discount on exchange? How are your funds to be transferred from places where they are redundant, to places where they are none? By hauling money from New York—says to Pittsburg? No, sir, but by drafts or bills. These bills will be bought at a premium, when above par; at less, when below par. What power of speculation and fraud do you not thus place in the hands of your agents? How many losses shall we not suffer, from bills thus purchased and not paid? Who is to lose, in such cases—the government or the agent? We shall have hundreds of applications to release our agents from such liabilities, of the same character as the famous Purviance claim. But it may be said that transfers will be made by drawing drafts on those places where the funds most accumulate. Does not every one see, by whatever name you may call it, that this will make of the agency in New York a great central power, around which the whole system must revolve, dependent upon it for light, heat, and motion? Then as to issue. It is not proposed that the drafts of these agencies, and the Treasury notes about to be issued, shall be the currency? It will then be a bank of issue, deposit, and discount, and in its worst form, with greater insecurity, greater power and temptation to speculation and dishonesty, and greater facility of using the government funds for corrupt electioneering purposes, than with a bank at Washington, with branches distributed all over the country; as the security against all these is greater with an institution with twelve men to manage it than with one.

Why, sir, shall we be driven into this dangerous and untried expedient, when, to say nothing of other plans, that of special deposits with the banks is better in every possible point of view? In Spain, where a system of sub-treasuries exists, it is estimated that not more than one fourth of the revenue received ever finds its way into the public treasury. In France, not more than half. The banks will be more cheap depositories, all will admit; more secure; as the responsibility of the banks will be greater than that which can be secured from a private individual. The facilities of transfers of the public funds will be greater, and the risk and the patronage less. Let me state a case; and stating it, furnishes the answer. Two millions are deposited with a sub-treasurer, who is the appointee of the President, of the same political party, and dependent for his support upon his salary—say \$3,000; and for that upon the President. The same amount is deposited with a bank of a million capital, receiving the same compensation, to be divided amongst a thousand stockholders;

ers; over which is the President likely to wield the greatest power? Would special deposits with the banks increase their power? I cannot, for the life of me, see how. But the banks, it is said, are not to be trusted. Is this true, sir? Will any man rise in his place, and say that he would fear to deposit his own money, jewels, or plate, in a bank, or that he would have the slightest doubt of having them restored to him on application? But the banks have stopped payment: they are therefore broken. Is an inability to pay specie equivalent to insolvency? Between man and man is it so regarded? Does he who holds the note of his neighbor for one hundred dollars, who is worth one hundred thousand, regard his debtor as insolvent, or his debt insecure, because he has not the hundred dollars in specie? The promise of a bank to pay is no more than that of an individual. It is a promise which places it in the power of the creditor, in both cases, to exact specie, or to sacrifice the property of the debtor if he fails to pay it; with this decided advantage on the part of the bank, that the creditor is fully informed of the condition of the bank, and well knows that the bank has more notes out than it has specie, and more than in times of panic and apprehension can, by any possibility, be commanded. The credit is not given on the faith of the bank having specie, but that it has property, or, what is the same thing, lies upon the property of its debtors, to meet its engagements; that property, being a measure of the value of which constitutes the great value of specie, and to buy which, specie is alone wanted.

Take as an example the condition of the deposit banks in the State of New York. They had, at the date of our last annual Treasury report, \$4,087,678 in specie, to meet demands upon them of \$4,737,475; and yet knowing this, the Secretary made his deposits, and gave to Congress the most confident assurances that the public money was safe. So it was, sir, not because the banks could pay all their obligations in specie, but because they could pay, and have paid, nearly the whole amount in that which alone was expected.

The banks not only acted wisely and honestly in stopping at the time they did, but they would not have acted thus if they had continued to pay until their last dollar was exhausted. It would have given a preference to some bill-holders and depositors over others—that very preference which it is the object of a bankrupt system to prevent; and might, besides, have put it out of their power to pay their other debtors any thing. No, sir, the banks are not only entitled to the approbation, but to the gratitude of the country; and that they have received both, is conclusively shown by the fact that every-where the people have abstained from the exercise of their power to coerce payments in specie. They have stood nobly have they stood—between the people and general bankruptcy. They have done more: they have enabled our merchants to save their own high character and that of the country from the infamy of paying their debts by wilful and fraudulent bankruptcy—a course recommended to them by those, and the organs of those, in high places.

But, Mr. Speaker, the insolent effrontery of these charges upon the banks must excite a just indignation, when it is seen that every single act imputed by the Government to the banks as a crime, has been committed by that very Government, not only without excuse, but with aggravated enormity. The Government has stopped paying specie, when it is unquestionably in its power to do it. It may at any day raise funds in specie by loan; the banks cannot. The Government, whilst it refuses to pay its debts in specie, demands specie of its debtors; the banks only demand the same currency that they pay. Take the conduct of the Government in the matter of the French indemnity; that indemnity, rather than delay which for three months, until the meeting of the French Chambers, we were well nigh being involved in war. After it was obtained, instead of allowing the claimants to draw for it, and have the premium of a foreign bill on their own money, it is delayed for a year, that it may be brought home in specie, at the expense of the premium, the delay, and the expense of transportation. When it arrives, it is paid in specie to the claimants by the Government, their mere agents? Oh no, sir, but in paper; and the very next day the man who was refused his own specific money, if he owes to the Government, (yesterday his debtor and refusing to pay specie,) is forced to pay his own debt to the Government in specie. If the banks had been guilty of conduct so flagrant and flagitious, what shouts of indignation should we not have heard from one end of the Union to the other? But the banks have shipped specie to England—a charge, I believe, wholly without evidence; but, if true, has not the Government done the very same thing? Has it not very lately paid a debt to the Barings in specie—to those odious Barings, who have been guilty of the