

# THE BIBLICAL RECORDER.

J. MEREDITH, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR.

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## TERMS.

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From the Christian Reflector.

TO THE REV. RICHARD FULLER D. D.

## LETTER V.

MY DEAR BROTHER.—In my last letter I attempted an examination of the argument derived from the Old Testament in favor of slavery. It becomes me next to consider the manner in which this institution is treated in the New Testament. Before, however, I do this, it will be proper to offer a few suggestions on the subject of expediency. This topic, as I am aware, is introduced only incidentally into the discussion. Nevertheless as it is liable to embarrass our judgments in the further prosecution of this inquiry, I propose briefly to consider it in this place.

It gives me great pleasure to declare that I cheerfully and heartily coincide with you in the spirit and intention of your remarks on this subject. I admire the indignation with which you repel the suspicion that the Saviour or his apostles would, for the sake of escaping persecution, shun to declare the whole counsel of God. I sympathize in the scorn with which you contemplate that craven spirits, which, while it "speaks great swelling words," yet has "men's persons in admiration because of advantage." I know of nothing more utterly contemptible. Disgraceful however as it is every where, it is specially so in the Christian church, and more than all in the Christian ministry. We have all seen the evils of this sort of expediency. It has too frequently brought the ministry of the gospel into contempt in the eyes of all honorable and high-minded men. Holding their views I should be thoroughly ashamed if any thing that I have ever said or written, has justly led any one to suppose that I consider our Lord or his apostles capable of so unmanly a wickedness.

Or again, suppose that while I myself hold firmly to the doctrines of the gospel, I, from the fear of popular clamor, adopt means for advancing what I believe to be truth, of which my conscience and reason disapprove. In this case also I do wickedly. I obey men rather than God. I ruin men's souls rather than incur their displeasure. I do, as by the command of God, what I do not believe that he has commanded, and do this because my fellow-men desire it. I am guilty, and to God I must answer it.

In these instances, and in all such as these, it is vain to plead that I desire to do good, that I wish to advance the cause of truth, or that I wish to preserve my influence for the sake of using it on some other occasion. God does not choose to be served by abandoning his service, and serving man in his place. He has not commanded us to serve him by doing wickedness. Our influence is not more valuable than truth and righteousness. When we can only preserve it by doing wrong, it is clear that God does not intend us to hold it any longer; and we cannot hold it longer, except on the peril of our souls.

A third, expediency may become wicked, not only by doing an act in itself wrong, but by doing an act in itself innocent, from an imperfect motive. We have a striking illustration of this in the case of the apostles, Peter and Paul. In the first commencement of the gospel dispensation, when Judaism was fading, but had not yet entirely vanished away, there was a considerable mingling of the Jewish rites with Christianity. Many of the sincere believers in Jesus, from the force of old association, adhered to the rites of Judaism; looking upon them as by no means obligatory, but yet pleasant and perhaps profitable. And yet more, as the Jews would much more readily hear the truth from one who respected their law than from a Gentile, a concession to their prejudices, for their own good, was in many cases innocent. The innocence, however, depended wholly on the motive. Peter, from the fear of man, was led into sin. He conformed to the Mosaic ritual, to avoid the offence of the cross; and so acted as to lead men to believe that he considered its rites and ceremonies as of yet binding obligation. For this cause Paul rebuked him to the face, in the presence of them all, because he was to be blamed. Yet Paul himself circumcised Timothy, kept the feast of Pentecost, and in many other cases yielded obedience to the law. What then was the difference in the moral character of the actions?—Simply this, Paul yielded this obedience for the good of others, every where, and at all times, setting the grounds on which he acted, and, in the face of all opposition, and in despite of the bitterest persecution, contending that Christ having fulfilled the law, it was no longer binding obligation upon the Jews, or upon any other men. Peter, on the contrary, for the sake of avoiding persecution, kept the law, and urged the Gentiles to keep it, as though it were still an ordinance of God, and as if our salvation depended on the keeping of it. No man ever understood this distinction better than the apostle Paul, and no man ever acted upon it with more promptness or precision. He circumcised Timothy, in order to render him more acceptable as a preacher of the gospel to the Jews. But, when the performance of this rite upon Titus was pressed upon the apostle as a matter of moral obligation, he utterly refused to do it, and that because of false brethren, who desired to bring the disciples into bondage; to whom, says he indignantly, "we gave place by subjection, no, not for an

We see then clearly, that simple expediency, that is, the use of the means suitable to accomplish an end, is in itself innocent; that it may be commendable, and that the want of it may justly excuse us to censure. On the other hand, it is equally evident that expediency may be mean, contemptible, cowardly and wicked. In what manner, then, may these two cases be distinguished from each other?

The end which we desire to accomplish may be either bad or good. As however no means which we use to accomplish a bad end can be innocent, we may at once dismiss this class of cases from our consideration. The question then will be reduced to the following: Under what circumstances is expediency in the accomplishment of a good end wicked, and under what circumstances is it innocent?

We have seen that expediency, in itself, is not only innocent, but that it may be even commendable. When it is wicked the wickedness lies in its arising from some cause aside from the fact that the act seems to be expedient. In other words, then, expediency is wicked when the act which we deem expedient is in itself wicked; or when the act itself is performed from a wicked motive. When neither of these is the case, when it does not violate any moral law, either in act or in motive, it is innocent as any other. And moreover, we see that these two qualities of the act are entirely distinct from each other. Let an act seem ever so expedient, this does not affect its moral character. If it be wicked, it is just as wicked as if it did not seem expedient; if it be virtuous, it is just as virtuous whether it seem to be expedient or not.

Let us now illustrate this distinction by a reference to some of the cases in which expediency clearly partakes of one or the other of these characters.

I may for instance desire to promulgate the knowledge of the gospel among the heathen; and, in order to convince them of its truth, I perform before them pious frauds, and work false miracles. I may suppose that by so doing I shall convert men's souls. But I have done wickedly. I have lied; and more than this, I have lied in the name of the Most High God. Again, suppose I wish to increase the interest of the public at home in the cause of missions, or any other scheme of benevolence, and I utter exaggerated statements, tell stories which I know to be false, or which I have no reason to believe to be true, and do this for the sake of advancing the cause; this also is wicked. It is a sheer lie just as much when uttered to support a good cause, as a bad one. The cause makes it no better, and my hypocrisy makes it worse.

Again, suppose that I understand the Scriptures to reveal a particular system of truth to the human race, and I profess to be moved by the Holy Ghost to enforce this truth upon my fellow-men. I however think that I can make it more acceptable to them by withholding a part of it, or by adding to it, or by modifying the whole or any part of it. In so doing I am guilty of a great wickedness. God has authorized me to preach the preaching that he bids me, and no other; to preach the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. I am guilty of telling a lie in his name, of usurping the prerogative of the Most High, and for the consequence of my sin I am responsible in his sight.

Or again, suppose that I understand the revelation which he has given, but I fear that to deliver it just as he has revealed it, will expose me to persecution, or will endanger my property, my influence, my reputation, or my life; and I, from the fear of consequences to myself, abridge, or alter, or modify the message which God has given me; in this case again I do wickedly. I violate the commandment of my Maker, and I prefer my temporal happiness to the will of God, and the eternal salvation of the soul of my fellow-men. I deny Christ before men, and he will deny me before the angels of God.

Or again, suppose that while I myself hold firmly to the doctrines of the gospel, I, from the fear of popular clamor, adopt means for advancing what I believe to be truth, of which my conscience and reason disapprove. In this case also I do wickedly. I obey men rather than God. I ruin men's souls rather than incur their displeasure. I do, as by the command of God, what I do not believe that he has commanded, and do this because my fellow-men desire it. I am guilty, and to God I must answer it.

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"we gave place by subjection, no, not for an hour, that the truth of the gospel might continue with you."

Such are some of the cases in which the acting from expediency involves moral guilt, and frequently guilt of no ordinary turpitude. Let us now examine some of the cases in which expediency may be employed innocently. I suppose they may all be comprehended under the following rule. We may innocently employ any means for the accomplishment of our purposes, which are innocent in themselves, and which we employ with a virtuous intention.

Let us examine a few cases which come under this rule.

Supposing that I am communicating to another a system of truth or of duty. I think that he will be most likely to be influenced by my teaching, if I unfold my views gradually, allowing one portion to work its part of the change which I hope to effect, before I introduce another. Is there the violation of any moral law? am I obliged to present the truth in such a manner as

will be most likely to ensure its entire rejection?

Am I not bound, in such a case, to consult the dictates of my own reason, and the best good of him whom it is my duty to benefit? The Bible is filled with cases of just such expediency as this. The gradual development of the truths of revelation under the several dispensations, illustrate it on the widest possible scale, and show that the Deity frequently allows ages to intervene between the discovery of one truth and the discovery of the next which is intimately associated with it. Our Saviour discloses his doctrines to his disciples, as their minds expanded to receive them. Even at the close of his ministry he affirmed, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now." John 16:12. To precisely the same effect is the saying of the apostle to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 3:1, 2. "And I, brethren, could not speak to you as unto spiritual but as unto carnal, even as unto babes in Christ. I have fed you with milk and not with meat; for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, nor now are ye able." Here the apostle distinctly recognizes the principle that he delivered divine truth to the Corinthians, not in its totality, but in such portions and in such manner, as the weakened understandings and benighted consciences of his hearers would enable them to receive it. This, then, is, undoubtedly, a proper and innocent use of expediency.

But again, there may be a choice not only in respect to the succession of the several parts, but also in respect to the manner in which the whole or any part of the truth shall be presented. Thus, for instance, suppose that in the discussion of the subject of slavery there were no wrong in applying opprobrious epithets to fellow-citizens, and to Christian brethren; insomuch as the use of these epithets would disunite men to receive what we believe to be the truth, would not both wisdom as well as Christian charity suggest the expediency of laying them aside?

Again, it is frequently the case that we wish to incite a duty upon another, to which he is particularly adverse, and of which the obligation depends upon principles with which he is not familiar. In such a case while he will not hear on for a moment to the present he is willing reluctantly to consider the principles on which it is founded. In such a case, I see no reason why I may not incite the principle, and leave it to work out its result, instead of directly inciting the precept. For instance, I find a man violently enraged, and burning with vindictiveness towards another who has injured him. It is his duty to forgive the offender. But the suggestion of this duty might only enrage him the more. May I not then, instead of inciting the duty directly, unfolded to him our relations to God, how much we have sinned against him, how much we all need his forgiveness, and how much and how often we have all offended our brethren and needed their forgiveness? I well know, that if these sentiments once gain possession of his mind, his wrath will be quelled, and he will not dare to ask forgiveness of God until he has exercised forgiveness to his brother. This is almost precisely what our Lord himself has done, when he taught charity to the Pharisees with whom he was dining, Luke 14:34-35. So when he was called upon to interfere in the case of the brother who was defrauded of his inheritance, Luke 12:13-20. This also he incites the duty of forgiveness, Matt. 18:23-35. Here he gives a very general precept, and explains the principle at length. A beautiful instance of this kind of expediency is also seen in 2 Cor. 8th chapter. St. Paul is desirous of inciting upon the Corinthians the duty of liberality. He does not, however, as he had a right to do, make use of his apostolic authority; he does not demand this or that portion of their income; but he merely tells them what other churches had done, and adds, "we know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, though he was rich, yet for your sakes became poor, that ye through his poverty might become rich." Indeed, if we were disposed to generalize this idea, we might easily show that the gospel of Christ is rather a system of principles than of precepts. It is a treasure house of elementary and all controlling moral truth. This truth it presents to the understanding, and impresses upon the conscience, leaving it to every individual to carry it into practice according to the peculiarities of his individual situation, provided only he do it honestly, earnestly, with pure love to God and ardent charity to man.

This form of expediency, the inciting of a fundamental truth, rather than the duty which sprang immediately out of it, seems to me innocent. I go farther. In some cases it may be really demanded. Thus, suppose a particular wrong to have become a social evil, to have become interwoven with the whole framework of society, and to have given place by subjection, no, not for an hour, that the truth of the gospel might continue with you.

and to be established by positive enactment and immemorial usage. Suppose that all departments of society have become adjusted to it, and that much instruction was necessary before any party could avail themselves of the advantages of a righteous change. Suppose also that the whole community was ignorant of the moral principles by which both the wrong was condemned, and the right established. In such a case the wrong could only be abolished by changing the sentiments and enlightening the consciences of the whole community. Here it seems to me that it would be not only allowable, but a matter of imperative duty, to inculcate the principles on which the duty rested, rather than the duty itself. The duty being fixed in the mind, would necessarily produce the other; and thus the end would in the most certain manner be accomplished.

It is in this manner that the New Testament has generally dealt with the various forms of social evil. Take for instance civil government. At the time of Christ and his apostles, the only form of government known in the civilized world, was a most abominable and oppressive tyranny. Yet the New Testament utters no precept in regard to forms of government, or the special duties of rulers. It goes further. It commands men every where to obey the powers that be, so far as this could be done with a good conscience towards God. But it at the same time inculcates those truths concerning the character, rights, responsibilities, and obligations of man, which have been ever since working out the freedom of the human race; and which have received, as I believe, their fullest development in the principles of the American Declaration of Independence. Indeed, in no other manner could the New Testament have become a system of religion for the whole human race, adapted to meet the varying aspects of human depravity. If it had merely taught precept, whatever was not forbidden must have been taken as permitted. Hence, unchecked wickedness would soon have abounded, and the reign of God must have become a nullity. But by teaching principles of universal application, it is prepared to meet every rising form of moral deviation, and its authority is now as all pervading as at the moment when it was first delivered.—Our Saviour, as it appears to me, carries out this principle to the utmost, when, setting aside as it were all other precept, he declares that our whole duty is summed in these two commandments, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself; for this is the law and the prophets; that is, I suppose him to mean the cherishing these principles in our hearts and carrying them out into all our actions, we shall do the whole will of God without any other precept.

I have thus, my dear brother, endeavored in as distinct a manner as I am able to develop my views on the subject of expediency. I have done it with great diffidence, because I know it is one from a misconception of which great misunderstanding is likely to arise. It seemed however to be required by the nature of our discussion, and I hope that what I have suggested may throw some little light upon the subject. I know of but few points in controversy which at the present moment require a more thorough examination. It is from a misconception here that Jesuitism has arisen on the one hand, and fanaticism on the other. The Jesuit, whether Protestant or Catholic, believes himself at liberty to use any devices whatever, to accomplish a good design; or in other words, that the end sanctifies the means. The fanatic, provided his end be good, considers himself at liberty to deride the dictates of reason, and use the means which have the least possible tendency to accomplish the end which he has in view. He decares that he has no regard for consequences. He seems however to forget that the end which he has in view is a consequence, and that it must be a consequent, that is, an effect of certain causes, which, in the providence of God, are ordained to produce it. If therefore he has no regard to consequences, and sets in action causes without regard to their effects, he is as likely to produce any other end as that which he intends. I think, besides, it may sometimes be observed that while men are so entirely reckless of the consequences of their conduct upon the cause which they espouse, they are not at all unmindful of the consequences to themselves, and not unfrequently pursue the same courses which shrewd, selfish and intriguing men adopt, to advance by means of the cause their own personal interests.

But I am wandering from the subject immediately before us, and will therefore close by assuring you that I am, with the greatest personal esteem and Christian affection, yours very truly,

THE ACTION OF THE MORAL SCIENCE.

## RUINS OF NINEVEH.

An interesting account of the researches and excavations now in progress, under the superintendence of the French consul, among the ruins of Mosul, on the mounds of ancient Nineveh, is given in a letter from the Rev. M. Laurie, dated August 8, 1844, published in the *Missionary Herald* for February. The mound of Khorabad, at present in process of excavation, stands in one corner of an enclosed area about one mile square, the walls of which are similar to those near Mosul. They are mere elongated tumuli, with remains of towers at various distances, and originally faced externally with large square stones. The top of the mound is flat, and between six and seven hundred pieces in circumference. Eleven rooms have been excavated, the largest of which is one hundred feet in length by thirty in width. The walls are very thick, and are formed of two masses of earth interlaid with masses of earth. Each block of stone is ten feet high, and one foot thick. They vary in breadth. On their surfaces are figures executed in bas relief. Some occupy the whole height of the wall; others are in double rows, with a broad inscription between.

Mr. Laurie writes—"The sculptures represent a variety of objects. In one place is a royal feast, with chairs and tables in European style. In another they prosecute a siege; and while some use the battering ram, or advance under the testudo, others fire the gates, while the devoted defenders fall transplanted from the walls. In one instance, a row of figures in front of the fortress, are impaled by the breast. In another dead bodies and heads trunks are seen floating down the river that flows in front of the beleaguered fortress.

The names of most of these castles are inscribed upon them. Elsewhere, captives loaded with chains approach the conqueror on bended knee; and the executioner, standing by a pile of heads, waits with uplifted sword, the nod that is to decide the fate of each one as he passes by. One room is entirely occupied with a royal hunt. The king's chariot is driven through the fortress; birds perch on the trees; deer run beneath them, and the tiniest hare fly at their approach. Slaughtered game bears testimony to the success of the hunters, some of whom are seen carrying it in their hands.

The most remarkable sculptures, however, are those at the gates. There are passed on each side by a five-footed monster, of gigantic proportions. To the body of a bull fifteen feet high and eighteen in length, is attached an immense human head. The side of the bull is concealed by wings, which spring from his shoulder; and the fifth foot was made