

THE WHIG CLARION.

H. W. HUSTED, EDITOR.]

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FROM THE REGISTER.

HILLSBORO', August 5, 1843.

Mr. GALES:—A Communication of the Hon. R. M. Saunders, in the Standard, referring to my Letter to you of the 22d July, requires some notice from me.

In the Speech of that gentleman at Raleigh, he affirmed "the table of 'Post Office distances,' to be the rule by which the mileage of members of Congress should be estimated, and having produced that Document, he declared that Messrs. Rayner, Stanly, and many other members of Congress had received excessive allowances for mileage, and that any one would discover this who should compare the table of distances with the accounts of these members.

That the Post Office Table furnishes no rule on the subject of the mileage of members, I said in my letter to you; and the correctness of my position will be apparent from several considerations. First, from the language of the Act of Congress giving the mileage. It provides that each Senator and Representative shall receive "eight dollars for every twenty miles of estimated distance by the most usual road," &c. Most usual for what! for transporting the mail!—surely not—but most usual for travelling by the public conveyances. This is evident from a subsequent provision in the same law, in these words "and each member of the Senate shall be entitled to the same, &c., allowance for, &c., travelling to and from any meeting of the Senate," &c. It is an allowance for travelling, to be computed, not by the distance actually travelled, but by that usually travelled by the public conveyances.

Secondly—from the Retrenchment Bill, of Mr. Arnold, for supporting which Gen. Saunders seems to think himself entitled to special commendation; for one of the amendments proposed by that Bill was to make the Post Office estimate, the rule for computing mileage in future—a provision useless, and indeed absurd, if it had been the rule already.

Thirdly—from the uniform action of the members and officers of the two Houses for more than twenty years, by none of whom (except General Saunders) is it believed that the Post Office Table was deemed to furnish the rule; but on the contrary, by all of them the usual route of travel was considered the only proper guide. But we now learn from Gen. Saunders, that the table, *per se*, is not the rule, but the table corrected by ascertaining the true distance of travel. The General it seems wrote to the Postmaster General, and learned that in his own case, the table and the fact did not agree, and he, in consequence of this information, charged not according to the table, but according to the supposed fact. Now when the General wrote to the Post Master as to his own case, did he consult him as to the proper distances of Messrs. Rayner, Stanly, and the other members referred to? If so, why did he not give the result of those inquiries? If, as I suppose, he did not do this; then in the only case in which he consulted the Postmaster General, he found that the table was erroneous, and he himself disregarded it. Why, then, did he propose that as the rule for others, by which he had not governed himself—and why did he assume the estimates of a table to be right as against others, which by the only instance in which their correctness had been tested, he himself had found to be erroneous. This was bringing forward evidence to accuse others, which he knew was not worthy of trust; it was requiring them to submit to a rule by which he was not willing to govern himself—and it was more than this. As Gen. S. affirmed the Post Office table to be the true rule of calculation, and condemned others for exceeding its estimate, while he gave no intimation that he had rejected it in his own case, was it not the natural inference of all that heard him, that his own account had been settled by that rule which he had just declared to be the true one? Whether Gen. S. designed to produce this inference, which he knew was contrary to the truth, he only can determine. This much, however, is certain—he alleged the rule, condemned others for not adhering to it, and was at the same time perfectly silent as to the fact that he had disregarded it.

The table of Post Office distances being thus set aside as a governing rule, in the calculation of mileage, both by the confession and practice of Gen. Saunders himself, it is difficult to understand why a Committee, consisting of the General and the Postmaster, should be a more appropriate medium of adjusting the mileage, than was furnished by the consultation of the Secretary of the Senate and myself. The Postmaster was not an Officer of Congress—neither the law nor the practice of that body gave him any power of in-

terference; he had nothing to do with it; and the General might just as well have called to his assistance any Clerk in the General Post Office, as the head of that Department. The difference then between the General and myself is merely this—I resorted to the usual and proper mode of estimating the distance, and he to one which though not improper, was certainly unusual. I see no reason to admit that the result in his case was accurate rather than in mine; but, if it were so, my effort was as sincere as his, and a mistaken calculation, I presume, even the General himself will admit, constitutes no offence.

The other charge made against me in the Standard and endorsed by Gen. Saunders, he alleges that I have evaded—but this allegation like most others that he has introduced into his gratuitous and unprovoked attack upon me, is without foundation. That charge, as I understood it, was, that while paid for the whole extra Session, I came home to attend a Superior Court. Knowing that I did not come home to attend any Court during the extra Session, and that I had left Washington before the close of the Executive Session, of the Senate in the Spring of 1841, and did attend a Court, I naturally supposed this absence was the subject of reference. I answered the charge supposed to have been made, by stating that I was present at the close of the extra Session, and though I left the Senate while in Executive Session in the Spring, yet my pay stopped with my departure. This the General considers but a small affair, and supposes I might have lost a day's pay. If he had been as careful to ascertain and to recollect facts, as he seems to have been intent on making charges, he might have learned that the Executive Session referred to continued from the 5th to the 15th of March, and that I left Washington a full week before its termination.

The charge, I now learn is, that I was absent on some other occasion, and without deduction of pay. I was absent once during the extra Session. I came home on an occasion of indisposition in my family of the deepest interest to me as a father and a husband. Finding, on reaching home, that the crisis was over, I took the very next Stage on my return to Washington. My absence lasted six days, of which period four days and nights were spent on the road. I consulted with a friend as to the propriety of deducting pay for these days of fatigue, expense and anxiety, but was told that under the circumstances, my absence was not voluntary, but compelled by a necessity which fell under the equity of that provision of law which allows pay to an absent member detained by sickness. This view struck me as correct, and I acted accordingly, and I very much doubt whether either for the absence or the pay, any honorable man in the United States will deem an excuse required.

As Gen. Saunders seems to have made an investigation somewhat particular into my absences from Congress, it is not uncharitable to suppose that when he alluded to my hurried journey home, he was informed of the necessity which caused it. Why did he withhold that information from those to whom he made the charge of absence? Why, but because he knew that to have communicated that information, would have been to fasten attention upon the difference between a short absence, under the influence of considerations having the force of physical coercion, and a long and voluntary absence in the prosecution of a lucrative profession, and would thus have made his charge against me recoil upon himself.

As to Mr. Arnold's Bill, of which the General seems a great admirer and advocate, and which he has drawn rather unnecessarily, as appears to me, into this discussion, I have but a few words to say. I was opposed to that Bill as a whole, because it proposed a very large deduction from the pay of all Officers, Civil and Military, which is within the control of Congress, and because it proposed no reduction of the pay of the Congress who were to pass it, but a very large reduction of the pay of their successors. The first would have been a cruel injury to a large class of meritorious public servants, and the second provision made us to be generous to the country not at our own expense, but at the expense of those who should come after us. I thought besides, that the compensation of members was not excessive and ought not to be reduced, but I was very decidedly in favor of fixing a common criterion by which to determine mileage. Whether my views were correct or not, they were certainly adopted without the bias of interest, for it was then ascertained that I was not to be a member of the ensuing Congress, and the passage of the Bill would not have affected my own interests a penny.

But surely the self-complacency of Gen. Saunders in the support he gave to this Bill rests on a

very slender foundation; for if the present rate of compensation be not excessive, why should it be reduced at all? And if it be, why should not the reduction be applied to those who judged it excessive?

One other remark, Sir, and I will encroach no farther on your columns. When Gen. Saunders in his Raleigh Speech, at which I was present, produced the Post Office table—announced it to be the rule by which mileage should be estimated—accused several members of Congress by name who were absent, with overcharging, and referred his auditory to the book and accounts for proof—the inference was inevitable, that he had been engaged in the laudable business of making the examination, to which he invited others. When afterwards in another Address, at which I was not present, he added my name to those which he had before singled out for accusation, it was certainly not an overstrained inference, that I was in the first instance omitted because I was present, and in the second named because I was absent. That such conduct deserved to be called *unmanly*, none surely could doubt, and to some, might seem to merit a harsher epithet. But it seems the inference I so naturally drew was mistaken, and that the discovery as to myself was made after the Raleigh Speech was delivered. I am glad to learn that it is so, and desire to express my felicitations to the General, that the continual succession of his electioneering appointments yet left him leisure to pore over the table of Post Office distances—that each day of diligent inquiry added somewhat to his store of matter for villification; and though I cannot praise the spirit which prompted his efforts, his industry is undeniably entitled to commendation.

And I think, Sir, I may congratulate myself, that after all his energy of inquisition, he has been able to produce but two charges—one supported by a proof which he himself has discredited, and the other which, if he deems an offence, he is the only man in America who would.

Of the flourish about facing with which the General very appropriately and characteristically concludes his note, I shall say nothing, because it deserves no reply, which it would become me to make.

I am Sir, very respectfully,

Your obt. serv't

WILL: A. GRAHAM.

THE TARIFF AND THE SUGAR INTEREST.

The New Orleans papers are engaged in discussing the subject of the Tariff as it relates to the duty on sugar. The free-trade advocates are labouring to show that they are not opposed to the sugar duty; but they maintain that it is a revenue duty only, although protection results from it. In point of principle they are hostile to protection; the 'democratic' doctrine requires that they should be. The practical application of this doctrine, however, seems to be that they are to oppose protection to all interests except their own.

In answer to a letter from R. C. NICHOLAS, Esq. of Louisiana, on this subject of protection to the sugar interest, Mr. CALHOUN says:

"I concur in most of your views and reflections on the identity of interest (fairly considered) between cotton and sugar; and, as far as my principles will admit, will see full justice done to the latter, to the extent that it can be effected by my exertions. I can, however, agree to no duty but such as the revenue may require; and none so high on any article as will push it beyond the greatest amount of revenue that can be derived from the article. These are the limits within which I may act, and within them exercise a sound discretion. But, in determining the amount of revenue required, I shall expect economy and retrenchment on the part of those having the control, as far as public policy may permit; and that no part of the public revenue shall be given away. Observing these rules, and with the scope they will admit, I shall take pleasure in PROTECTING your great staple against the machinations of the opponents of slave labor. They are ever on the watch, and stand ready to seize every opportunity to render our labor worthless, and to weaken our title to our property."

Now if revenue duties are laid for protection; if under an ostensible denunciation of the Tariff the real benefits of the Tariff are sought, is it not evident that grave statesman, preaching up free trade in theory and condemning it in practice, are playing a petty game of artifice, which high minded men should disdain? Protection within the lim-

its of the revenue standard! What does that mean? Who is to define that standard?—The duty on sugar at this moment is nearly one hundred per cent. Is that revenue duty? If so, the most ultra protectionist need not desire any higher rate of duties than the revenue rate. Yet the opponents of the Tariff in Louisiana, while they denounce protection, the Whigs and HENRY CLAY in one breath, are upholding the sugar duty and complaining that it is not high enough.

If the professions of the "free trade" men are sincere why do they advocate a higher rate of duty upon sugar than upon tea or coffee? The answer which must be given to this question cannot but be a direct refutation of their abstract principle; it cannot but be an avowal of the true principle of protection as advocated by the Whigs. Suppose they were imperatively called upon, by a necessity not to be evaded, to lay a duty upon tea or coffee or both, for revenue, as in our judgment ought to be done now. Would they put an impost upon either of these articles as high as the duty now laid on sugar? Would their revenue duty on tea or coffee rise as high as one hundred per cent or near it? We may safely answer, No. We do not grow tea or coffee, and have no home interest in those commodities to protect. And the reason why the duty on sugar is maintained at its present rate, while no duty at all is laid on tea or coffee is, as the planters of Louisiana know very well, because protection is due to their interest as well as to other domestic interests. It is a poor sort of quibbling to evade this, and to talk of revenue duties and free trade in so inconsistent a manner as some do.

But there is another impost included in our Tariff which the free trade men of the South may consider—the duty on raw cotton. Is that a revenue duty? It is not; it is even more than protective in its character; it is a prohibitive duty. If it were removed the cotton of Texas would come largely into our ports. But the Southern members of the last Congress would not allow it to be removed; they would raise a great clamour if it were touched. Revenue! There is not a cent of revenue derived from this duty on foreign cotton. Yet in the face of Mr. CALHOUN'S "principles," of which he speaks to Mr. NICHOLAS, this duty stands; and he himself would object to its being abolished; and the only reason why it stands is because it protects a Southern interest.

As to "the identity of interest (fairly considered) between cotton and sugar," it requires no great amount of investigation to discover it. If the sugar duty were removed, the planters of Louisiana, thrown out of their business as sugar growers, would cultivate cotton, and the increased production thus brought into the market would affect the prices of the article injuriously. The South Carolina planters are aware of this; and let them rave against protection as much as they will, verbally, they will take good care to protect the sugar interest notwithstanding.

When Southern politicians, in their devotion to principles, are ready to destroy protection to their own interests, it will be time to credit their assertions of patriotic opposition to protection in general. Until then let their own inconsistencies answer their arguments; and let them not complain if men of sense smile at their inconsiderate violence, and pay little respect to their professions of sincerity.

A red-haired man went into a barber's shop to have his locks trimmed. The barber's monkey troubled him, and he gave the creature a kick. Jacko revenged himself by gathering up the fire locks, sticking them under the shingles, and blowing away at them as though he would set the house on fire. Moral: red-haired men should not kick monkeys.

At the late Congressional Election in Martin County, a Moore man wrote on the back of his ticket—"This will catch a coon." A Rayner man, standing by, immediately endorsed on his—"This will kill a Terrapin."—Old North State.

THE RULLING PASSION.—A President Judge, not many leagues from Cleveland, Ohio, who has been promoted from the bench to a nomination for Congress, recently close a stump speech with "Gentlemen, you will now retire in charge of the Constable!"