

# THE CENTRAL NEWS-PAPER

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Render Unto Caesar the Things which are Caesar's, Unto God, God's.

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## OFFICIAL DIRECTORY

### NATIONAL FARMERS ALLIANCE AND INDUSTRIAL UNION.

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### DECLARATION OF PURPOSES.

Whereas the general condition of our country imperatively demands unity of action on the part of the laboring classes, reformation in economy, and the dissemination of principles best calculated to encourage and foster agricultural and mechanical pursuits, encouraging the toiling masses—leading them in the road to prosperity, and providing a just and fair remuneration for labor, a just exchange for our commodities, and the best means of securing to the laboring classes the greatest amount of good; we hold to the principle that all monopolies are dangerous to the best interests of our country, tending to enslave a free people and subvert and finally overthrow the great principles purchased by the fathers of American Liberty. We therefore adopt the following as our declaration of principles:

1. To labor for the education of the agricultural classes in the science of economic government in a strictly non-partisan spirit.
2. To inculcate the motto: "In things essential, unity; and in all things, charity."
3. To develop a better state, mentally, morally, socially, and financially.
4. To create a better understanding for sustaining civil officers in maintaining law and order.
5. To constantly strive to secure entire harmony and good will among mankind, and brotherly love among ourselves.
6. To suppress personal, local, sectional and national prejudices, all unhealthful rivalry and selfish ambition.
7. The brightest jewels which it garners are the tears of widows and orphans, and its imperative commands are to visit the homes where lacerated hearts are bleeding; to assuage the sufferings of a brother or sister; bury the dead; care for the widows and educate the orphans; to exercise charity toward offenders; to construe words and deeds in their most favorable light, granting honesty of purpose and good intentions to others; and to protect the principles of the Alliance unto death. Its laws are reason and equity; its cardinal doctrines inspire purity of thought and life; its intention is "one earth peace and good will toward men."

### OCCALA DEMANDS.

1. We demand the abolition of national banks; we demand that the government shall establish sub-treasuries or depositories in the several States which shall loan money direct to the people at a low rate of interest, not to exceed 2 per cent per annum on non-perishable farm products, and also upon real estate, with proper limitations upon the quantity of land and amount of money; we demand that the amount of the circulating medium be speedily increased to not less than \$50 per capita.
2. We demand that Congress shall pass such laws as shall effectually prevent the dealing in futures in all agricultural and mechanical productions; preserving a stringent system of procedure in trials such as shall secure the prompt conviction and imposition of such penalties as shall secure the most perfect compliance with the law.
3. We denounce the silver bill recently passed by Congress, and demand in lieu thereof the free and unlimited coinage of silver.
4. We demand the passage of laws prohibiting alien ownership of land, and that Congress take prompt action to devise some plan to obtain all lands now owned by aliens and foreign syndicates, and that all lands now held by railroad and other corporations in excess of such as is actually used and needed by them, be reclaimed by the government and held for actual settlers only.
5. Believing in the doctrine of equal rights to all and special privileges to none, we demand that our national legislation shall be so framed in the future as not to build up one industry at the expense of another. We further demand a removal of the existing heavy tariff tax from the necessities of life that the poor of our land must have. We further demand a just and equitable system of graduated tax on incomes. We believe that the money of the country should be kept as much as possible in the hands of the people, and hence we demand that all national and State revenues shall be limited to the necessary expenses of the government economically and honestly administered.
6. We demand the most rigid, honest and just State and national governmental control and supervision of the methods of public communication and transportation, and if this control and supervision do not remove the abuse now existing, we demand the government ownership of such means of communication and transportation.

## THE EXTENDED BONDS.

The United States bonds that were continued at 2 per cent are now at a premium of 5 per cent, and are difficult to obtain at that rate. This is a matter that every one, especially the farmers of America, should consider carefully. Just why a bond bearing such a low rate of interest should command such a premium, while nearly all other forms of indebtedness are at a discount or convey a much greater interest, is a question well worthy the attention of all. The farmer knows that in nearly every case where money is borrowed on mortgage security a bonus is paid in addition to the rate of interest named in that instrument. This is really a discount on the mortgage, which rarely exceeds in amount one half the value of the farm.

There must be some good reason for so wide a discrepancy in the investment values of these two forms of indebtedness, since those engaged in this particular branch of business are controlled by facts and experience, and never by sentiment or theory. They may sometimes err in judgment, but all their calculations are based, as a rule, on a sordid desire for gain. Among the probable factors that enter into this premium are their use as a basis for bank issues, the certainty of payment of principal and interest, their being non-taxable, and their acceptability as collateral security. To a majority of people these furnish a satisfactory solution of the problem, and no further investigation is made. While such conditions that may obtain in a loan of this character are taken into account by investors, there are and must be some weightier influences that control the transaction. Bankers declare that national bank issues are no longer profitable, which if true would eliminate that factor from those which conspire to produce this premium. The gain arising from being non-taxable and the payment of interest in advance would not exceed 1 1/2 per cent, which added to the interest named in the bonds, would give a return of only 3 1/2 per cent per annum on the investment. Here, then, is the situation: The most experienced and shrewdest financiers of the country prefer a government bond netting but 3 1/2 per cent interest to a farm mortgage bearing from 8 to 12 per cent, and in many instances even more. May not the reasons for this be found in the rapidly increasing power of money over the products of labor? The certainty of payment when based on the taxing power of government as against the uncertainty of payment when dependent on the prosperity of the people, together with the intimate relations which exist between the financial department of government and the owners of national obligations? Is it not true that 3 1/2 per cent interest now will purchase almost, if not quite, as much as 10 per cent would in 1865 and 1866 of labor products in nearly every line of industry? The interest, however, cuts but a small figure when compared with the principal; while the interest numerically stated is less its purchasing power, so called, has decreased but little if any. Not so with the principal. The \$1,000 loaned in 1866 that would have purchased less than 500 bushels of wheat will at the present time purchase nearly 2,000 bushels. The farmer who mortgaged his farm worth \$10,000 in 1866 for \$5,000 at 10 per cent interest could at that time pay the interest with less than 50 bushels of wheat, and the principal with less than 2,500 bushels. Since that time his interest has been scaled down a trifle, but the principal has remained the same. At the present time it will require about 150 bushels of wheat to pay the interest, over 10,000 to liquidate the principal, and while the farm as a rule would not sell for \$4,000. In this example lies the milk in the coconut. Those who manipulate the currency of the nation have been able to keep the purchasing power of the interest upon which they live about on the same level, knowing full well that the same power is rapidly increasing in the principal, and this, too, without any probability of forfeiture

of interest, non-payment of principal, or depreciation of security. The real incentive, therefore, for investment in government securities lies in "the power of money to oppress" when controlled and manipulated by those who own it. Just so long as government loans are sought for at a low rate of interest, just so long will the people suffer. Just so long as government bonds are at a high premium will the industries languish and the profits of individual effort flow to the owners of money. The remedy for this unfair condition lies in an adequate volume of money, at all times and in all seasons readily accessible to all people.

## THE SEVENTH DEMAND.

The following remarks were made by Senator Turpie in submitting joint resolution of the Indiana legislature, instructing the Senators from that State to vote in favor of submitting an amendment to the Federal Constitution providing for election of United States Senators by the people. This conforms to the seventh demand of the Occala platform, and Senator Turpie's argument will be read with interest by members of the Order:

The question by whom Senators should be chosen does not seem to have been much considered by the framers of the Constitution or by the constituencies to whom it was submitted for adoption. That they should be chosen by the legislatures of the several States was determined almost at once; there was a great deal in the history of that time which led even unconsciously to such a conclusion. It does not seem that there was any debate or division upon the topic as to who should choose United States Senators. The alternative of a choice by the people or the legislature of the States appears not even to have been presented. They did not omit to provide for the contingency that a matter regarded as of minor moment might become, as this is in our age, of great concern. So such things were left by their provident wisdom to the disposal of future advice and after amendment. This is called a government of the people, republican in form, and very justly it may be so called in comparison with many others, especially those in vogue at the time of its establishment. Such a government ought to be one wherein the people should control and more immediately direct the management of public affairs. We are constantly repeating the maxim that the people are the real source of all authority, yet in the actual drift of events there is a tendency to slip away from this source—to deny and to disown it.

The distribution of powers was justly regarded by the framers of our fundamental law as one of the chief safeguards of liberty, and it is within the grasp of their policy and by virtue thereof that tendencies to centralism or absolutism may, by this means, be checked and thwarted. A redistribution of power, that is what this amendment proposes. It relates to a redistribution of power in the present apportionment. There is a certain element in our system which to-day is demanding a larger share of power, as is evidenced by the action of the learned and honorable Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Vilas] in introducing the resolutions of his legislature this morning. They are demanding a larger share, and I may be permitted to say they deserve it. This centralization is always competent by the voluntary suffrage of the people of the States, under the forms of law.

In accordance with this policy of distribution we have been provided with three departments of the government, the legislative, executive and judicial. Of these three under the present form which is controlled by the people? Surely not the judiciary. This whole province of power touches but once its putative source and origin, at the time of appointment, and thereafter it is forever independent of, and indeed, irresponsible to, the people as such. Just as certainly it is not the executive. The head of the department is chosen by electors, who are themselves chosen by the people; but when elected, and after his election, the President and the chiefs of the great administrative sections appointed by him are not at all the subjects of popular regulation or direction.

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There is nothing in the proffered amendment which could detract from the position or influence of members of this body, on the contrary, these would be enhanced. The States as such would lose nothing of dignity, sovereignty, or power. Far is it from my purpose to de-

tract anything from the character or authority of the States. The separate autonomies of the States, at distinct sites and centers of intellectual, social and civic culture, and of various interests, customs, laws and institutions, diversified as the climate and soil which characterize them, have been the chief elements in our national greatness. They have given us a very different policy and a vastly superior career to that which might have been induced by the dull and deadening uniformity of a system of centralization, destructive of local self-government, gathering to one head and focus all political functions. I do not know of a measure better calculated to preserve the separate and equal existence of the States than to give to the people of each the right directly to choose the members of both Houses of Congress.

That central power is indigenous to all forms of government, so alien to the spirit of a free democracy, has always been greatly favored by modes of communication from the State to the Senate and the Senate and the people, modes somewhat devious, indistinct, indefinite. To make the path of this communication straight, to make it a public highway, an open course, unbroken and uninterrupted from the State to the Senate, to State and to the people, would be to inflict a grievous wound upon centralism, and will help to drive monopoly from its noxious lair. To grant to the whole body of electors in a State this senatorial franchise, if you will allow me the word, its extension, must induce and awaken an interest much enlarged, a sense of responsibility very much heightened in the heart and mind of every citizen.

The indomization of the units in a free State if not that of the federal head, but creates and subverts the condition of distinct, independent, personal thought, feeling and action—the unassailable bulwarks of home rule and local sovereignty. The power of each individual voter at his home must diminish the means as it would lessen the opportunity for federal aggression.

Very keen distrust has been sometimes expressed as to the action of legislative bodies in the choice of Senators. This is only one of the forms which the popular protest against the present method most frequently assumes. Consider how full, clear, and thorough would be the remedy for the mischief of such suspicion under the new mode of election. It is true added importance would be given to that class of conference called State conventions, and their action might be objectionable to some, but the remedy would be the more carefully guarded against the imputation of wrong, and yet, if found impure, might fall of acceptance.

Those studious of constitutional lore who have studied concerning the cause of so little direct power having been placed by the terms of that instrument in the hands of the people. It has been sometimes thought that this was due to jealousy of the purely Democratic element, lest it should become too dominant.

But we may well entertain the opinion that this scant allowance of direct power was the result of a concession—to the conditions of that time—especially to the fact that upon the one engrossing issue of national independence the legislatures and the people had been by the heat of war welded together, in inseparable union.

Besides this, the federal government, although officially framed by the adoption of the Constitution, was still a thing of the future. Its tendencies were not wholly unmet, unmeasured. But at this time, after more than a century of national existence, we begin to see indications that the general government, in its infancy, has a kind of existence, separate, distinct, very little amenable to the popular will.

The more ancient departments of the executive branch in this distribution of power have become the subject of a long and weary history of traditions, and usages. Although it is the theory that the administration actually and practically changes in accordance with the suffrage by successive elections, yet there are some official points and their action might be objectionable to some, but the remedy would be the more carefully guarded against the imputation of wrong, and yet, if found impure, might fall of acceptance.

The department of the judiciary, with its numerous appointees, many of them perpetual judges, clerks, marshals, postmasters, and commissioners, dealing daily with the persons and property of the citizen, yet not answerable even in the most remote manner to the people, shows a somewhat similar divergence.

Even upon the passage of this amendment the legislatures of the States will yet retain great functions in our federal polity, the very greatest, far superior to those of Congress or any of the departments. It has been too common to make use of language from which it might be inferred that the power granted to the three departments of the government were forever lost to the grantors, incapable of resumption, whereas it is very certain, both from the theory and practice of the republic, that the people are not only the source, but the ultimate depository of all powers, both those granted and those reserved.

vote sufficiently unanimous of an adequate number, three-fourths thereof, resume any part of the powers granted to the executive, judicial or legislative divisions, or without formal resumption, the people may thus directly exercise through their legislatures the definite functions of constitutional change and reformation. For example, if the proposed amendment in argument be submitted, the legislatures of the several States in behalf of the people in voting for or against it, are discharging the same duties as are ordinarily performed by Congress. If the amendment be approved they are exercising the functions of the judiciary in deciding and declaring the law, giving judgment in favor of the principle involved therein.

This is an adjudication final, not subject to review by any court, and acts from its own force. An enactment of the people through the States, in the form of a constitutional amendment, is in the nature of a decree, definitive and judicial, unaffected by precedents, paramount to every other. Take the instance of the adoption of the recent amendments upon the subject of slavery. How fundamentally and how completely were these enactments of the nature of a decree, definitive and judicial, what an innumerable series of judgments and decisions were overruled, repealed, and annulled thereby! Of rights vested, of rig its corporate, long established, and recognized, both by courts and lawgivers, relating to this subject, not a vestige remains.

Article V, relating to amendments, found near the close of the Constitution, is a testamentary devise to the people of every State, and it is a wholly unimpaired. In this clause is placed the vital principle, the living soul of the whole dispensation. So many must conclude who will carefully reflect upon its comprehensive scope and range of its intentions. These can be interpreted only to mean that the wise founders and fathers of this system did not purpose to grant any powers absolutely to the federal government or to either of its departments, but ultimately to vest all powers and franchises in the people of the several States. The functions and forces of constitutional reform have hardly yet been broached. During one hundred and fifteen years we have had fifteen amendments. It may be that the time approaches for a new article with other sections upon additional subjects. If Congressional statutes and commissions are found incompetent to cope with existing evils, within the wide province of constitutional reform may yet be shown a way more excellent.

There is a restriction upon the high prerogative of the people to make in this mode the law of the land, and that is that no State shall in aid of corporations, or not in favor of corporate trusts, syndicates or charters. That limitation is made for the benefit of the States, and it relates to the composition of this body.

Not even a constitutional amendment can deprive any State of its equal voice in the Senate without the consent of that State.

To correct the illegitimate tendencies in our system adverse to free institutions, to avoid the necessity of too frequent resort to extraordinary legislative action, the best method is now by this measure suggested—an increase of direct popular representation in the national legislature.

This would cause the character of the people to be represented more perfectly into the modes of government. This would cause the needs, wants, aims, and aspirations of the masses of men in our free communities to be more faithfully reflected in the laws of the country and their administration.

Congress, in the two branches thereof, would be thus brought closer to the people, and this immediate proximity would have the most wholesome effect, not only upon the legislative but upon every other bureau and department of the public service.

Such a change would purify the air in the chambers of our public offices, free those satellegites, the perpetual placemen of routine. It would leave the whole lump of official autocracy; it would cut away the entail of false prestige and unfounded pretensions; it would greatly diminish the power of the corrupt element in the legislative branch, and it would increase, and which ought to be extinguished.

Under the beneficent environment of this new senatorial franchise even those classes most averse to popular influences would by degrees recognize the ultimate political truth. All legislative grants and franchises, as well as public offices, would be held by those who hold them are not owners or proprietors; they are only trustees, they are merely tenants, tenants at will, at the will of the people.

And thus it may be known of all men that the founders of our Republic did not intend a purely democratic element an indisputable ascendancy; that they granted to this popular tribunal a jurisdiction from which there can be no appeal; that in fullest faith, in confidence unshaken, they have committed the destinies of their country to the arbitrament of the conscience and the judgment of a free people. What is said above relates to rights granted; it has no relation to natural rights, sometimes called inherent rights belonging to the citizen as a man, or person, or human, common to all. These rights, as they are not conferred, neither can they be taken away by any legislation.

practice, members of the House were chosen by the people of the whole State upon a single ticket; but this no longer obtains. Wherefore were this amendment in force, the Senator would be chosen and would represent the whole mass of voters; the Representative would, as he does now, in a special sense represent the people of the district or portion of the State from which he is sent, and wherein he usually resides.

Government for the people is a phrase easily fixed and much abused. Ivan, the Terrible, the White Czar, fir of the Romanoffs famous in history, claimed that his administration of affairs was a government for the people.

Government by the people is an expression more stable, standing for a practice and policy which has been greatly aggrandized since the era 1776, both here and elsewhere. At the time what was known or realized of governments by the people?

It is true there was the House of Commons in England, whose members were chosen by suffrage, but the right of suffrage was very closely restricted, hardly one man in five hundred of the whole population voted. In France, government by the people had yet scarcely been heard of. In Spain, Italy, Austria, Germany, the method was royal—(except in Switzerland, where freedom, like a strong man armed, kept her house in the fastnesses of the high Alps), there prevailed the same system of personal hereditary despotism. Now, in all these countries, popular suffrage has become in some degree a recognized political element, parliamentary representation has obtained a foothold, and constitutional limitations upon the powers of the ruler have been more or less established. In some of these, as in England and France, progress here has been very great, in others less, but none have remained unmoved. Here among our own States, the same kind of progress has been made, but as it began and proceeded from a line already much advanced, these very sweeping changes in our domestic rule have not been so clearly marked or noted.

At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 1789, none of the States gave to their citizens the unqualified right to vote, and very few of them afforded the opportunity of its exercise to any considerable number of officials. Nearly every office in the States was filled by appointment either by the legislature or the chief executive. Even the voting for members of the legislature was not general, as may be well enough inferred from the clause authorizing the election of members of the House of Representatives.

The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the legislature.

At present all public offices, including the judicial in the States, and even the smaller subdivisions of counties and townships, have become for the most part elective. Manhood suffrage has everywhere become general, almost unqualified.

To say nothing at this time of other consequences, the operation of the late amendments to the Federal Constitution, conferring the right of suffrage upon men of color, added largely to the number of voters.

Yet even this may appear of less moment, indeed is somewhat inconsiderable in the account, when compared with the vast increase in the body of electors and the enlargement of the use of the ballot made by these organic changes in the law of the States during the lapse of time from the surrender of Yorktown to the conclusion of peace at Appomattox.

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franchise and of the subjects to which it has been made applicable. But this development internally has not so far touched our Federal relations, because the franchise, in its use, is applicable as yet to but one subject therein, the membership of the House of Representatives.

The passage of this amendment would be in accord with the law of our growth; it would bestow upon the people a gift entirely worthy of their acceptance and of our profier.

Sir, we are preparing for the exhibition of a splendid international pageant commencing on the 1st of July, 1892, in commemorative of the discovery and settlement of this continent. In the imperial commercial metropolis of the great lakes, that urban miracle of the century, we are to show from our own country, we are to behold from others, whatever is most excellent in nature, art, or industry. Many a medal will be cast, many a souvenir will be designed in honor of this event so not ble. It would be most felicitous should we signalize it by the submission and adoption of his amendment, thus publishing to this grand economical council of the world's commerce and exchanges that the great republic of the West had given to its people direct control of the legislative department of the government.

Such an act would be a monument of the age, worthy of its genius and fortunes; more enduring than the Eiffel Tower, more imperishable than the column of Trajan or the arch of Titus, which have for centuries marked and adorned the site of the Eternal City. Herein the right, truly divine, of self-government, the sovereign rule and dominion of the people, as proclaimed, vindicated, justified, glorified in the eyes of all earth's inhabitants to the latest posterity.

A GRADUATED income tax went into effect in Germany at the beginning of the new year. It is about the same as that demanded by the Alliance, except that it begins by taxing smaller incomes than American farmers would think proper.

A WEEKLY statement of business failures with elaborate comparisons have heretofore been printed in Bradstreet's, a leading financial paper, but for some reason they have been omitted in the last two issues. Doubtless the rapid increase and unfavorable comment has led to their discontinuance.

SENATOR STANFORD has re-introduced his land loan bill of last session. It is subject to the same objections of an unlimited amount of the loan upon an unlimited quantity of land that obtained in the first bill. The Alliance demands a limitation upon both the amount of the loan and quantity of land. Because of this and a few other objections, the Alliance can not support the measure.

It is learned from the United States treasurer's report, that during September, 1890, \$12,030,617.30 was paid out to anticipate interest that was not due until July 1, 1891.

The worst feature of the transaction, however, was the anticipation of \$3,060,100.80 of interest on Pacific railway bonds, that the government will in the end be swindled out of completely. Not satisfied with being cheated out of the interest, the Secretary of the Treasury pays it six months in advance.

The report of the Treasury Department shows a deficit for the month of December. The revenues were \$28,500,000, and the expenditures not far from \$31,000,000. This deficit reduced the cash balance in the Treasury to \$30,495,749. This amount was made up of \$14,000,000 in subsidiary coins and \$12,656,927 on deposit with national banks. Until about one year ago this subsidiary coin was classed in the Treasury Department as "unavailable." The same is true to-day, as it is only a legal tender for small amounts, and can not be considered by any rule of finance as a reserve for the payment of debt. It is simply a convenience for the people, and has never been looked upon as a real part of the Treasury balance. The amount deposited with national banks has been loaned out to their customers, and has been in the channels of business for years—so long, in fact, that to demand payment would bankrupt the country. The \$100,000,000 in gold that has been kept in the Treasury for the alleged purpose of relieving greenbacks, can not be disturbed, if the arguments and statements of both Republican and Democratic statesmen can be relied on. There are floating about somewhere, liable to come in at any time for payment, about \$34,000,000 of national bank notes that are being retired. In addition to this there are about \$6,000,000 of 4 1/2 per cent bonds that are advertised to be paid on presentation, making in all about \$40,000,000 floating liabilities and not a dollar in the Treasury to meet them with. If this is a healthy condition for the United States Treasury, there are a great many business men who are willing to admit.