

SECRETS OF DIPLOMACY THAT LED TO THE GREAT WORLD WAR

Astonishing Revelations From Many Nations' Archives Show Germany's Careful Preparations and Other Nations' Neglect of Plain Warnings.

By JUDSON C. WELLS, Editor of the New York Sun.

The world is beginning to find out how the war started. The things it is learning, indeed, deal rather with the incidents than with the underlying causes. But the incidents are sufficiently illuminating to show that there seems to have been just one diplomat representing a state allied with the entente who understood what was going on in Germany during the long period of laying the mine. It was Jules Cambon, the French ambassador at Berlin for a long time preceding the war.

The fact that his brother, Paul Cambon, was simultaneously the French ambassador at London, that the brothers were both men of distinguished ability and splendid judgment, and that they worked together as well as in close harmony with the Paris office, goes far to account for the fact that France, of all the entente nations, had the most accurate perception of the danger and had accomplished most toward preparation. France saw the danger in the summer of 1914, and France owes to the two Cambons a debt of gratitude which it can never pay.

On the other hand, England, which now seems to have been for a long time the ultimate object of German malice and enmity, was badly served by both its foreign office at home and its ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna. Its efforts to supplement a weak ambassadorial representation by sending an unofficial government agent to Berlin only served to make matters worse.

The revelations of former ambassador Gerard, the various books of diplomatic documents which the governments have published, the astonishing papers that have been given to the world since the Russian autocracy's archives were made accessible to the provisional government, the efforts of discredited statesmen and politicians to vindicate their records—all these have been contributing of late in unusual measure to illuminate the methods and results of secret diplomacy.

Minor Causes of War. At the outbreak of the war there was a spontaneous burst of appeal to the world's judgment at most of the belligerent capitals. White books, red books, green books, orange books, blue books, yellow books, were fluttering in all directions. On the whole, the lay world was rather surprised at the simplicity, the naivete, with which diplomatic language dealt in affairs which involved the fate of states and empires. It was more startled at realizing how minor causes, including in secrecy and darkness, have been contributing to major issues irresistibly driving the nations into the great conflict.

Going back to the Berlin congress of 1878, and following the course of European diplomacy down to the fatal days of August, 1914, it may fairly be said that if the seeds of distrust, which were as grains of mustard when planted, had not been permitted to germinate and expand in the soil of diplomatic secrecy; if the warmth of sunshine and fresh air of public understanding could have been brought to bear, probably every one of these issues would have been settled, every developing issue adjusted long before there was opportunity for them to develop into the sharply drawn schism which has rent Europe and then spread to tear the whole world asunder.

Bismarck must be recognized as the man who set the Europe of the last two generations by the ears. Ruthless, strong, daring, able, devoted to his great purpose of building Prussia into commanding position on the continent of Europe, he was a strange combination of frankness and furtiveness. His memoirs and his record prove that he knew just how to employ frankness as a foil to his furtiveness, to use furtiveness as a means to make his frankness misleading. When he was most candid he was likely to be most misleading.

The present emperor of Germany came to the throne filled with vanity and vainglory, imagining himself a composite of the great Frederick and the iron chancellor. The institutions with which he worked, the atmosphere by which he was surrounded, served to encourage his propensity for mischief.

He had this vital advantage over the diplomatic autocrats of democracies, that he was able always to adjust his domestic policies to his international purposes. If he was carrying on an intrigue which aimed to create jealousies among other nations and then destroy them one after another, he had the power to provide himself with the armies and fleets that would at length be the instruments of his will.

Intrigues of Kaiser. Jules Cambon could play diplomacy with the Wilhelmstrasse and beat it. He knew more about what was going on within the Junta of German control than some of the fractions within that junta knew. He understood whether the Kaiser and his militaristic advisers were driving. But all this knowledge and understanding could not save France and Europe, because Jules Cambon did not have the power which Wilhelm could wield, of laying down keels, of building new armies, of creating vast munition works and storing Germany full of war materials. He had no power to spend milliards of wealth in equipping his country against the German designs.

So France was only half ready, Germany was completely and absolutely ready. Britain was not ready at all except as to its navy, whose preparedness has been an established tradition so long that even diplomats are unable to interfere with it.

It is now clear that the Russo-Japanese war provided the scheming Kaiser with what he quickly seized as an opportunity to prejudice every western nation against England. He was himself ready enough to ally Germany with England in any combination that would enable him to destroy either France or Russia, or he would ally himself with France and Russia for the destruction of England. Proposals of both kinds were put forward at different times.

He was trying to carry out the policy of Bismarck, who selected one enemy at a time, isolated that enemy, and then destroyed him. The Kaiser, regarding every other first class nation as Germany's enemy, all of them requiring to be destroyed sooner or later, was merely planning to handle them one at a time. Just as Bismarck's Germany crushed Denmark, then Austria, then France, in succession, so the Kaiser would crush France, Russia, Great Britain and ultimately the United States.

His plottings concerned merely the order in which he might take them on. At one period he tried to isolate England, but being doubtful of Germany's capacity to stand alone, he alone his program was to ally France and Russia against Great Britain. For this he would have found his justification in the alliance of England and Japan.

For years he devoted himself to cultivating prejudices against Great Britain on account of this alliance. How near he may have come to succeeding cannot yet be told very definitely. But there is diplomatic authority for saying that the French foreign office failed to report to London some things which it learned about the machinations of Berlin which it would seem a devoted ally ought to have reported. Indeed, it is not at all without reason to say that possibly the present war might have been averted if there had been real frankness even among the nations bound together as allies.

Threatened Denmark. There were two hard and fast offensive and defensive alliances in Europe. The Franco-Russian combination was opposed to the Austro-German alliance. The Austro-German alliance was distinctly different from the Austro-German-Italian alliance. Italy was only bound to support its two allies in case they were attacked but not in case they were the attackers. This was the situation at Berlin and all that would be needed from Italy. The actual or potential power of Italy was given a contemptuous valuation; so long as it remained a possible menace to the southern border of France it served its purpose.

The Russo-Japanese war gave the Kaiser a chance to sympathize with the czar, to offer endless advice and almost to lead that weak and incapable sovereign into an alliance that would surely have been his undoing. The Kaiser knew that France could not afford to array itself against Eng-

land. So he proposed that Russia and Germany make a hard and fast treaty and that only after it was signed and binding should France be notified. He calculated that France, though reluctant, would assent and associate itself with the Russo-German arrangement rather than be left isolated. It has not yet been made clear what inducement was offered to Russia, but at any rate he did not give it.

The Kaiser's program included a joint declaration by Germany and Russia that the Baltic should be regarded as a mare clausum. As Denmark might have objections to such a scheme, the Kaiser coolly proposed that in case of trouble he would move his armies in Denmark and take possession of that country, precisely as in 1914 he treated Belgium. The general theory that treaties were scraps of paper was not formulated on the spur of the moment in 1914.

But Denmark was one of the group of little nations which instinctively looked to England as their natural friend and protector. This attitude is not necessarily a testimony to England's superior international morals. Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Portugal and France were all in a fashion buffer states between England and Germany. But there was this difference, that England had no ambition to acquire territory from any one of these countries, because they were separated from her by water; whereas Germany in its effort to get at England might at any time be expected to invade any one of them. Therefore these buffer states naturally leaned to the power whose interest made it desirable to perpetuate their inviolability and against the power whose interest might be furthered by attacking them.

Thought England Wouldn't Fight. So the Kaiser discovered that his pleasant enterprise of getting Denmark wherever it might be convenient to do so was no more pleasing to the Danes than he afterward found it was to the Belgians. He dropped that part of the project and he lost his nerve at the possibility of offending his French ally and the project of isolating England had to be dropped.

Recent diplomatic disclosures have shown that at one time the Kaiser, or people inside the Kaiser's entourage, pointedly suggested that England and Germany unite for the purpose of crushing France. The crown prince has been quoted on excellent authority as having said that he had never heard of such a project. It is seriously presumed that if his initiative had been favorably considered in responsible British circles the Kaiser would presently have been found sympathizing with England would not betray France and this project was dropped.

Then the Kaiser turned to the development of the scheme of opposing alliances which he had conceived on the basis of Europe's division when the war opened. He devoted himself assiduously to making trouble for England at home. He and his government sympathizers went with whatever element in Ireland was at the moment making the most trouble for Westminster. His agents were everywhere in England, studying its politics, its finances, industries and sociology.

The Kaiser did not know the precise terms of the triple entente which bound England, France and Russia together. At that point he made a grave blunder. He was not aware that the terms of the arrangement did not definitely bind Britain to enter such a war as started in August, 1914, on the side of France and Russia. The Kaiser was right in guessing that England was not so bound; but he was egregiously wrong in assuming that whether bound or not England would keep out of the war.

He had become convinced that England was decadent, hopelessly torn by internal political and social strife, possessed of only a "contemptible little army," and of a fleet which while larger than that of Germany was probably not nearly so efficient. So he believed it safe to go ahead, presuming that England would remain neutral.

The Kaiser's mistake as to England proves him a bad observer. He had really tested out England's attitude toward France at the time of the Agadir incident in 1911 and ought to have discovered that England was determined not to see France sacrificed.

The appearance of the German warships at Agadir brought Europe to the brink of war. Within a week after this crisis of Agadir, the British house of commons and the world that Britain would stand by France if necessity arose. This was plainly a surprise and a shock to Berlin. The result was that Germany finally backed down.

Peril of Secret Diplomacy. Yet within the next three years, although Mr. Asquith, continued the head of the government and Sir Edward Grey remained at the foreign office, and although in the meantime the British fleet had been largely expanded and its efficiency increased, the

ALBANIAN LEADER TO JOIN GREEK ARMY



Here is Essad Pasha, leader of the Albanian troops, snapped at the headquarters of General Sarail during a conference with the allied commander. He will probably join the Greek army for a grand drive into Bulgaria.

German government somehow managed to convince itself that England would desert France, even though Belgium was violated and France menaced with a repetition of 1870. It is hardly worth while to inquire by what processes the Kaiser and his advisers reached such a mistaken conclusion. But the fact that they did reach it and act on it is significant of the danger which lies in the secret manipulation of diplomatic events.

For ten years before the war the Kaiser seemed persistently intriguing to make Morocco an excuse for hurling his army against France. There was a succession of major and minor crises. There never was a time in which the Kaiser's government would have dared the substitution of a government determined to plunge it into war over such an issue. But the nation had no voice in its military arrangements or international relations.

A government responsible to the electorate would at any time after the 1911 Agadir have been compelled to suppress the imperial intrigues. Otherwise it would have been driven from office and the voice of the country would have dictated the substitution of a government that could be trusted not to break the peace because of so unimportant an issue.

A good deal has been published in England recently about the diplomatic relations of this period. The men at the head of the British government have been accused of incompetency because they did not realize what was going on in Germany and prepare against it. Particularly bitter has been the criticism of Viscount Haldane, who from 1905 to 1912 was secretary of state for war.

Lord Haldane's Failure. Lord Haldane was widely credited with being an expert in German affairs. He had been educated in Germany, was supposed to know fully as much about German philosophy as the men who wrote it, and to have an almost uncanny apprehension of the German psychology. The event proved that he was a sadly overrated expert in German affairs. But Sir Edward Grey, who was at the head of the foreign office, accepted the popular estimate of Lord Haldane without question, and sent him on various missions to Germany to find out what was happening there.

Lord Haldane was always treated with the utmost deference by the Kaiser and the inner governing circles, but he was uniformly misled as to what was going on. Apparently Lord Haldane, by reason of his generally sympathetic attitude toward the Germans, was unable to believe in the capability of the things the world now knows they planned.

Lord Haldane has recently been appearing extensively in the public prints, explaining how it happened that his missions at Berlin failed to result in effective warning to England concerning German designs. His friends earnestly avouch that he did not find out the truth about Germany because the Germans were very particularly engaged in concealing it, and that is probably true.

The most recent defence of Lord Haldane's German missions has been put forth in the Manchester Guardian. Whether he actually wrote the dozen articles or thevise versa is not clear, but he admitted that he was admittedly an authorized presentation of his case. In effect, he insists that he did realize the danger of the situation, and that he did warn his fellow members of the cabinet, and that as secretary of state for war he did reorganize the army in a fashion that greatly increased its strength and efficiency, that he did work out an expeditionary force into France in time to help save Paris.

The debate about Lord Haldane's soldierly and diplomatic services to his country will continue a good many years. Not all the documents have yet been made available, not all the intricacies of his enterprises at Berlin have been explored. It is rather unfair to the German psychology, and to the subjects about which the British kingdom can work itself into a state of tremendous excitement on very short notice.

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Rev. Philip Schwartz will conduct the Epworth league meeting at 7:00. Topic, "Barbed Wire Christians Versus the Holy Spirit."
The pastor will conduct an evangelistic service at 8:00, speaking upon the theme, "Satan the Hindering."
Prayer meeting on Wednesday night will be in the nature of a round table service, in which the pastor will answer questions.

FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH.
Rev. W. F. Howell, pastor.
"Practical Patriotism," will be the subject of the morning message at 11:00.
The evening sermon will be based upon the seventh commandment, having for its theme, "The Altar Within the Home."
Bible service at 9:35.
Junior and Senior Young Peoples' unions at 7:00.
Strangers and visitors cordially invited to the services.

CONGREGATIONAL.
Rev. J. B. Thrall, pastor.
Sunday school services at 10:00 at the home of the pastor, at 329 Merrimon avenue. All interested are cordially invited to attend.
Morning services at 11:00 at the Y. M. C. A. hall, sermon by the pastor.

WESTLAW METHODIST CHURCH.
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Rev. A. E. Belk, pastor.
Sunday school, 9:45.
Morning services at 11:00. "Undeveloped Religion."
Evening services at 7:30. "Three Hells."
Prayer meeting Thursday evening at 7:30. You are cordially invited.

TRINITY EPISCOPAL.
Corner Alston and Church streets.
Rev. Willis C. Clark, rector.
Twenty-first Sunday after Trinity.
Holy communion at 8:00.
Morning prayer and sermon at 11:00.
Sunday school at 9:45.
Evening prayer and sermon at 8:00.

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Special revival services, beginning at 7:30. Good music led by H. G. Briggs. Services every night this week at 7:30. Sunday school at 9:30. Come bring your friends.

CHESTNUT STREET METHODIST.
Rev. D. Atkins, pastor.
Sunday school song service at 9:30. Sunday school at 9:45.
Morning services at 11:00. Sermon by Rev. O. J. Chandler, of the Kentucky conference. A delightful musical program will be given at the morning services.
Junior Epworth league will meet at 8:00.
On account of the absence of the pastor there will be no night services. Prayer meeting Wednesday night at 7:30. Visitors are welcome.

BETHEL METHODIST.
Rev. J. O. Eavin, pastor.
Sunday school at 9:30.
Morning services at 11. "Robbing the Lord of his time," will be the sub-

ject of the sermon, which will be delivered by the pastor.
Evening services at 7:30. Text Matthew 1:15.
Junior Epworth league at 4:00.
Prayer meeting at 7:30 Wednesday evening.
An anniversary reunion-home coming service will be held on Tuesday October 30, at 7:30.

CENTRAL METHODIST.
Rev. Charles W. Byrd, pastor.
Sunday school at 9:45.
Morning worship at 11:00. Sermon by the pastor. "Causes of the Great World War, and the Nation's Call for Subscriptions to the Liberty Loan, and the Conservation of Food."
Evening worship at 7:30. Sermon by the pastor.

The Senior Epworth league will meet this evening at 6:30. Miss Frances Burkehead, a returned missionary from China, will speak. There will be special music, and all members are urged to be present.
The Woman's Missionary Study Class will meet Monday afternoon with Mrs. J. T. Bledsoe, Grove Park. Mrs. A. J. Robinson, leader. In connection with this meeting a reception will be given for Miss Frances Burkehead.
Wednesday evening prayer service

at 7:30. Services will be conducted by Deaconess Murphy.
The Young People's Missionary society will have a silver tea at the home of Miss Gussie Smith 184 Chestnut street, from 4 to 6. Members urged to attend.

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Rev. Charles Mercer Hall, rector.
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Holy communion at 8:00.
Matsins, 10:30.
Solemn mass and sermon, 11:00.
Catechism, 4:00.
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