

SIMONDS' REVIEW OF THE WAR

BY FRANK H. SIMONDS.

(Copyright, 1918, by The Tribune Association—The New York Tribune.)

President Wilson's response to the German notes has cleared the atmosphere and placed squarely upon the shoulders of the German government the responsibility for the success or the failure of its effort to get an armistice. With the preliminary conditions outlined in Mr. Wilson's notes, the German has to comply if he desires to continue his application for an armistice. If he continues his application, then it will be the duty of the president to transmit any further application to the governments of our allies and, in concert with them, frame a response. What we shall next have in case the German is ready to surrender is a formal request made of the president or made of the Allied governments, collectively, for an armistice.

It is true that the Germans have made their appeal to the president and not to Marshal Foch, but it is equally true that the president has been asked to act merely as the messenger to transmit to all the allied governments the German request for an armistice, and that the president, like the executives of all other governments, will not act upon the German proposal save upon the advice of Marshal Foch.

Let us be perfectly clear at the outset that the request for an armistice is a military matter, to be acted upon in the light of military judgment. Our armies are advancing from the Meuse to the sea; the German has been beaten in every engagement for four months, and his armies are being pounded to pieces. In this situation he asks for a cessation of hostilities. The answer there can be a cessation of hostilities only when he complies with the conditions which would result from a continuance of the struggle and therefore are within the right of the victors.

In the present situation these conditions are obviously demobilization, evacuation of conquered allied territory and agreement to the occupation of genuinely German territory, not for purposes of aggrandizement, but as a guarantee of the later compliance of the German government with the decisions of the allied countries in the matter of peace terms. On the map this means the permanent evacuation of France, Belgium and Russia, to be replaced by the allies of the left or west bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland.

Now, the German gesture means one of two things. It either means that Germany is prepared to surrender or is seeking to repeat her success of 1918, when her peace offensive broke the home fronts of her enemies and nearly won the war for her. We may reason that it is a genuine pursuit of peace, because the military conditions of today are so different from those of 1918; but we have no right to assume that it is an unqualified application for peace until it is revealed that it is a genuine tender of appropriate guarantees. It is nothing more than a "scrap of paper" until it is secured; there can be no other security than that of territory.

We are in this situation. We have all been attacked and we have after four years reached the point where our assailant asks us to "let up" on him. We have got him down and he is rapidly becoming helpless, but if we do "let up" now he may be able to fight again, and we may be unable without new and even greater efforts and sacrifice to compel him to comply with our just demands, which are that he should pay for the damages inflicted, for our injuries and restore to us what he has stolen from us recently and in the past.

All this is Foch's business. It is not making peace; it is not settling the questions of permanent peace. It is only making sure that peace can be arranged; it is only making sure that we are not again face to face with our old foe, when he has got his breath and his strength back and finds himself on a convenient line of defense. It is easier to continue the present fight than to begin all over again; we can only be sure we shall not have to begin all over again by insisting upon guarantees.

The first step is clear. We can not negotiate with Germany; we can not talk with our foe in arms; we can not do anything but demand that as the price of interrupting our military operations he lay aside all of his weapons. This is unconditional surrender, and there is no other kind of surrender, and our enemy is not beaten until he surrenders. Anything else would be a sham and a subterfuge, a loss of all that we have gained by fighting.

If Germany is beaten, if her pro-

positional flows from her defeat and is made in good faith, she will comply. She will surrender. If it is not made in good faith, then she will resist; but her resistance will be on the battlefield, and we can deal with that easily and completely. She will simply choose to prolong the conflict a little and have her sword struck from her hand. They do not have a matter of years also will have to surrender and we shall have lost nothing.

But if she surrenders and agrees unconditionally to those terms which Marshal Foch must dictate, terms which cover what he regards as the necessary military insurance against a new German resistance, then the military aspect of the problem will be disposed of. Then and only then will it be possible for us, the allied nations, to discuss among ourselves the basis for peace. With Germany we shall discuss only the details of the application of those terms after we have agreed on the terms themselves. This is where Mr. Wilson and his "fourteen points" come in, not a moment before.

We must be clear about all this. Terms of peace settlement have nothing in the world to do with an armistice. They do not have a matter of discussion until the fighting is over and the military decision had. They can not be mentioned by the enemy until he has conquered or surrendered. Two contestants may agree to a truce to end a fight, but that is not an armistice and this is neither an armistice nor the condition which now exists. There is no question of a negotiated peace today. We are all agreed as to this. We mean to have a military decision, and then an absolutely untrammelled application of allied peace conditions. Therefore the matter is still in Foch's hands and must remain there until the military phase is disposed of. After Foch, President Wilson can participate, but obviously unless Foch's work is done completely, there will be no chance for the president or any one else to begin the construction of peace.

We may for a moment assume that Foch has completed his work and that the Germans have agreed to surrender unconditionally, to evacuate the regions they have occupied, and to consent to an allied occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. Then to the question of peace; then the terms of permanent settlement must be fixed by all the allied nations in conference, each with equal right to be heard and to have its will accepted. Here is the point at which Mr. Wilson's "fourteen conditions" last arrive.

But of these fourteen conditions we shall see at once that not less than five have no bearing in a peace conference. We are to fix the conditions which are to be exacted of Germany; they are conditions based upon the deeds of Germany and her allies; they have been summed up as conditions which must include restitution, restoration and guarantees. But of Mr. Wilson's "points" concern the organization of international society after the war; they deal with open covenants, freedom of navigation, the removal of economic barriers between nations, adequate guarantees for the reduction of armaments and finally the constitution of a league of nations.

These are not matters which are properly before a conference engaged in the task of making peace with our enemy. We can not impose any of these things upon Germany; they have no value save as voluntarily accepted principles—and we have to impose on Germany at first military peace, restoration and guarantees. Certainly there must be an indemnity for all this, and the president's words indicate his belief that wanton damage should be paid for.


We may, then, place at one side as beyond debate the two principles of evacuation of occupied territory and indemnification for wanton injury of all sorts, whether the territory be Belgian, Italian or French. We may accept as fundamental facts in discussion the peace the determination of Mr. Wilson, speaking for this country, to compel the Germans to make restitution of stolen territory and restoration in the case of property and wealth either stolen or destroyed by German troops or laid in ashes by German "terribleness."

But the application of this principle goes a little further and is expressed in the demand for the "righting of the wrong" done by France and Prussia to Italy of her unredeemed provinces and cities. Now, I do not propose in this place to discuss again the question of Alsace-Lorraine or that of Trent and the Trentino. If Germany and Austria are not prepared to evacuate Metz and Strasbourg, Trieste and Trent as a condition precedent to any armistice, then it is inconceivable that there should be any armistice.

If Germany can precipitate a debate between the United States and Great Britain, on the one hand, and France and Italy, on the other, as to the necessity for a return to each of its own, then the removal of the alliance against Germany; there is a reopening of the war, with every prospect of losing it; for neither France nor Italy will consent to an armistice in advance of the restoration of what is right to them. It means to Italy that all of us Americans should from the very outset of all peace discussions insist in our own minds and thought that three things are immediately necessary to the making of a peace which will last. First, the evacuation of territory taken during the war. Second, the evacuation of certain other territory, specifically Alsace-Lorraine and the Trieste and Trentino districts, which are quite as properly bases for an evacuation as Champagne and Venetia. Third, a pledge to restore ravaged and ruined provinces and cities, this pledge to be accompanied by proper guarantees, of which the occupation of the west bank of the Rhine is the most essential.

With this brief statement I shall discuss the questions which involve France, Italy and Belgium. If Germany is not prepared to comply with the minimum which I have indicated, not one of the western European nations will consent to an armistice. I do not think that there is any more reservation in his declarations with respect to Alsace-Lorraine than the question of the Italian Irredenta. I do not believe that there is an American who can read into the president's demand for the "righting of the wrong done France in 1871" any other meaning than that what was then stolen shall now be returned. Nor do I believe, in the wholly remote contingency that such reservation did exist, that the people of the United States would agree with the chief executive on the question of Alsace-Lorraine. The mind of the American people is made up, and it is made up in the sense which the French mind is made up. All the principles which Mr. Wilson has subscribed to and eloquently championed in recent months would go into the discard if the wrong of 1871 were perpetuated in 1918, or for that matter, in 1919.

We have, in addition, to consider the president's demands as to Russia,



and the Balkans. Here he is finally moved by the same underlying notion. He means that the various nationalities shall be assured the right to live their own lives in accordance with their own customs, faith, language. But in January, 1918, there have been many changes in the east and south of Europe, largely the result of the Russian revolution and the German actions expressed in the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. We have ourselves subscribed to the freedom of the Czech-Slovakia, and this nullifies the ancient notion of preserving Austria-Hungary as a federation of autonomous races. More than this, in the Balkans Bulgaria has surrendered, and there remains no problem for settlement between the Balkan states which is properly before any world conference.

As to Russia, evacuation of all of Russia now held by the Germans disposes of the first problem; the creation of a free Poland, including all of the Polish-speaking tribes of Austria, Russia and Germany, erects a barrier between Germany and Russia and eliminates the Russian phase from immediate discussion. We may assume that the Polish question, that of the Polish-speaking tribes of Austria, Russia and Germany, erects a barrier between Germany and Russia and eliminates the Russian phase from immediate discussion. We may assume that the Polish question, that of the Polish-speaking tribes of Austria, Russia and Germany, erects a barrier between Germany and Russia and eliminates the Russian phase from immediate discussion.

Actually the question now arises, What shall be the verdict of the allied world with respect to Austria? Shall we still act in the spirit of the president as revealed in January, or in the light of the subsequent action of our government and all other governments since? Obviously in the latter fashion, and this means the absolute destruction of Austria. It means the re-creation of a free Poland, including all of the Polish-speaking tribes of Austria, Russia and Germany, erects a barrier between Germany and Russia and eliminates the Russian phase from immediate discussion.

Instead of one nation there will then be four nations: the German-speaking provinces of Austria, the Hungarian-speaking regions of Hungary, Jugo-Slavia and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Italian-speaking districts of the Danubian region, the Roumanian regions of Transylvania and possibly in the Banat will be united with Roumania, to which Bessarabia, a Roumanian-speaking province of old Russia, has already by voluntary act united itself. Finally, the Polish-speaking regions of Galicia will naturally go to that Poland which Mr. Wilson has already outlined as including all indisputably Polish lands. What remains of the Ruthenian portion of Galicia, the Ruthenian portion of the Bukovina, the Banat and the new frontiers of Italy east of Trieste, this state to be united with Serbia and Montenegro on the south.

Instead of one nation there will then be four nations: the German-speaking provinces of Austria, the Hungarian-speaking regions of Hungary, Jugo-Slavia and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Italian-speaking districts of the Danubian region, the Roumanian regions of Transylvania and possibly in the Banat will be united with Roumania, to which Bessarabia, a Roumanian-speaking province of old Russia, has already by voluntary act united itself. Finally, the Polish-speaking regions of Galicia will naturally go to that Poland which Mr. Wilson has already outlined as including all indisputably Polish lands. What remains of the Ruthenian portion of Galicia, the Ruthenian portion of the Bukovina, the Banat and the new frontiers of Italy east of Trieste, this state to be united with Serbia and Montenegro on the south.

Instead of one nation there will then be four nations: the German-speaking provinces of Austria, the Hungarian-speaking regions of Hungary, Jugo-Slavia and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Italian-speaking districts of the Danubian region, the Roumanian regions of Transylvania and possibly in the Banat will be united with Roumania, to which Bessarabia, a Roumanian-speaking province of old Russia, has already by voluntary act united itself. Finally, the Polish-speaking regions of Galicia will naturally go to that Poland which Mr. Wilson has already outlined as including all indisputably Polish lands. What remains of the Ruthenian portion of Galicia, the Ruthenian portion of the Bukovina, the Banat and the new frontiers of Italy east of Trieste, this state to be united with Serbia and Montenegro on the south.

Instead of one nation there will then be four nations: the German-speaking provinces of Austria, the Hungarian-speaking regions of Hungary, Jugo-Slavia and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Italian-speaking districts of the Danubian region, the Roumanian regions of Transylvania and possibly in the Banat will be united with Roumania, to which Bessarabia, a Roumanian-speaking province of old Russia, has already by voluntary act united itself. Finally, the Polish-speaking regions of Galicia will naturally go to that Poland which Mr. Wilson has already outlined as including all indisputably Polish lands. What remains of the Ruthenian portion of Galicia, the Ruthenian portion of the Bukovina, the Banat and the new frontiers of Italy east of Trieste, this state to be united with Serbia and Montenegro on the south.

Instead of one nation there will then be four nations: the German-speaking provinces of Austria, the Hungarian-speaking regions of Hungary, Jugo-Slavia and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the Italian-speaking districts of the Danubian region, the Roumanian regions of Transylvania and possibly in the Banat will be united with Roumania, to which Bessarabia, a Roumanian-speaking province of old Russia, has already by voluntary act united itself. Finally, the Polish-speaking regions of Galicia will naturally go to that Poland which Mr. Wilson has already outlined as including all indisputably Polish lands. What remains of the Ruthenian portion of Galicia, the Ruthenian portion of the Bukovina, the Banat and the new frontiers of Italy east of Trieste, this state to be united with Serbia and Montenegro on the south.

slan, circles in which the Poles are clearly a majority, you will deprive Germany of much of Silesia, all of Posen and a considerable fraction of both East and West Prussia. East Prussia will be isolated from the main German mass by a strip of territory extending down the west bank of the Vistula to the Baltic at Danzig; a howling frontier will be carried almost to Frankfurt-on-Oder, and this within striking distance of Berlin itself.

But, by contrast, without Posen and Silesia, so far as it is Polish, the new Poland will be incomplete, and there will survive a Polish question. And without Danzig and a window on the sea the new Poland will be economically and industrially at the mercy of Germany, exactly as Serbia was at the mercy of Austria-Hungary in the evil times before the present war. And the Serbian grievance was one of the causes of the world conflagration. Finally, nowhere in Europe has the persecution of a subject race been more brutal than in the Polish circles of Prussia. To turn the Prussian Poles back to the old slavery which thus be to do violence to all the spirit of the president's declaration.

Such, briefly, is Mr. Wilson's program of peace, as modified by events which have occurred since his January declaration. It divides itself into the redressing of the immediate wrongs of the present conflict expressed in the conquest and devastation of countries attacked by Germany and Austria, the abolition of certain wrongs surviving from 1866 and 1871, in the case of Italy and France, which belong actually in the category of the more recent crimes, and finally the liberation of subject races and fractions of races all over Europe and Asia Minor, and thus the removal of all the more familiar causes for all wars. Once these things have been written into a treaty of peace, then Mr. Wilson has formulated a program for the organization of the already re-organized world on the basis of a league of peace. But all programs for such an organization must derive their authority from the league of nations, when constituted, and are not details in the restoration of peace at the present moment.

Having said these things, I return now for the moment to the discussion of the more immediate question, that of peace. Does Germany mean that she says or is she conducting a new and even more daring and gigantic peace offensive designed to do two things, to create discord among the nations fighting her and to deprive the leaders of these nations of the support of their own publics, while rally-

ing her own people to a new sacrifice? No man is justified in refusing to consider the possibility that Germany is acting in good faith, but who can believe it, who can trust the German, until actual guarantees have been given?

In all human probability the question of peace or war will turn on Germany's willingness to evacuate Alsace-Lorraine. If she is in earnest and acting in good faith, she will agree to the surrender of Metz and Strasbourg, precisely as she demanded in July, 1914, that France should evacuate Verdun and Epinal, as a guarantee of neutrality. She will consent to evacuate these no other possibility of gaining an armistice, because Foch and Haig and Pershing are not going to surrender the advantages so dearly purchased in recent weeks, and permit Germany to reorganize her best armies and renew the fight in good condition next spring at the line selected by her.

But if Germany is acting in bad faith, then she will refuse to surrender Metz and Strasbourg, she will attempt to rouse the people of America, Britain and Italy by arguing that they are kept in the fight because of French ambitions, she will seek to sow discord among her enemies, she will gamble on a possible withdrawal of the president to be her advocate, and she will calculate that rather than surrender Alsace and Lorraine her people will consent to prolong the war, that Germany will rise to the threat of what will be held by her to be mutilation, as France rose in the last days of Louis XIV and again in 1919.

Our greatest peril now lies in thinking of the war as over or accepting the words of the German when these words are not translated into corresponding deeds. The German is talking in acceptable words, but he is spreading ruin and waste over the richest and fairest fields of Europe. Would he continue to do this if he expected on Saturday to make peace with the guaranteed indemnification of the people of Cambrai? At least it does not seem likely.

We have come to the most critical moment in more than four years of struggle. We have won the war, we have beaten the German, but we have not yet reached the point where we can safely accept his verbal assurances that he desires to make peace on our terms. Short of the acceptance by the German of the fact of defeat, short of his consent to the expression in practical terms of our victory, we can not safely and wisely consent to an armistice or permit ourselves to believe our labors are at an end.

We can not forget that the German attacked the civilized world four years ago and in defiance of all his written and spoken pledges. We can not forget that for four years he has continued to disregard all pledges until the moment when his armies were beaten and all chance of a victor's peace escaped him. We must act with this knowledge in mind; we must demand immediate guarantees which will prevent a resumption of the contest under conditions favorable to Germany next spring. Above all else, we must in our armistice translate our victory in positive terms.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

These terms are the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine and Italia Irredenta, the temporary occupation of the left bank of the Rhine from Holland to Switzerland and the prompt demobilization of the German army and navy.

DISCOUNT YOUR TAXES

The Board of County Commissioners has authorized me to make a DISCOUNT OF 2 PER CENT. on State and County Taxes IF PAID IN FULL by the tax-payer during the month of OCTOBER, and of 1 PER CENT. if paid during the months of NOVEMBER and DECEMBER. Your Taxes for 1918 are now due, and I will be glad that you will meet me or my Deputies at the following times and places:

Township.	Place.	Time.
Avery Creek—Ledbetter's Store	October 26, 1918.	
Upper Hominy—Taylor's Shop	October 26, 1918.	
Leicester—Leicester, N. C.	October 26, 1918.	
Sandy Mush—Waldrop's Store	October 26, 1918.	
Limestone—Arden, N. C.	October 26, 1918.	
Fairview—Fairview, N. C.	October 26, 1918.	
Swanton—Swanton, N. C.	October 26, 1918.	
Roma Creek—Weaverville, N. C.	October 26, 1918.	
Flat Creek—Jupiter, N. C.	October 26, 1918.	
Ivy—Maney's Store	October 26, 1918.	
Black Mountain—Black Mountain	October 26, 1918.	
French Broad—Morris' Store	October 26, 1918.	

OFFICE AT COURT HOUSE OPEN EVERY DAY

Respectfully,
C. P. GASTON, Tax Collector.
Buncombe County, N. C.

DURABLE DURHAM HOSIERY

"Soles and toes are smooth, seamless and even—"

"That's going to mean more comfort—for in these busy times we seem to have so much more standing and walking to do."

Durable-DURHAM soles and toes are reinforced, too, which makes them give more months of wear no matter how hard you use them.

DURABLE DURHAM HOSIERY FOR MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN
Made Strongest Where the Wear is Hardest

The quality of the yarn is extra good—our location in the heart of the cotton belt making it easy for us to obtain the best.

Every pair of Durable-DURHAM Hosiery is strongly reinforced at points of hardest wear. Legs are full length; tops are wide and elastic; sizes are correctly marked; colors will not fade.

Durable-DURHAM includes styles for every member of the family, selling at 25, 35, 40 and 50 cents. Your dealer will gladly show you all styles. Look for the Durable-DURHAM ticket on every pair.

Write to our Sales Department, 88 Leonard Street, New York, for free catalog showing all styles.

DURHAM HOSIERY MILLS
Durham, N. C.

BIG SISTER
A fine, wide elastic out-size stocking with extra wide elastic top. Medium weight. Made from soft combed fine finish yarn. Strongly reinforced heels and toes. Ballgrip, black and white. Price 40c pair.

BANNER
All year wearing stocking. Medium weight. Soft combed yarn, fine finish. Wide elastic top. Strongly reinforced heels and toes. Black and white. Price 35c pair.

ROVER LAD
A good medium weight unadorned, stocking for children. Triple reinforced heels. Strongly double reinforced heels and toes. Ballgrip. Feet and toe smooth, seamless and even. Black and white. Price 40c pair.