H " -gfe.
Causes Leading Upto
the PresitQ)ndit.pn
In the East Charac
teristics of the Rus
sians and the Japs
T X reviewing the present trouble lx
II tween Japan and Russia aud Its
H prohjible outcome it Is necessary
to consider the motive actuating
each of the parties to the conflict. To
Russia a war with Japan or 'with any
other country, for that matter would
mean territorial or other aggrandiftvJ
mem ana uoiuing more, xo japan war
with Russia means national existe&Ve
almost, for Japan, rjgbt or wrong, has
constituted herself the guardian of the
east and wishes to apiiear yefore the
world aa the orl Slain me In the modern
ization of the orient. She has a quar
rel with Russia not only because she
dislikes the czar's method's with refer
ence to herself, but also because, if she
should permit him to go on as he has
begun in the east, Japan will be forced
forever Into the background. Thus it
ts that the mikade todaj has the sym
pathy of practically the entire civilized
world. lie is standing for the rights of
other nations besides his own, whereas
Russia stands for the rights of but one
nation Russia.
A New Japan.
Not that Japan likes Russia. Far
from It Indeed, she has good cause to
feel anything but frieudly toward the
"bear." She has never forgiven Russia
for the contemptible part that country
played In the settlement between China
and Japan. When the Chlno-Japaflese
war began, there was not one military
man out of a hundred who did not
..- think that China would project her
hordes Into Korea and literally sweep
the timorous Japs into the sea. Those
who called attention to tlie fact that
Jafpan had succeeded In getting togeth
er the nucleus of a very respectable
navy were met with the statement that
China bad been doing something along
that line herself, and that even on the
sea she was apt to demonstrate that
numbers would count over the slight
nddltloual intelligence wbl.h it was
conceded thut Japan possessed. The
battle of the Yalu put to rout ti e sup
porters of the Chiiieoe navy, and the
fi ;ht at Tort Arthur disposed of what
ever consideration the Chinese army
might previously have been entitled to.
Hut. after all. It was not thnt China'B
prowess had been overestimated. Ja
pan's simply had been underestimated.
In short. It was tit same old China
which went to war. but a different, a
very different. Japan.
Strong on Land and Sea.
When Japan, flushed with victory
and anxious to emulate the example of
the more liberal larger nations In her
peace settlement, suggested terms
which were so generous that China
naturally would have been delighted
to accept 4 hem, Russia coolly stepped
in and practically told Japan that she
should have nothing tor tier trouble.
If she cared to take Formosa, all well
and good, but the smallest piece of the
CMnese malulund never. Russia pro
fessed to tie acting In the interest of
the Integrity of the Chinese" empire,
but she deceived no one.
Japan was mad. She wits ready to
fight and would have fought right
there and then had it not been that at
the head of her government there were
men thoroughly equipped to hold their
own In diplomacy with the beet Euro
wan. masters of the "art of concealing
facts." These men decided to bide
their time, and ever since Japan ha
NICHOLAS IU
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The
been building ships, ships, sai
ips, until
today her navy, vessel for vessel
sel la the
peer of 4hy In the world. She has also
paid a great deal of attention to her
army, and, while she does ot keep
under arms a very large body of men.
those which she has arc soldiers in ev
ery sense of the word.
Russia's Duplicity.
Russia's disinterestedness was ex
posed when on the pretext of "pacify
ing" Manchuria site poured 200,000
men into that country in 1900 add then
after the war of the titled nation
against China contrived by every arti
fice known to diplomacy to bold on to
Manchuria. She had her railroad con
necting the Russian and Chine cap
itals, and naturally she was anxious to
hold on to the territory It traversed.
Since then, while tho local authorities
have been Chinese, they are merely
underlings of the Russian representa
tives, to whom everything must be re
ported. Pressure, however, finally became so
strong and the other nation so insist
ent for souieexpresslon of Russia' ulti
mate Intentions concerning Manchuria
that Russia about a year ago formally
declared that she would get out Oct. 8,
1!K3. For that reason the recent an
nouncement that she Intended to re
main iu Manchuria practically perma
nently "In the interest of outside enter
prises" (to say nothing of her own rail
roads and the coal which they need and
which is found in abundance In the
mines of Manchuria) came aa a thun
derclap from a clear aky to the few
diplomatists who occasionally seriously
repird the utterance of the czar's gov
ernment. It was to be expected that
this should be denounced as a canard,
but It is pretty well understood that
the statement was inspired and was
issued as a feeler. If it was lleslgned
to produce results it disappointed no
one, for Euglnnd, Japan and the Unit
ed States immediately asked what it
all meant. Now Russia says that she
will ttrt out when she considers It safe
to tlt so, hut she also declared at the
close of the Chinese war that she would
"soon" evacuate Manchuria.
Japan knew full well that Russia
wouid "consider It safe" to get out of
MiiiM'huria concurrently with tiie blow
ing of the horn by the angel Gabriel,
and Russia knew that Japan knew it.
The mikado then realized that the czar
hr.d practically announced that it was
Jn pun's move. He tlierefore notified
Russia that as the time for the evacua
tion of Manchuria hud passed It wns
but right, with Korea (Japan's special
charge, which had already cost Jier one
war) rljrht at the door of Manchuria,
that the czar should let the world know
hi intentions with regard to th great
Chinese province. Russia' only reply
to this was to rush extra troop to her
ports In the east and Incidentally te
foment small disturbances In Man
churia In order to demonstrate that It
was not yet safe for her to leave.
Mjnn while the mikado became Insist
ent so Insistent, in fact, that the pow
ert thnt he at St Petersburg deemed
It nH-essary to create a diversion. Thla
"diversion" was characteristically Rus
sian. Affecting to regard the Manchu
rlun mutter as a "res adjudlcata," Rus
sia lMgan to encroach upon Korean ter
ritory. Just what step she took In that
direction the method of diplomacy
will not permit of pur knowing for
CZAR OF RUSSIA.
6
ConoordCTimes - Pages
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' UtAP OF KOREA AND VICINITY.
Korea strait, between Korea and Japan, is only luo miles wide, and midway be-
tWMB the twn nnuntrlaa r the wall fortified Til islands, owned by Japan. Thii
narrow strait, dominated by the torts and
municatlon between Vladivostok, on the north, and Port Arthur, the southern ter
minus of her Chinese Eastern railroad, which connects with the Trsnsslbertan line
Fuean, a Japanese colony in Korea, ia rapidly being connected by rail with Seoul
through the efforts of the Japanese government. . There Is also a short line between
Seoul and Us seaport, Chemulpo. On the map the dotted lines represent the boundary
between Korea and Manchuria and between Manchuria and Russia, the parallel linee
uncompleted railroads and the checkered lines railroads already built.
some time, but It 1 certain that she
ought to break down the predominat
ing Influence of Japan in the Hermit
Kingdom. Indeed, she went much fur
ther than the proper regard for 'the
rights of an ostensibly friendly nation
should have permitted her to go. Nat
urally Japan wanted to know what she
waa about. Then -began negotiation
concerning Korea. Russia actually had
the assurance to propose to Japan
terms with reference to Koreu, a coun
try with which, so far as the facts are
generally understood, she ha as much
right to interfere as the United State
would have, the position of "watchdog
of Korea" by common consent among
th nations of the world having long
since been accorded to Japan by reason
of her proximity and later because of
her having fairly won the distinction in
her war with China. But the purpose
of the Russian government had been
accomplished, and Korea appeared to
be the Issue, while Manchuria was, at
least temporarily, forgotten.
But, shrewd as are the czar's diplomats,
the mikado has about him a few men,
like Ito and Komura, who know a bit
about diplomacy themselves. They
had permitted the Russiaus to go on
and on and on assuming that the Japs
had forgotten that Manchuria is still
on the map. They wore merely biding
their time. Therefore when the Rus
sian statesmen, in response to one Af
their notes dealing with Korea and the
issue" there, received a communica
tion from Tokyo bodily shifting the
whole discussion back to Manchuria,
whence it hud originally begun and
where It really belonged, there was but
one thing to do assume to Ignore it.
This they did, and this Japan refused
to accept as belug a warrantable posi
tion on the part of Russia. Aa Russia
could nut well afford to back down
after having been checkmated in what
she had regarded as a very clever bit
of land grabbing, a clash then became
Inevitable. .
When two nation spring at each
other' throat, figuratively speaking,
there are more things to be considered
In speculating upon the probable out
come than mere number of men or
ships. After all, it is the individual
who brings success. American soldier
are regarded as being of more value
in the field than the soldiers of any
nation, and yet from the strictly tech
nical Btandpolnt they are probably the
poorest soldiers in the world. Except
for the handful of men who constitute
the regular army, the United State
has no troops ready to do field duty as
it 1 understood In Germany and? Rns
sla and even in France. The eondi
tions render that unnecessary. But,
a has been demonstrated on several
occasions, the American in six month
Is converted Into the most valuable
military man the world ha ever seen
That Is because be Is a thinking indi
vidual. Your well drilled man 1 all
right so long aa he has officers to lead
him. but the moment the bead disap
pears the army becomes a disorganised
mob, not knowing what to do or how
to do it. With the American the of
ficer's principal duty Is to let his men
know what lie wishes them to do.
That is all that is necessary. The men
find a way to do it, and the officer
don't bother to inquire too closely into
the methods which brought about the
desired result.
Japan's Transformation.
But even the American soldier Is In
a measure put in the shade by the Jap,
for the latter is full to bursting of en
thusiasm born of his sejf assumed di
rectorship of civilisation In the east
Regarded as a nation, Japan is new;
regarded as soldiers, the Japanese are
so new that the paint hasn't yet worn
off. But they have the right spirit and
they have demonstrated to the "world
that they are in earnest. A brief re
trospect Just here may serve to show
th really wouuerful strides made by
the Japanese.
From the appearance of Terry and
hi fleet In Yeddo bay. July 8. 1853,
may bo said to date the awakening of
3 and 4-February 10,;i,904. A
fleet of Japan, is Russia's avenue of com
Japan. Terry' mission wa to over-
we tlie Japanese into exienaing to
American ships the privileges then en
loyed by the Dutch only. History doe
not say to what lengths he wa pre.
pared to go should his show of force
prove Insufficient the fact being that
the mere sight "of the warships wa
enough to convince the shogun of th
expediency of acceding to Perry's wish
es. Accordingly, much against the de
ilres of the mighty dalmlos, African
trade was granted access to two port
As might have been expected, the Eu
ropean powers were not slow to profit
by the example, forcing similar conces
sions until, little by little, the suogun
liad surrendered the domestic trade of
tho country to th control of the treaty
powers. Out of this state of affairs ul
timately grew the revolution of 1808, in
which several of the most Influential
among the dalmlos took charge of the
person of the young mikado, MutsuhJ-
to, declared their Intention of restoring
him to full power as the real ruler of
Japan, made war on the ahogun's
troops and signally worsted them. Thus
did the young emperor find himself
placed on the throne of which his an
cestors had lieen deprived centuries be
fore. Birth of a Nation.
The ultimate result of the rebellion
was anything but pleasant even for
those dnlmlos who had participated in
the restoration of the mikado. . Grad
ually falling under the sway of culti
vated and liberal n. I tided statesmen,
the youthful Mutsuhito began to exer
cise his titular prerogative In a way
that was contrary to all Japanese tra
ditions. For this change two men, who
have since been prominently identified
with Japanese politics, were largely re
sponsible, these two being the Marquis
Hirobunil Ito and Count Inouye, the
former's lifelong friend and political
coadjutor. Chiefly ns a result of their
efforts the policy of cultivating the for
eigner sprang into being, and It was
also In no small nfeasure owing to them
that the mikado announced his lnten-
Ltlon of providing the country with an
up to date ivestern parliament. Then it
was thut the dalmlos surprlsej them
selves nnd the world by taking a step
which Insured the solidarity of the em
pire and its future high position among
the nations of the world. Voluntarily
they agreed to surrender all the privi
leges hallowed In their eyes by centu
ries of custom aud at the same time
promised to do their utmost to further
the interests of a united Japan.
A Factor In the Far East.
In this act can be discerned what has
since been widely recognized a one
of the most distinguishing traits of this
most remarkable people the r (illness
to yield life Itself If by the death of
the individual good will accrue to the
commonwealth But self sacrifice alone
gannot account for the progress Japan
has made, nor, for that matter, can
the faculty for Imitation which the
Japanese possess to so great a degree.
Their adaptability to western civiliza
tion, their willingness to accept the
noJt'l .n the place of the customary.
their amenability to discipline, all of
which have become proverbial In speak
Ing of Japan In a word, their liberal
ity Is due to their innate quickness In
tlw direction of mental Initiative.
It was the Chlno-Japanese war of
1894-93 that first aroused the civilized
world to lively Interest in the doings
of the Land of the Rising Sun. Nearly
everybody predicted when the war be
enn that the aggressive little bantam
would speedily be crushed by the aheer
weight of the nnwieldy old rooster, but
few took Into account the fact that
nation that has Just come into Its own
Is much more likely to be able to take
care of Itself than are a people decay
Ing under the obsolete rule of an effete
dynasty.
Not only are the Japanese soldiers
brave and well disciplined, but they
are also blessed with great agility and
a physical strength that one would not
expect In such mite of humanity
Their strength. ajgmay be Imagined,
was time and again tested (Wring that
trying march in the summer of 1900.
Their agUity was at all times In evi
dence, but perhaps never morefo tftn
durinrr the tormln4)f Tientsin.
Quia orderly, Mite, earnest sue
re some more of the Qualities ofiihWI
am tiny warrior who never fall to
salute the officer of every natlonen
dure without murmur all that dfllltary
life entail, accept thankfully their sti.
pend of 11-50 a month and can live and
thrive on a diet In which rice la the
prevailing staple, and little enough of
that Yet the Japanese Midler doe
not retrograde Into mere lighting ma
chine. He know how to think, be
know how toaTt aseaccaslon demands.
In the Individual, a In the race, Is
found that faculty which work so
largely for the greatness of a nation
the faculty of mental initiative.
The Russian Army.
And now for a glance at the other
aide of th picture. It would be futile
to contend that the Russian army Js
not one of tho most pfcwerful war en
gine the world has ever seen. Equally
absurd would it be to hesitate to ad
mit that the Russian soldier, from the
old world hypertechnlcal standpoint, Is
not one of the best that military science
1 capable of producing.
Russia ha the greatest army ou
earth. It consist of over 1,000,000
men In time of peace, which may eas
ily be increased to 4,000,000 in the
vent of war. The magnitude of the
czar' military establishment may be
realized if one considers the fact that
the Russian army even on a peace foot
ing contains more officers alone than
the American army ha of both officers
and men.
On a peace footing, as at present
constituted, the ariuiea of the czar are
made up of about 02 per cent Infantry,
12 per cent cavalry, 11 per cent artil
lery, 3 per cent engineers, 3 per cent
commissariat aud departmental troops
and 0 per cent Cossacks. These pro
portions give but little Idea, however,
of the relative importance of the va
rious arms of the service. While by no
mean the largest numerically, the
most conspicuous and effective portion
of the army 1 the cavalry, together
with the kindred though Irregular
body of troops known as the Cossacks.
In fact, Russia place chief reliance
on her war horses. Of these there are
4,000,000 In the empire that have had
actual training in the army and thut
can be requisitioned in case of emer
gency for cavalry duty.
A Mighty War Engine.
And the horsemen! They have no
equal In the world, these wild riders
of Russia. It Is probably due to tlie
great pluins and the vast distances to
be traversed that the Muscovites are
veritably reared In the saddle. Cer
tainly there are no other people who so
love the horse, who so cultivate him
and who have such mastery over him.
As a result the Slavic empire has al
most half of the horses of the world.
As another result the men ride like
cowboy
Every year a million men become eli
gible to Alter the Russian army. As
only about SOO.OOO are required, over
two-thirds of tlie availables must be
exempted or excused. Every district
has its recruiting board and makes up
Its quota for the various arms of the
service. The soldier in the ranks re
ceives only about $4 per year, ia some
times whipped to death, must give un
questioning obedience and is Inured to
a life of privations and hardships such
as are known in scarcely any other
army In the world. This, however, ts
not felt so much by Mie Slav as it
would bo y other races, for he has
been used to these things from his
youth up. The mass of the soldiery 1
fmptrial V K ftf
: Iff J .
UUTSUHITO, EMPEROR OF JAPAN.
Lcomposed of the peasant or former
serr class, tlie member of which are
illiterate, unaspiring, stolid, slavish but
witha hardy, courageous aud singnlar
ly devoted. In fact, no nation on earth
Mias tbj solidarity that mark Russia.
With Ml its divejgent element, It ia
still the most completely knit together
of jny empire now in existence. The
Mnscovfci is taught the submergence
of self. Obedience is the prime virtue.
t Is drilled into the citizen that he ex
1st only for the czar.
.Muscovite Peculiarities.
The Russian is gregarious in a mark
ed dree. the communal life ha ex-
1 morla. iblf sort of rough, lementaj
altruism Is carried into the army and is
in fact It distinctive spirit. It marks
the "Muscovite soldier as peculiar. It
give him a certain stolid bravery
which was recognized in the iimous
remark of Napoleon that "it is not
enough to kill a Russian soldier; you
must also push him over."
This habit of personal effacemeut, of
f blind obedience, of igmost slavlshnesa.
la sboeyii nowhere more plainly than In
the manner of the private soldier in aV
drosstng an officer. He stands rigidly
at "attention" with his hand at bis cap
throughout the entire conversation. He
never presumes to answer a question
with a direct "yes" or "no," but with a
qualified "quite so" or "not exactly so."
He invariably use the title of "yoajr
excellency" or "your illustrlousness" or
"your nobility" or even "your high no
bility." Russia, the Undefeated.
The diet of the Muscovite when in
the field is simplicity itself. It is
largely vegetarian. Cabbage soup, po
tatoes, peas, beans, macaroni and vari
ous kinds of porridge are the staple
foods. Those, with the black ry bread
and occasionally a small amount of
meat, make up the army fare. Yet,
like the Roman soldier, who also lived
on a-vegetable diet, these men can en
dure hardships such as the ordinary
civilian can acarcely conceive. The
"moving kitchen" is one feature of the
Russian camp that is unique and that
Is being copied by other European ar
mies, ft Is what Its name Implies, a
veritable kitchen on wheels that ac
companies the army on all Its marches,
as indispensable as its camp equipages.
Its artillery and Its ammunition In
fact, It supplies the ammunition for the
human war machines, furnishing dy
namic force that when released In time
of bnttle is hurled against the enemy
with terrific effect.
Russia has never been defeated, if
the rather inconclusive Crimean war lie
excepted. Steadily, resistlessly, she has
spread her dominion over Finland, over
Poland, over Turkey, over Manchuria.
Even the matchless genius of a Napo
leon was unequal to the task of pene
trating this human mass. No nation of
either ancient or modern times has ever
been so unified, so organic.
In the matter of navies there is little
to choose between Russia atylj Japan.
Russia has more ships, but Many of
them are locked up in the Black sea,
and many' more of them dare not leave
the Baltic. Then, too, while a fair pro
portion of Russia's warships are strict
ly modern instructions, practically all
of Japan's are ns up to dnte ns it Is
possible to make them. Russia has bad
no fighting experience wl her new
navy; Japan has had both men aud
ships tested under tire. And, most im
portant of all, the theater bf the pres
ent conflict Is half around the world
from Russia . proper, while Japan iu
operating against Russia's fleets In the
east will be at the same time patrol
ling her own coast and menacing the
Asiatic ports owned or controlled by
her foe.
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