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WILMINGTON, N. C, FRIDAY JULY 29, 1898.
81.00 PER YEAR.
OL. XXXI. NO. 60.
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SAMPSON'S
To the Navy Department on the Destruction
of Cervera's Fleet
SCHLEY'S REPORT TO SAMPSON
Detailed Account of the Dash for Liberty by the Spaniards and the
Prompt and Powerful Resistance of Our Warships Sampson
Has Little to Say of the Part Played by the Brooklyn in
This Fierce Contest The Little the New York Did
Elaborately Set Forth The Heavy Attack
on the Brooklyn.
Washington, July 20. The navy de
partment today made public the re
port of Admiral Sampson on the de
struction of Cervera's nrjuadron, off
Santiago, July 3rd. It is as follows:
Off Santiago de Cuba, July 15, 1808.
Si i I havf the honor to make the
following report upon the battle and
destruction of th- Spanish squadron
rornrnii.ndd by Admiral Cervera, off
Santiago d Cuba, on Sunday, July 3rd,
The enemy's vessels came out of the
harbor between t:C5 and 10:00 o'clock
it. in., the head of the column appear
ing around Cay Smith at 9:13 o'clock
smd emerging from the channel five or
ix minutes later.
The positions of the vessels of my
command off Santiago at that moment
were as follows: The flagship New
York was four miles east of her block
ading station, and about seven miles
from the harbor entrance. She had
started for Siboney, where I intended
to land, accompanied by several of my
staff, and fro to the front to consult
with General Shafter. A discussion of
the situation, and a more definite un
derstanding " between us of the opera
tions proposed had been rendered ne
cessary by the unexpectedly strong re
sistance of the Spanish garrison of
Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff
on shore the day before to arrange an
interview with General Shafter, who
has been suffering from heat prostra
tion. I made arrangements to go to
his headquarters, and my llagship was
in the position mentioned above when
the Spanish squadron appeared in the
channel. The remaining vessels were
in or near their usual blockading po
sitions, distributed in a semi-circle
iibout the harbor entrance, counting
from the eastward to the westward in
the following order: The Indiana
about a mile and a half from shore,
the Oregon, the New York's
place between these two, the Iowa,
Texas and Brooklyn, the latter two
miles from the shore west of Santiago.
The distance of the vessels from the
harbor entrance was from two and one
half to four miles, the latter being the
limit of day blockading distance. The
length of the arc formed by the ships
was about eight miles. The Massachu
setts had left at 4 o'clock a. m. for
Guantanamo for coal. Her station was
between the Iowa and the Texas. The
auxiliaries Gloucester and Vixen lay
close fo the land and nearer the har
bor entrance than the large vessels,
the Glctucester to the eastward and the
Vixen to the westward. The torpedo
boad Kriesson was in company with
the flagship and remained with her
during the chase until ordered to dis
continue, when she rendered Very ef
ficient service in rescuing prisoners
from the burning Vizcaya. I enclose
a diagram showing approximately the
positions of the vessels as described
above.
Four Spanish ships came rapidly out
of the harbor at from four to six
knots, in the following order: Infanta
Maria Teresa (flagship), Vizcaya, Cris
tobal Colon, and the Almirante Oquen
do. The distance between these ships
was abi.ut S00 yards, which means that
from the time the first one became vis
ible ir. the upper reach of the channel
until the last one was out of the har
bor, an interval of only about twelve
minutes elapsed. Following the Oquen
do at a distance of about 1,200 yards,
came the torpedo boat destroyer Plu
ton. and after her, the Furor. The ar
mored cruisers, as rapidly as they
could bring their guns to bear, opened
a. vigorous fire upon the blockading
vessels, and emerged from the chan
nel shrouded in the smoke from their
fruns.
The men of our ships in front of the
port were at Sunday "quarters for in
spection." The signal as made sim
ultaneously from evera,.-vessels, "En
emy's ships escaping," and general
quarters was sounded. T.'e men cheer
ed as they spran-g to thei, guns, and
fire was opened probably within eight
minutes by the vessels whose guns
commanded the entrance. The New
York turned about and steamed for the
escaping fleet, flying the signal "Close
in toward harbor entrance and attack
vessels," and gradually increasing
speed, until toward the end of the
chase she was making knots and
was rapidly closing on the Cristobal
Colon. She was not, at any time, with
in the range of the heavy Spanish ships
and her only part in the firing was to
Teceive the undivided fire from the
forts in passing the harbor entrance,
and to fire a few shots at one of the
destroyers, though they at that mo
ment were attempting to escape the
Gl&ucester.
THE CHASE.
The Spanish vessels in clearing the
harbor turned westward in column, in
creasing their speed to the full power
of their engines. The heavy blockad
ing vessels, which had closed in to
ward the Morro at the instant of the
enemy's appearance, and at their best
speed, delivered a rapid fie, well sus
tained and destructive, wh speedily
overwhelmed and silenced V e Spanish
fire. The initial speed of th Spaniards
carried them rapidly past the blockad
ing vessels and the battle developed
Into a chase In which the Brooklyn and
REPORT
the Texas had at the start the advan
tage of position. The Brooklyn main
tained this lead. The Oregon, steam
ing with amazing speed from the
commencement of the action, took first
place. The Iowa and the Indiana, hav
ing done good work, and not having
the speed of the other ships, were di
rected by me in succession, at about
the time the Vizcaya was beached, to
drop out of the chase and resume their
blockading stations. These vessels
rescued many prisoners. The Vixen,
finding that the rush of the Spanish
ships would put her between two fires,
ran outside of our own column and
remained there during the battle and
chase.
The skillful handling and gallant
fighting of the Gloucester excited the
admiration of every one who wit
nessed it, and merits the commen.la
tion of the navy department. She is a
fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary
vessel the yacht Corsair and has a
good battery of light rapid fire guns.
She was lying about two miles from
the harbor entrance, to the southward
and eastward and immediately steam
ed in, opening fire upon the large
ships. Anticipating the appearance of
the Pluton and the Furor, the Glou
cester was slowed, thereby gaining
more rapidly a high pressure of steam,
and when the destroyers came out
she steamed for them at full speed,
and was able to close at short range,
where her fire was accurate, deadly,
and of great volume. During this fight
the Gloucester was under the fire of
the Socapa battery. Within twrenty
minutes from the time they emerged
from Santiago harbor, the careers of
the Furor and the Pluton were ended
and two-thirds of their people killed.
The Furor was beached and sunk in
the surf. The Pluton sank in deep
water a few minutes later. The de
stroyers probably suffered much in
jury from the fire of the secondary
batteries of the battleships Iowa, In
diana and the Texas, yet I think a
very considerable factor in their
speedy destruction was the fire, at
close range, of the Gloucester's bat
tery. After rescuing the survivors of
the destroyers, the Gloucester did ex
cellent service in landing and securing
the crew of the Infanta Maria Teresa.
The method of escape attempted by
the Spaniards, all steering in the same
direction and in formation, removed
all tactical doubt of difficulties, and
made plain the duty of every United
States vessel to close in immediately,
engage and pursue. This was promptly
and effectively done. As already stat
ed, the first rush of the Spanish squad
ron carried it past a number of the
blockading ships which could not im
mediately work up to their best speed;
but they suffered heavily In passing,
and the Infanta Maria Teresa and the
Oquendo were probably set on fire by
shells fired during the first fifteen
minutes of the engagement. It was
afterward learned that the Infanta
Maria Teresa's fire main had been cut
by one of our first shots and that she
was unable to extinguish the fire. With
large volumes of smoke rising from
their decks aft, these vessels gave up
both fight and flight, and ran in on the
beach, the Infanta Maria Teresa at
about 10:15 o'clock at Nima Nima, six
and one-half miles from Santiago har
bor entrance, and the Almirante
Oquendo at about 10:30 o'clock at Juan
Gonzales, seven miles from the port.
The Vizcaya was still under the fire
of the leading vessels. The Christobal
Colon had drawn ahead, leading the
chase, and soon passed beyond the
range of the guns of the leading
American ships. The Vizcaya was
soon set on fire and at 11:15 o'clock
she turned in shore and was beached
at Asserraderos, fifteen miles from
Santiago, burning fiercely, and with
her reserves of ammunition on deck
already beginning to explode. When
about ten miles west of Santiago the
Indiana had been signaled to go back
to the harbor entrance and at Asser
raderos the Iowa was signaled to
"resume blockading station." The
Iowa, assisted by the Ericsson and the
Hist, took off the crew of the Viz
caya, while the Harvard and the
Gloucester rescued those of the In
fanta Maria Teresa and the Almirante
Oquendo. This rescue of prisoners, in
cluding the wounded, from the burn
ing vessels, was the occasion of some
of the most daring and gallant con
duct of the day. The ships were burn
ing fore and aft, their guns and re
serve ammunition were exploding and
it was not known at what moment the
fire would reach the magazines. In
addition to this, a heavy surf was
running just inside of the Spanish
ships, but no risk deterred our offi
cers and men until their work of hu
manity was complete.
There remained now of the Spanish
ships only the Cristobal Colon, but she
was their best and fastest vessel.
Forced by the squadroti to hug the
Cuban coast, her only chance of escape
was by superior and sustained speed.
When the Vizcaya went ashore the Co
lon was about six miles ahead of the
Brooklyn and the Oregon, but her
spurt was finished, and the American
ships were gaining upon her. Behind
the Brooklyn and the Oregon came the
Texas, Vixen and New York. It was
evident from the New York that all
the American ships were gradually
overhauling: the chase and that she had
no chance of escape. At 12:50 o'clock
the Brooklyn and the Oregon opened
fire and got her range, the Oregon's
heavy shells striking beyond her. ana
at 1:20 o'clock she gave up without
firing another shot, hauled down her
colors and ran ashore at Rio Torpuino,
forty-eight miles from Santiago. Cap
tain Cook, of the Brooklyn, went on
board to receive the surrender. While
his boat was alongside I came up in
the New York, received his report and
placed the Oregon In charge of the
wreck to save her if possible, and di
rected the prisoners to be transferred
to the Resolute, which had followed in
the chase. Commodore Schley, whose
chief of staff had gone on board to
receive the surrender, had directed
that all their personal effects should be
retained by the officers. This order I
did not modify. The Cristobal Colon
was not injured by our firing and prob
ably is not much injured by beaching,
though she ran ashore at high speed.
The beach was so steep that she came
off by the working of the sea. But
her sea valves were opened and brok
en treacherously, I am sure, after her
surrender, and, despite all efforts, she
sank. When it became evident that
she could not be kept afloat, she was
pushed by the New York bodily upon
the beach, (the New York's stem be
ing placed against her for this purpose,
the ship being handled by Captain
Chadwick with admirable judgement),
and sank in shoal water and may be
saved. Had this not been done she
would have gone down in deep water
and would have been, to a certainty, a
total loss.
I regard this complete and important
victory over the Spanish forces as the
successful finish of several weeks of
ardous and close blockade, so stringent
and effective during the night that the
enemy was deterred from making the
attempt to escape at night and de
liberately made the attempt in day
light. That this was the case I was
informed by the commanding officer of
the Cristobal Colon.
Admiral Sampson at this point fully
describes the manner in which the
blockade of the harbor was maintain
ed, showing that it was impossible for
any of Cervera's ships to escape with
out detection. Every night an Ameri
can battleship turned its searchlight
on the channel leading out of the har
bor. Admiral Sampson continues as fol
lows: When all the work was done so well,
it is difficult to discriminate in praise.
The object of the blockade of Cer
vera's squadron was fully accomplish
ed and each individual bore well his
part in it, the commodore in command
of the second division, the captains of
the ships, their officers and men. The
fire of the battleships was powerful and
destructive and the resistance of the
Spanish squadron was in great part
broken almost before the had got be
yond the range of their own forts. The
fine speed of the Oregon enabled her
to take a front position in the chase,
and the Cristobal Colon did not give
up until the Oregon had thrown a
13-inch shell beyond her. This per
formance adds to the already brilliant
record of this fine battleship and
speaks highly of the. skill and care
with which her admirable efficiency has
been maintained during a service un
precedented in the history of vessels
of her class. The Brooklyn's westerly
I blockading position gave her an ad
! vantage in the chase which she main
tained to the end, and she employed
her fine battery with telling effect. The
Texas and the New York were gaining
on the chase during the last hour, and,
had any accident befallen the Brook-
i lyn, would have speedily overhauled
tne Cristobal colon. From the . mo
ment the Spanish vessels exhausted
her first burst of speed the result was
never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far
below what might reasonably have
been expected of her. Careful meas
urements of time and distance gave
her an average speed from the time
she cleared the harbor mouth until the
time she "was at Rio Tarquino, of 13.7
knots. Neither the New York nor the
Brooklyn stopped to couple up their
forward engines, but ran out to the
chase with one pair, getting steam,
of course, as rapidly as possible in all
boilers. To stop to couple the forward
engines would have meant a delay of
fifteen minutes or four miles in the
chase.
OUR LOSS.
Several of the ships were struck, the
Brooklyn more often than the others,
but very slight material injury was
done, the greatest being aboard the
Iowa. Our loss was one man killed and
one wounded, both on the Brooklyn. It
is difficult to explain this immunity
from loss of life or injury to ships in
a combat with modern vessels of the
best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor
i at best, and the superior weight and
accuracy of our fire speedily drove the
men from their guns and silenced their
fire. This is borne out by the state
ments of prisoners and by observation.
The Spanish vessels, as they dashed
out of the harbor, were covered with
the smoke of their own guns, but this
speedily diminished in volume and
soon almost disappeared. The fire
from the rapid-fire batteries of the
battleships appears to have been re
markably destructive. An examina
tion of the stranded vessels shows that
the Almirante Oquendo especially suf
fered terribly from the fire. Her sides
are everywhere pierced and her decks
were strewn with the charred remains
of those who had fallen.
The reports of Commodore W. S.
Schley and of the commanding officer
are enclosed.
A board appointed by me several
days ago, has made a critical examina
tion of the stranded vessels, both with
a viewT of reporting on our fire, of mil
itary features involved and reporting
upon the chance of saving any of them
and of wrecking the remainder. The
report of the board will be speedily
forwarded.
Very respectfully,
W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.
Commander-in-Chief United States Na
vy Force North Atlantic Station.
COMMODORE SCHLEY'S REPORT.
Commodore Schley's report is as fol
lows: North Atlantic Fleet, Second Squad
ron, United States Flagship Brooklyn,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, July 6, 1898:
Sir: I have the honor to make this
report of the squadron under your
command which came under my ob
servation during: the engagement .with
the Spanish fleet on July 3, 189S.
At 9:35 o'clock a. m. Admiral Cer
vera, with the Infanta Maria Teresa.
Vizcaya, Oquendo, Christobal Colon
and two torpedo boat destroyers came
out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba
in column at distance and attempted
to escape to the westward. Signal was
made from the Iowa that the enemy
was coming out, but this movement
had been discovered from this ship
at the same moment. This vessel was
the farthest west, except the Vixen,
in the blockading line; signal was
made to the western division as pre
scribed in your general orders and
there was immediate and rapid move
ment inward by your squadron and a
general engagement at ranges begin
ning at 1,100 yards and varying to 3.000
until the Vizcaya was destroyed about
10S30 o'clock a. m. The concentration
of 'the fire of the squadron upon the
ships coming out was most furious
and terrific, and great damage was
done them.
Aoout twenty or twenty-five minutes
aft.-r the engagement began, two ves
sels, thought to be the Teresa and
Oquendo and since verified as such,
took fire from the effective shell fire
of the squadron and were forced to
run on the beach some six or seven
mile.? west of the harbor entrance,
where they burned and blew up later.
The torpedo boat destroyers were de
stroyed early in the action, but the
smoke was so dense in their direction
that I cannot say to which vessel or
vessels the credit belongs. This doubt
less was better seen from your flag
ship. The Vizcaya and Colon," perceiving
the disaster to their consorts, contin
ued at full speed to the westward to
escape and were followed and engaged
in a running fight with the Brooklyn,
Texas, Iowa and Oregon until 10:50
o'clock, when the Vizcaya took fire
from our shells. She put her helm to
port and with a heavy list to port,
stood in shore and ran aground at
Asse.-aderos, about twenty-one miles
west of Santiago on fire fore and aft.
and where she blew up during the
night. Observing that she had struck
her 'colors, and that several vessels
were nearing her to capture and save
the ; crew, the signal was made to
cease firing. The Oregon having prov
ed vastly faster than the other battle
ships, she and the Brooklyn, together
with the Texas and another vessel
which proved to be your flagship, con
tinued westward in pursuit of the
Colon, which had run close In shore
evidently seeking some good spot to
beach if she should fail to elude her
pursuers.
This pursuit continued with increas
ing speed in the Brooklyn, Oregon and
other ships and soon the Brooklyn and
the Oregon were within long range of
the jCDlon, when the Oregon opened
fire with her 13-inch guns, landing a
shell close to the Colon. A moment
afterward the Brooklyn opened fire
with her 8-inch guns, landing a shell
just aaead of her. Several other shells
were fired at the Colon, now in range
of the Brooklyn's and Oregon's guns.
Her commander seeing all chances-of
escar l-cut off and destruction awaiting
his- hip, fired a Lee gun and struck
her flag at 1:15 o'clock p. m., and ran
ashore at a point some fifty miles
west of Santiago harbor. Your flag
ship was coming up rapidly at the
same time, as was also the Texas and
the Vixen. A little later, after your
arrival, the Christobal Colon, which
had struck to the Brooklyn and the
Oregon, was turned over to you as
one of the trophies of this great vic
tory of the squadron under your com
mand. During my official visit a little later,
Commander Eaton, of the Resolute,
appeared and reported to you the pres
ence of a Spanish battleship near Al
tares. Your orders to me were to take
the Oregon and go eastward to meet
her, and this was done by the Brook
lyn, with the result that the vessel re
ported as an enemy was discovered
to be the Austrian cruiser Infanta Ma
ria Teresa, seeking the commander-in-chief.
I would mention for your considera
tion that the Brooklyn occupied the
most westward blockading position
with the Vixen, and, being more di
rectly in the route taken by the Span
ish squadron, was exposed for some
minutes, possibly ten, to the gun fire
of three of the Spanish ships and the
west battery at a range of 1,500 yards
from the ships and about 3,000 yards
from the batteries, but the vessels of
the entire squadron, closing In rapid
ly, soon diverted this fire and did mag
nificent work at close range. I have
never before witnessed such deadly
and fatally accurate shooting as was
done by the ships of your command,
as they closed in on the Spanish squad
ron, and I deem it a high privilege to
commend to you for such action as
you may deem proper, the gallantry
and dashing courage, the prompt decis
ion and the .skillful handling of their
respective vessels, of Captain Philip,
Captain Evans, Captain Clark and es
pecially of my chief of staff. Captain
Cook, who was directly under my per
sonal observation and whose coolness,
promptness and courage were of the
highest order. The dense smoke of
the combat shut out from my view the
Indiana and the Gloucester, but as
these vessels were closer to your flag
ship no doubt their part in the con
flict was under your immediate obser
vation. Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the
Vixen, acted with conspicuous courage,
although unable to engage the heavier
ships of the enemy with his light guns,
nevertheless was close in to the batle
line under heavy fire and many of the
enemy's shots passed beyond his ves
sel. I beg to invite special attention to
the conduct of my flag lieutenant, Jas.
H. Sears, and Ensign Edward Mc
Cauley, Jr., aide, who were constantly
at my side during the engagement and
who exposed themselves fearlessly in
discharging their duties: and also to
the splendid behaivor of my secretary.
Lieutenant B. W. Wells, Jr., who com
manded and directed the fighting of
the fourth division with splendid ef
fect. I would commend the highly merito
rious conduct and courage in the en
gagement of Lieutenant Commander
N. E. Mason, the executive officer,
whose presence everywhere over the
ship during its continuance did much
to secure the good result of this ship's
part in the .victory.
The navigator. Lieutenant A. C.
Hodgson, and the division officers.
Lieutenant T. X. Griffith, Lieutenant
W. R. Rush. Lieutenant Edward Simp
son. Lieutenant J. G. Doyle. Ensign
Charles Webster and the junior divis
ional officers were most steady and
conspicuous in every detail of duty,
contributing to the accurate firing of
this ship in her part of the grvat vic
tory of your forces.
The officers of the medical, pay and
engineer and marine corps responded
to every demand of the occasion and
were fearless In exposing themselves.
The warrant officers. Boatswain Wil
liam L. Hill, Carpenter G. H. Warford.
and Gunner Applegate. were every
where exposed in watching for dam
age, reports of which were promptly
conveyed to me.
I never have in my life served with
a braver, better or worthier crew than
that of the Brooklyn. During the com
bat lasting from 9:35 o'clock until 1:15
o'clock p. m., much of the time under
fire, they never flagged for a moment
and were apparently undisturbed by
the storm of projectiles passing ahead,
astern and over the ship.
The result of the engagement was
the destruction of the Spanish squad
ron and the capture of the admiral and
some 1.3O0 to 1.500 prisoners, with the
loss of several hundred killed, estimat
ed by Admiral Cervera at 6u0 men.
The casualties on board this ship
were: G. II. Ellis, chief yoeman, kill
ed; J. Burns, fireman, first-class, se
verely wounded. The marks and scars
show that the ship was struck about
twenty-five times and she lears in all
forty-one scars as the result of her
participation in the great victory of
your force on July 3. IMS. The speed
cone halliards were shot away, and
nearly all the signal halliards. The en
sign at the main was so shattered
that in hauling it down at the close of
the action, it fell in pieces.
I congratulate you most sincerely
upon this great victory to the squad
ron under your command and I am
glad that I had an opportunity to con
tribute in the least to a victory that
seems big enough for all of In.
Since reaching this place and hold
ing conversation with severaJ of the
captains, viz.: Captain Eulate. of the
Vizcaya and the second in command
of the Colon, Commander Contreras, I
have learned that the Spanish ad
miral's scheme was to concentrate all
fire for a while on the Brooklyn, and
the Vizcaya to ram her, in hopes that
they could destroy her, the chance of
escape would be increased, as it was
supposed she was the swiftest ship of
your squadron. This explains the
heavy fire mentioned and the Vizcaya's
action in the earlier moments of the
engagement. The execution of this
purpose was promptly defeated by the
fact that all the ships of the squad
ron advanced into close range and
opened an irresistibly furious and ter
rific fire upon the enemy's squadron,
as it was coming out of the harbor.
I am glad to say that the injury
supposed to be below the line was due
to a water valve being opened from
some unknow cause and flooding the
compartment. The injury to the belt
is found to be only slight and the
leak small.
I-beg to enclose a list of officers and
crew who participated in the combat
of July 3, 1898.
I cannot close this report without
mentioning in high terms of praise the
splendid conduct and support of Cap
tain C. E. Clark, of the Oregon. Her
speed was wonderful and her accurate
fire splendidly destructive.
Very respectfully,
W. S. SCHLEY,
Commodore, U. S. Navy,
Commanding Second Division, North
Atlantic Fleet.
UNSUCCESSFUL EXPEDITION
The Wanderer Prevented by Spanlfth
Cavalry From Landing Suppllew on
tne Cuban Shores.
Key West, Fla., July 27, 9:30 a. m.
News reached here today of the at
tempted landing on the Cuban shore
of a large expedition, men and arms,
by the steamer Wanderer, which left
Key West about a week ago. Banes,
west of Havana, was the point selected
for debarkation, but arriving there, the
expedition was confronted by a body
of cavalry numbering 1,000 or more and
a sharp engagement ensued. The Wan
derer was to have been met by a par
ty of Cubans who had evidently been
dispersed by the Spanish forces before
the arrival of the steamer.
The Wanderer, which was not under
convoy, drew up about 400 yards from
the shore and began discharging her
cargo by means of small boats. At
first there was no sign of resistance
and a portion of the supplies had al
ready been placed on the beach when
a vigorous rifle fire was opened on the
members of the expedition from a
wooded growth lining the beach and a
force of Spanish cavalrymen burst into
view. There were about two score of
shorpshooters with the expedition and
they attempted to cover the retreat
by lying flat and returning the Span
iards' fire. They picked off a number
of the cavalrymen and as the oppos
ing force backed to the woods, the
Wanderer's men got their boats off,
but not before William Davis, mate;
William Ross, seaman; Renite Sabata,
Gabriel Alvarez. Felix Lopez and Ro
julu Garcia had been slightly wound
ed. After the Wanderer's men had got
ten away the Spaniards pushed down
to the beach and resumed their fire,
peppering the hull of the Wanderer
with Mauser bullets, but inflicting no
further damage.
The gunboat Vicksburg returned here
this morning, after having been thlr-t-
-eight days on the blockade. She re
I ' rts that on Tuesday last, while two
rriles off shore, west of Havana, the
Vedaldo battery and a battery recent
ly erected fired three shots each at her.
The shells fell close to the ship and
she quickly got out of range.
Jott What She Needrd.
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was so nervous I could not sleep. I
was troubled with dyspepsia and was
very weak. After I had taken a few
bottles of Hood's Sarsaparilla I could
eat anything I wished, could eleep well
and was much stronger. Mrs. John
J. Martin, Werrington, North Caro
lina. Hood's Pills cure all liver ills. Easy
to take, easy to operate; reliable,
sure. 25c
J,
Absolutely Pure
ov rcwr co., tr
A TALK WITH MIAPTKU
Proposition to Install Cuban In Power
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(Special to The Baltimore Sun.)
Santiago. Monday, July 23, (cable. I
from Playa del Este Tuesday.) Gen
eral Shafter gave me today an inter
esting interview on the situation here.
He throws much light on the contro
versy with General Calixto Garcia,
the Cuban leader.
"You may state." General Shaftor
said, when I called at the palace, in
which he is now comfortably situated,
"that the situation in Santiago is much
improved. Twenty thousand Spanish
soldiers in the province have laid down
their arms, leaving less than fivo
thousand to be accounted for. I bopo
that all the Sparish army will havo
been accounted for by the end of tho
week, so that the work of loading tho
troops on transports will bo over aa
soon as possible and the campaign In
the province be brought to a close.
"General Wood, who has been in
stalled as military governor, has full
power to act as circumstances may,
warrant. If the occasion should arise,
it would be a simple matter for him to
suspend the operation of the existing
civil government and impose a mili
tary dictatorship. But it is unlikely,
that any serious difficulty will be met.
"The people of Santiago are quiet
and orderly, and they seem delighted
that the campaign ia over. They
have been cooped up so long that
whatever regret they may feel is over
balanced by the compensation of
peace.
"In the country many of the Span
ish troops have gone to work, while
here in Santiago, as you can see for
yourself, business has been resumed.
Food is coming In more liberally, and
in another week there should be plen
ty for all.
"The health of the city is much bet
ter than I had anticipated, yet there
is a great deal of sickness, and con
stant care will be required to pre
vent the Fpread of disease in tho
army. Our troops havo withstood tho
ravages of death and the great dis
comforts of the heavy rains. They are
remarkably well. Sanitary reforms,
which are being Instituted, will, I
think, improve the health of tho com
munity in general.
"As to the political situation, I havo
little to add to what Is already known.
I regreat that General Garcia Bhould
feel offended because he was not per
mitted to be a signatory party to tho
Spanish surrender. In a letter to him,
written in reply to his protest, I havo
made it plain that the ceremony ot
surrender and the retention of Span
ish municipal officers and tariff duties
must be treated as temporary meas
ures, apart from the final permanent
policy of the United States in Cuba,
I told General Garcia that we were at
war with Spain; that we would bo
held responsible before tho world for
the administration of the surrendered
territory, and that pending the conclusion-
of the war the Cubans could
not reasonably expect tho recognition
which he sought. At the proper,
time, I added, the terms of the presi
dent's proclamation would undoubt
edly be made good.
"The letter was personal and friend
ly In tone, but General Garcai mado
no reply to it The next news I heard
of him was that ho had withdrawn
with his army near Holguin.
"The fact is that I did recognize Gen
eral Garcia as far as I could by invit
ing him to be present at tue surrender
of Santiago as my guest. He declined
to come, sending this message: 'I can
not be your guest under tne Spanish)
flag.'
"I have the moat kindly feeling for
General Garcia, and sincerely regret
that he has found cause for complaint.
It is Idle, to argue the point, for no
matter how warmly one may sympa
thize with the Cubans, the proposition
to install them in power immediately
after the surrender of the Spanish la
untenable and lacks support among;
Cubans themselves."
The palace In which General Shaf
ter has established his headquarters
is large and roomy, though a some
what antiquated building. General
Shafter today inspected the ctty on
horseback, being accompanied by two
members of his staff. He was well
received along the route.
General Shafter Is a strict discipli
narian, and Is rapidly bringing the
branches of the army Into one cohe
sive body, capable of coping with any:
situation that may arise. . ...
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