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PAPERS

Presented by His Majesty's Command to both Houses of Parliament, the 18th May 1803.

(Continued from our last.)

No. 16. Mr. Merry to Hawkebury dated October 3, informing him that the provisional government of the revolutionary Swiss, had deputed a private agent to request of the first Consul not to take part in their troubles. At a first interview he was encouraged and assured that France would leave them to their own management; but soon afterwards was surprised to learn that the Consul was well known to have taken. He was authorized to apply to the foreign ministers for their interference, but was refused. He then requested money from Great Britain, to assist in maintaining the conflict.

No. 17. Hawkebury to Otto Oct. 10, complaining of the part France took in the affairs of Switzerland, alleging the independence of that country and expressing the wish of the English government that the Swiss might be left to settle their internal concerns without the interference of Foreign powers.

No. 18. Hawkebury to Francis Moore Oct. 10, appointing him confidential agent to the Swiss confederacy, with instructions to inform them that in case a French army entered their country, the British would furnish them pecuniary aid.

No. 19. A letter from Francis Moore, Esq. to Lord Hawkebury, dated Constance, Oct. 31, 1802, states, that he had received authentic intelligence of the submission of the Swiss Diet, assembled at Schwitz, to the French arms.

No. 20. Is a letter from Lord Hawkebury, to Francis Moore, Esq. dated Nov. 25, 1802, intimating that his residence in Switzerland would be no longer necessary.

No. 21. From Robert Lifton to Hawkebury, dated Hague, Oct. 13, stating the interference of the French in the troubles of the Dutch.

No. 22. Same to same, dated Oct. 29, stating the dissatisfaction of the government of Holland at the remaining of the French troops.

No. 23. Letter from Lord Hawkebury to Lord Whitworth, imputing the declaration of General Suart to Colonel Sebastiani, of his inability to evacuate Egypt, to his having been misled in supposing that it was requisite he should receive a warrant for the purpose; and stating that orders should be immediately sent to General Suart to remove the King's troops with as little delay as possible.

Nos. 24, 25, and 26. are extracts of dispatches from St. Petersburg and Vienna, relative to Malta. They are unimportant.

No. 27. Extracts from a dispatch from the Hon. A. Paget to Lord Hawkebury dated Vienna, Aug. 22, 1802; stating the Emperor's act of guarantee and accession to the treaty of Amiens.

Nos. 28, 29 & 30, are unimportant.

No. 31. Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Jackson to Lord Hawkebury, dated Berlin, Nov. 25, 1802; stating that Count Haugwitz had hinted that the King of Prussia took a very slight interest in the fate of Malta; and that he was countenanced in withholding his guarantee by the example of Spain. He however, added, that the report in question had been made to the king, and that he only wanted his Majesty's commands to confer with Mr. Jackson farther upon the subject.

Nos. 32, & 33, are unimportant. No. 34, contains the conditions upon which his imperial Majesty of all the Russias is willing to accede to the stipulations of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens.

No. 35. Whitworth to Lord Hawkebury, stating a conversation with Talleyrand, in which the subject of libels was renewed and gone over, and some serious enquiries made by the French minister, what was the intention of the British respecting Malta.

No. 36. Hawkebury to Whitworth, dated Feb. 9, 1803, alleging that when the treaty of peace was concluded, relation was had to the then state of affairs, that the interference of the French in the affairs of Europe, and the

tion of several countries to France since that period, would fully justify the King of England in claiming equivalents; that notwithstanding, he had proceeded in a course of fulfilment of the definitive treaty of peace, and would have been ready to carry into effect the 10th article according to its true intent and meaning, had not his attention been arrested by a publication of Sebastiani, respecting Egypt, which was received as official, and which avowed sentiments and views so hostile to the British interests, and inconsistent with the treaty of peace, that it became necessary to declare that it would be impossible to enter into any further discussion respecting Malta until that publication was explained.

No. 37. From Whitworth to Hawkebury, dated Feb. 27, 1803, the substance of which is more fully explained in.

No. 38. Same to same, date Paris, February 21, 1803, to do justice to which we give it entire.

Paris, February 21, 1803.

My Lord,

My last dispatch, in which I gave your Lordship an account of my conference with M. de Talleyrand, was scarcely gone, when I received a note from him informing me that the First Consul wished to converse with me, and desired I would come to him at nine o'clock. He received me in his cabinet, with tolerable cordiality, and, after talking on different subjects for a few minutes, he desired me to sit down, as he himself did on the other side of the table, and began. He told me that he felt it necessary, after what had passed between me and M. de Talleyrand, that he should in the most clear and authentic manner, make known his sentiments to me in order to their being communicated to his Majesty, and he conceived this would be more effectually done by himself than through any medium whatever. He said that it was a matter of infinite disappointment to him, that the Treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by conciliation and friendship, the natural effects of peace, had been productive only of continued and increasing jealousy and mistrust; and that this mistrust was avowed in such a manner as must bring the point to an issue.

He now enumerated the several provocations which he pretended to have received from England. He placed in the first line our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria as we were bound to do by Treaty. In this he said that no consideration on earth should make him acquiesce; and of the two he had rather see us in possession of the Fauxbourg St. Antoine than Malta. He then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the English public prints, but this he said he did not so much regard as that which appeared in the French papers published in London. This he considered as much more mischievous, since it meant to excite this country against him and his government. He complained of the protection given to Georges and others of his description, who instead of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised, were permitted to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coasts of France, as well as in the interior. In confirmation of this he told me, that two men had been within these few days apprehended in Normandy, and were now on their way to Paris, who were hired assassins, and employed by the Bishop of Arras, by Georges, and by Duthell, as would be fully proved in a Court of Justice, and made known to the world.

He acknowledged that the irritation he felt against England increased daily, because every wind (I make use as much as I can of his own ideas and expressions) which blew from England, brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him.

He now went back to Egypt, and told me, that if he had any inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago, by sending 25,000 men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country in defiance of the 4000 British in Alexandria.

That instead of the garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with pretence for invading it. This he should not do whatever might be his desire to have it a colony, because he did not think it would be worth the risk of a war, in which he might be considered as the aggressor, and by which he would lose more than he could gain, since sooner or later Egypt would belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or else some arrangement with the Porte.

As a proof of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he had to gain by going to war with England. A descent was the only means of defence he had, and that he was determined to attempt, by putting himself at the head of the expedition. But how could it be supposed, that after having gained the height on which he stood, he would risk his life and reputation in such a hazardous attempt, unless forced to it by necessity, when the chances were that he and the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom of the sea? He talked much on this subject, but never affected to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that there were an hundred chances to one against him; but still he was determined to attempt it, if war should be the consequence of the present discussion; and that such was the disposition of the troops, that army after army would be found for the enterprise.

He then expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries. France with an army of 480,000 men, for to this amount it is, he said, to be immediately completed, all ready for the most desperate enterprises; and England with a fleet that made her mistress of the seas, and which he did not think he could equal in less than ten years. Two such countries, by a proper understanding might govern the world, but by their strifes might overturn it. He said, that if he had not felt the enmity of the British Government on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens, there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate; participation in indemnities as well as influence on the continent; treaties of commerce, in short, any thing that could have given satisfaction, and have testified his friendship. Nothing, however, had been able to conquer hatred of the British Government, and therefore it was now come to the point whether we should have peace or war. To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled; the abuse of the public prints, if not totally suppressed, at least kept within bounds, and confined to the English papers; and the protection so openly given to his bitterest enemies (alluding to Georges and persons of that description) must be withdrawn. If war, it was necessary to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. He now made the tour of Europe to prove to me, that in its present state, there was no power with which we could coalize for the purpose of making war against France; consequently it was our interest to gain time, and if we had any point to gain, to make a renewal of the war when circumstances were more favorable. He said, it was not doing him justice to suppose that he conceived himself above the opinion of his country or of Europe. He would not risk uniting Europe against him by any violent act of aggression; neither was he so powerful in France as to persuade the nation to go to war unless on good grounds. He said, that he had not chastised the Algerines, from his unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers; but he hoped England, Russia and France would one day feel that it was their interest to destroy such a nest of thieves, and force them to live rather by cultivating their land, than by plunder.

The remainder of this document consists of the reply of Lord Whitworth to the First Consul, and some occasional observations on the letter. Lord Whitworth alleges as causes of jealousy and mistrust to the British Cabinet, that France had increased her territory; the impossibility of obtaining justice for British creditors or suitors and that such things were calculated to create

and continue distrust. He denied that any pensions had been allowed to French or Swiss individuals, but in consideration for past services; that as for participation in indemnities, his Majesty's ambition led him rather to preserve than acquire... and that with respect to the most propitious moment of renewing hostilities although his Majesty would consider such a measure as the greatest calamity... his disposition to peace did not proceed from the difficulties of procuring allies. The dispatch concludes with observing that the mission of Sebastiani was not alleged by the Consul to be wholly commercial, but that it was rendered necessary in a military point of view by the British infraction of the treaty of Amiens.

No. 39. Hawkebury to Whitworth, approving his conduct, but says the Chief Consul gave no satisfactory explanation or assurance &c.

No. 40. Whitworth to Hawkebury, dated 6th February, 1803, recapitulating a conversation with Talleyrand. He stated to the latter that the views of the First Consul were so apparent, that the British troops would not be withdrawn from Malta until some satisfactory security could be given that the British dominions would not be endangered by that measure. Talleyrand replied that the possession of Egypt had been and was a favourite object of the Consul; but not so much as to induce a war.— Lord Whitworth mentions the subject of securing the integrity of the Turkish Empire, which the Minister had before spoken of, and which he now observed was founded on a message of the Consul to that effect. Whitworth doubts whether that, or any other parole security would be considered sufficient. Talleyrand asks what security would then be required? Whitworth proposes negotiating on that subject.

Talleyrand informed him that Andreossi was intrusted to require a categorical answer to the plain question, whether his Majesty would cause Malta to be evacuated by the British troops? Whitworth laments this measure as tending to introduce into the discussion ill humor and offended dignity. He thought, however that the First Consul might expect more opposition to his will than he had been accustomed to on similar occasions. In a postscript, he adds that he was glad to find that Talleyrand had represented Andreossi's instructions much more offensive than they really were. That the Consul was desirous of discussing without passion, a point which he admitted was of importance to both countries. No. 41. Andreossi in a note, (March 10,) to Lord Hawkebury, demands the evacuation of Malta. No. 42. Whitworth to Hawkebury, (March 12,) notifying the arrival of a messenger with the King's Message, and that he found the French already in possession of it when he went to converse with Talleyrand on the subject.— Though he said he was in haste, the Secretary suffered Lord Whitworth to go on with his conversation uninterrupted, and made a reply alleging the pacific disposition of the Consul. In the evening, they met again at the Prussian Minister's. Talleyrand said the Consul was much irritated at the unjust suspicions of the British Government, but would not allow himself to be mastered by his feelings so far as to lose sight of the calamities which the present discussion might entail on humanity. That if England would discuss fairly, he would do the same. He then communicated a paper, in the nature of a memorandum, to Lord Whitworth, which was enclosed, and said to be a statement of measures. It was as follows: 1. If his Britannic Majesty in his message means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetsluys, all the world knows it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination, but in consequence of his Majesty's Message, the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded. 2. If we do not receive satisfactory explanation respecting these ar-

maments in England, and if they actually take place, it is natural that the First Consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the message. 3. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and moreover, that additional bodies should join those troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position. 4. It is natural that the First Consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different parts of the coasts. 5. It is likewise in the nature of things, that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum. 6. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment; a step so important, as cannot fail to agitate all Europe. The result of all these movements will be to irritate the two countries still more. France will have been compelled to take all these precautions, in consequence of the English armaments, and, nevertheless, every means will be taken to excite the English nation by the assertion, that France meditates an invasion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themselves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of stagnation throughout the whole of the countries occupied by the French arms. The experience of nations, and the course of events prove, that the distance between such state of things and actual hostility, is unfortunately not remote. As to the difference, of which mention is made in his Britannic Majesty's Message, we know not of any that we have with England; for it cannot be imagined, that a serious intention can have existed in England of evading the execution of the treaty of Amiens, under the protection of a military armament.—Europe well knows that it is possible to attempt the dismemberment of France, but not to intimidate her.

(To be Continued.)

RAN AWAY
From the Subscriber, in Raleigh, on the 6th July,
A NEGRO MAN by the Name of JIM, about 20 or 22 Years of Age, five Feet 8 Inches high, had on when he went away, a new Ofenburg Shirt and Trowsers, with Metal Buttons to the Waistband—no other Cloaths with him that I know of; also had on an old lopped Hat, generally wears something tied round his Head, and much accustomed to wearing his Hat; has a very remarkable Walk, turning his left Foot out very much; inclinable to be knock-kneed, more so in his left than in his right Knee, and limps when he walks, in the left Leg. Jim has remarkable thick Lips, and rather slow in speech. If any Person shall apprehend a Negro of this Description, secure him, and give Information to the Subscriber in Raleigh, by Post, he shall be well paid for his Trouble by
JOSIAH DILLIAD.

It makes no Difference what Story he may tell, or what Name he may go by, if he answer the Description above mentioned.

Runaway Negroes.
RUNAWAY from Havannah, in the State of Georgia, TWO NEGRO MEN, the Property of Joseph Hill, of that Place: the one, named Harry, is 5 feet 6 or 7 Inches high, about 35 Years of Age, of a yellowish Complexion, branded on both Cheeks, Forehead and Breast, J. HILL, the Letters perhaps not all of them visible. He went off about fourteen Months ago. The other, named Fegarrow, and ran off Four or Five Years ago, is about 25 Years of Age, of rather a Yellow Complexion, branded on one Cheek J. HILL, the J H most visible. He speaks the French language.—Harry was born in or about Baltimore. One of these Negroes, it is believed (it is not known which) died in the Goal of Randolph County, last Winter. Any Person apprehending the Negro who is yet living, and giving Information to his Owner aforesaid, or lodging him in the Goal of Wake County at Raleigh, will be well Rewarded. July 20.

STRAW HATS.
THE Subscriber carries on a Manufactory of Straw Hats, of all Kinds, at Portsmouth, in Virginia; where Merchants and others may be supplied on the most reasonable Terms.
R. Mather,
Portsmouth, June 19,

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