



AND

## North-Carolina State Gazette.

"Ours are the Plans of fair delightful Peace,  
"Unwar'd by Party Rage, to live like Brothers."

MONDAY, AUGUST 15, 1803.

No. 200

VOL. IV.

## PAPERS

Presented by His Majesty's Command  
to both Houses of Parliament, the  
18th May 1803.

(Continued from our last.)

No. 43. From Whitworth to Hawkesbury, dated Paris March 14, giving an account of the conversation which has already excited much public attention. The Consul remarked that they had already waged war for fifteen years, and the British would force him to a war of fifteen years more; and addressing the Count del Marow and the Chevalier Azara, said if the English are the first to draw the sword, I shall be the last to put it up. They do not respect treaties—and we must put up the badges of mourning. After having gone his round, he returned to Whitworth and among other remarks said, "You may possibly destroy France, but cannot intimidate her." "We do not wish to do either," said Whitworth, "we wish to maintain a good intelligence with her." "You must then," said the Consul, "respect treaties. Evil to those who do not respect treaties, they will be responsible to all Europe."

No. 44. Immaterial.

No. 45. Hawkesbury to Andreossi, dated March 15, recapitulating the arguments so often urged in defence of retaining possession of Malta. He insists that the treaty was concluded with reference to the then existing state of possessions, and as those had materially changed, the stipulations of the treaty were modified thereby; that the intentions of France with respect to the Turkish dominions became evident. It was of an alarming nature, and that the refusal of the powers to guarantee the island except on condition of the suppression of the Maltese language, placed it in a situation too uncertain to render it consistent with the interests or duty of the British Government to evacuate it under those circumstances.

No. 46. Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, giving him an account of his conversation with Talleyrand complaining of the Consul's treatment of him at the Thuilleries. Talleyrand apologized, said no offence was meant, and assured him nothing similar would again occur.

No. 47.—Is an extract of a letter from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, March 18, 1803. The only material point in this dispatch is a remark of the English Ambassador to Talleyrand, viz. That by our possession of Malta, France was not threatened, but the reverse was the case, should the access to Egypt be opened by its evacuation.

No. 48.—Letter from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, dated Downing-street, March 22, 1803. His Lordship says: "I have it in command to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you take the earliest opportunity to represent to Monsieur de Talleyrand, the surprise with which his Majesty has learnt the conduct which the First Consul had observed towards your Excellency in the instance to which that dispatch refers; and you will add, that as his Majesty has a right to expect that his Ambassador should be treated with the respect and attention due to the Sovereign whom he represents, it will be impossible for you to present yourself on any days of ceremony to the First Consul, unless you have an assurance that you will never be exposed to a repetition of the treatment which you experienced on this occasion."

No. 49. The undersigned, General of division, Ambassador and Minister Plenipotentiary from the French Republic, has laid before his Government the note addressed to him by his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury. He has received orders to make the following answer to the observations therein contained.

The object of this note appears to be to explain his Britannic Majesty's flag; and to give some elucidation which had been demanded respecting the execution of the treaty of Amiens.

The First Consul will not make any complaint relative to the extraordinary and unexpected assertions of this act issued by his Britannic Majesty. Not one of them is found

His Britannic Majesty believes his kingdom is menaced by preparations made in the ports of Holland and France. He has been deceived: The First Consul has made no preparation.

There were at the time of the message but two frigates in the roads of Holland, and but three corvettes in the road of Dunkirk.

How can his Britannic Majesty's Ministers have been deceived on facts so evident? His Britannic Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and the Hague have seriously reproached themselves, if they have credited information to be evidently false, and if they did not foresee that they thereby exposed their government to err in the most important deliberations.

Was it not conformable to the usage practised among nations, first to demand explanations, and thus to take means for being convinced of the falsehood of the intelligence which the Ministers might have received? Must not the least effects of the omission of this practice be, to bring on the ruin of families, and to carry confusion, uncertainty, and disorder into all the commercial affairs of both nations? The First Consul knows, both from his own sentiments, and judging of other people by the French, that a great nation can never be terrified. He believes that good policy and the feelings of true dignity ever inspire the sentiments of esteem for a rival nation, and never the design of menacing her. A great nation may be destroyed, but not intimidated.

The second part of his Majesty's message consists of another assertion no better founded. His Britannic Majesty makes mention of discussions, the success of which is doubtful. What are these discussions? What official notes, what protocols prove the opening, the progress, the vicissitudes of these debates? Can a state of difficulties, which leads to an alternative of Peace or War, forcing us unawares without commencement, without progression, and lead without distinction, to an appeal to arms before all the means of conciliation have been exhausted?

In this case, the appeal has been publicly made before it could be known that there was room for misunderstanding. The termination of the discussion was announced before they had begun. The issue of a difficult discussion has been declared before it arose.—What would Europe, what would both nations think, if they knew that these discussions announced by his Britannic Majesty as so difficult to terminate, were unknown to the French Government; and that the First Consul on reading the message, could not comprehend the meaning of either of the declarations therein contained.

He has also abstained from any offensive step; and whatever may have been the clamour, the activity, the provocations of war, which have taken place in England since that message, he has given no order, he has made no dispositions, no preparations. He places his glory in an affair of this nature, wholly in being taken in an unprovided state. He will continue in this system of honest frankness, until his Britannic Majesty has reflected fully on the part he proposes to take.

In Lord Hawkesbury's note, an opinion is expressed that the French Republic has increased in power since the peace of Amiens. This is a decided error. Since that epoch, France has evacuated a considerable territory. The French power has received no degree of augmentation. If his Britannic Majesty is determined to make war, he may alledge all the pretences he pleases. He will find few less founded.

The General then notices the abuses of the public prints, and concludes thus:

Lord Hawkesbury mentions an article in a French newspaper, containing a report of a French colony. In serious discussions an answer on this point might be dispensed with; but it is neither a long nor a difficult matter. A Colonel in the English army has published a work in England, filled with the most atrocious and disgusting calumnies against the French army and its General. The

lies it contains have been contradicted by the reception which Colonel Sebastiani experienced. The publicity of his report was at once a refutation and a reparation which the French army had a right to expect. On his arrival in Egypt, this officer, to his great astonishment, found the English army there, although they should have evacuated it, and the Turks prodigiously alarmed at the continuance of the English army, and at its relation with the natives in rebellion and open revolt against the Sublime Porte. He must have conceived that the treaties which connect us with the Porte, and by which we have guaranteed to it the integrity of its possessions, compelled us to unite with that power. It was natural to think that England meant to declare war from the instant she refused to execute the articles of the treaty. For after all, France is not reduced to such a state of debasement as to suffer treaties made with her to be executed or not at pleasure. Hence, the researches made by this officer, as to the forces which were in Egypt and as to the position occupied by the English army. But Egypt has since been restored to the dominion of its lawful Sovereign, and the idea of a rupture between the two nations, on account of the engagement contracted with the Porte, no longer exists.

There remains, therefore, but one object worthy of fixing the attention of the two nations. The execution of the treaty of Amiens, as far as concerns Malta. His Majesty has engaged to restore it to the order, and to entrust it to the Neapolitan army till the order shall be in a condition to guard it. His Majesty will reject all sophistry, every distinction, every mental reservation which might be offered to him, to put in doubt the force and the validity of his engagement. His Britannic Majesty's equity, his conscience in this respect, are guarantees for the French Republic. Were it otherwise, what means in future would the two nations have for coming to an understanding? Would not all be chaos? This would indeed be adding another calamity to those which have menaced local order.

The undersigned is directed to declare, in short, that the First Consul will not take up the defiance of war given by England to France; that as to Malta, he sees no subject for discussion, the treaty having provided for everything and settled every thing.

The undersigned has the honour to be &c.

(Signed) F. ANDREOSSY.  
Portland place, 8 Germinal year 11  
(March 29, 1803.)

No. L.

Downing-street, April 4, 1803.

My Lord,

It has become essential, that the discussions which have been for some time subsisting between His Majesty and the French government, should be brought to an issue within as short a time as is consistent with the deliberation which must be given to objects of so much importance.

The last note presented by Gen. Andreossi, in the name of his government, in answer to my note of the 15th of last month, evades all explanation, and even all discussion, of the points of which complaint has been made by his Majesty.

If the French government should seriously intend to persist in this course of proceeding, there can be no hopes of a successful termination to the present negotiation. It is important, therefore, that you should ascertain distinctly, in the first instance, whether they are disposed to enter into explanation on the points on which His Majesty has complained, and to come to such an arrangement as may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two countries; and for this purpose you will present a note to the effect of that which is herewith presented. It is possible that the French government may continue to evade all discussion on the points in question, and confine themselves to a categorical demand, that Malta should be immediately evacuated. In that case, it is his Majesty's pleasure,

possibility of the relations of amity continuing to subsist between the two countries, and the necessity that you will be under of leaving Paris in a certain time. But if, on the other hand, they should shew a readiness to enter into discussion, and to give reasonable satisfaction and explanation, it is important that you should be informed, without loss of time, of the sentiments of his Majesty's government, as to what might be considered as an equitable adjustment of the differences between the governments at this moment.

I have therefore, by His Majesty's command, inclosed the project of an arrangement, which, under the present circumstances, would meet the ideas of His Majesty's government; which would afford security for those objects which are considered as endangered by the unequivocal disclosure of the views of the First Consul, and which, at the same time, might entirely save the honour of the French government.

I am, &amp;c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, &amp;c.

(First inclosure referred to in No. L.)

The undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's ambassador extraordinary, has received the orders of his court to make the following communication to the French government.

His Majesty has perceived, with great regret, that the French government continue to withhold all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which he has complained, and that at the time when they evade all discussion on the subject of his representations they persist in their requisition that the island of Malta should be forthwith evacuated by his forces. His Majesty can never so far forget what is due to himself and to his people, as to acquiesce in such a course of proceeding. He has therefore commanded the undersigned to ascertain distinctly from the French government, whether they are determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and explanation upon the points on which His Majesty has complained, or whether they are disposed, without delay, to give such satisfaction and explanation upon the present state of affairs, as may lead to an arrangement which may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two governments.

It is His Majesty's anxious desire, that by adopting this mode of proceeding, an end may be put to that state of suspense and uncertainty which must be so injurious to the interests of both countries.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

(Second inclosure referred to in No. L.)

Heads of an arrangement to be concluded by treaty or convention between His Majesty and the French government.

Malta to remain in perpetuity in the possession of His Majesty. The knights of the Order of St. John to be indemnified by His Majesty for any losses of property which they may sustain in consequence of such an arrangement.

Holland and Switzerland to be evacuated by the French troops.

The Island of Elba to be confirmed by His Majesty to France, and the King of Etruria to be acknowledged.

The Italian and Ligurian Republics to be acknowledged by His Majesty, provided an arrangement is made in Italy for the King of Sardinia which shall be satisfactory to him.

No. 51. Lord Whitworth's acknowledgement of the receipt of a dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury.

52. Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury giving an account of his conversation with Talleyrand with respect to Sebastiani's official report; in which the French minister said two much stress had been laid upon this publication.

53. From the same to same, with particulars of another conversation with Talleyrand, in which he requires that the precise object should be stated, in which it was alleged explanations had been refused. Lord Whitworth answers that they had better confine the subject to a

exercised a right of extending its influence and territory in violation of the spirit of the treaty of Amiens. Great Britain had a right to seek a counterpoise. Talleyrand did not seem to dispute this, but on the point of satisfaction, he said the First Consul was hurt at the expression, which he conceived to be an arrogation of Superiority in the British. Concluded by Talleyrand's assurances that the Consul wished for Peace and proposed a particular convention for the settlement of grievances.

54. From the same to the same, mentioning the Negotiation as at a stand.

55. A note from Lord Hawkesbury, to Lord Whitworth, complaining of the conduct of the French Minister at Hamburg, in authorising the publication against Great Britain.

No. LVI.

Downing-street, April 13, 1803.

My Lord,

Your Excellency's dispatches have been received, and laid before the King.

His Majesty has observed, with great satisfaction, the admission by the French government of the justice of his claim to some compensation in consequence of the increased power and influence of France, since the period of the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty.

Although under the circumstances of your conversation with M. Talleyrand, and particularly after the Note Verbale which he gave to you, it might have been expedient that you should have deferred presenting the project contained in my dispatch No. 7, in the form of a project, it is desirable that you should communicate without delay, in some mode or other, the contents of that project, for the purpose of ascertaining distinctly whether the conditions are such as to induce the French government to give way upon the question of Malta. These conditions appear to his Majesty so well calculated to save the honour of the French government on the subject of Malta, if the question of Malta is principally considered by them as a question of honour, and at the same time hold out to them such important advantages, that the success of the proposition is at least worth trying, particularly as the result of it might be productive of the most easy means of adjusting the most material of our present differences.

With respect to the assertion so often advanced and repeated by M. Talleyrand in your last conversations of the non-execution of the Treaty of Amiens relative to Malta, I have only to observe again that the execution of that article is become impracticable, for causes which have not been in the power of his Majesty to controul. That the greatest part of the funds assigned to the support of the Order, & indispensably necessary for the independence of the Order and defence of the island, have been sequestered since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, in direct repugnance to the spirit and letter of that treaty; and that two of the principle powers, who were invited to accede as guarantees to the arrangement, have refused their accession, except on the conditions that the part of the arrangement which was deemed to material relative to the Maltese inhabitants, should be entirely cancelled. The conduct of the French government since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, gives His Majesty a right, which is now at length admitted by themselves, to demand some compensation for the past, and security for the future. Such compensation could never be considered as obtained by the possession of an island, which would entail a very heavy expence on this country; and the degree of security which would be provided by these means, would only be such as his Majesty, under the present circumstances, is entitled to demand.

I observe in the Note Verbale of Monsieur Talleyrand, he makes use of the expression, the Independence of the Order of Malta. If this is meant to apply to the Order exclusively his Majesty would be willing, for the preservation of Peace, that the civil