



AND

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Quere are the plans of fair delishful peace,  
Unwar'p'd by party rage, to livelike Brothers.

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EXTRACT

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THE *Uti Possidetis*.—These are two words, which have been repeated upwards of three hundred and eighty times in the debates in Parliament, upon the papers relative to the late negociation.—In America, where they pay their members so much a day, when present and upon their duty, they would have most bitterly complained of the expense of such debates; but we, happy, thrice happy we! have no ground for any such complaint: for, except in the mere trifling article of candles, perhaps our members cost us just as much at one time as another. The "*Uti Possidetis*," mean, the *learned* tell us, *actual possession*; or the *state of actual possession*; and when they talk about treating upon the basis of the "*Uti Possidetis*," they mean that the parties agree, by way of preliminary, or first bargain, that each shall retain all that he possesses at the time the negociators meet. But, if this be the meaning of the "*Uti Possidetis*," why not give us that meaning in our own language at once? Do those who make use of such phrases, which the stupidest wretch upon earth might learn to use as well as they, in a few hours; nay, which a parrot would learn, or which a high-dutch bird-catcher could teach to a bull-finch or a tom tit, in the space of a month; and do they think, in good earnest, that this last relic of the mummery of monkery, this playing off upon us of a few gallipot words, will make us believe that they are *learned*?—Learning, truly so called, consists in the possession of knowledge and in the capacity of communicating that knowledge to others; and as far as my observation will enable me to speak, what are called the *learned* languages, operate as a bar to the acquirement of real learning. I a ready hear some pedagogue, or pedant, exclaim, "This is precisely the reasoning of the Fox without a Tail." But, to bring this matter to the test, I hereby invite the *learned* men of the two Universities to a discussion upon the subject. I assert that what they call the *LEARNED LANGUAGES* are *improperly so called*; and that, as a part of general education, they are *worse than useless*. Two months will afford time enough for any of the gentlemen just spoken of to disprove these positions. I will, therefore, give them until Lady Day next. I will publish their defence of their calling; and if I do not fairly beat them in the controversy, and that too in the space of 20 columns of my Register, I will then beg their pardon, and will allow, that to be able to speak or write in a language which the people do not understand, is a proof of learning.—But, until then I shall not dissent from the opinion, that none but clear streams are shallow, and that the muddier the water the deeper the well. To return now to the political topic before us: it seems, from the whole of the published debates upon it, that, had there been no such pretty words to be brought into play, there could have been nothing to talk about which the public would have been able to bestow one moment's attention upon; for, of what importance was it, in such a negociation, whether such was the basis or not? Every one must know, that, long before a treaty could have been concluded, there must have been cessions or surrenders on our part, or that we could have obtained nothing from France in behalf of any other state; and, if such was the case, of what consequence was it, of what use was it to have settled this mere form of a basis? The Ministers, for

what reason I know not, and I cannot imagine, insist that they did begin to negociate upon this basis; and their opponents contend, as a matter of course, that they did not. Very little interest has, however, been excited by the dispute, every man of sense clearly perceiving that the point at issue was not of the smallest importance, and, at the same time, reflecting with sorrow and with shame, that while we were spending our time in such quibbles, like Milton's fallen angels, sitting upon the burning marle, wrangling about predestination and free-will, our enemy was carrying his triumphant arms over newly conquered states and kingdoms. The "*Uti Possidetis*" could not charm down; it was not a spell strong enough to stifle the reflection; & on hearing the gallipot phrase echoed from side to side, it was impossible that it should not occur to the mind of every man, that, between the two, we had been brought to our present situation; the only question with us being, not which had done us most good, but which had done us the least injury; which had had the smallest share in producing the ruin and the disgrace of our country; a question which most men will, I think, decide in favor of the present Ministers, who must work day and night for years, before they will be able to accomplish a hundredth part of the mischief accomplished by Pitt and his minions.—In the debate attributed to the House of Commons, there was considerable interest excited by Mr. Whitbread's differing from Ministers, and even proposing an amendment to the address. "*The Opposition*," as the Morning Chronicle calls them, dealt in more cavilling; but, in the objection of Mr. Whitbread, there was something of reason and solidity. "*The Opposition*" said the Ministers had been "*duped*," one of them said, they had been "*bamboozled*," they all said, that no negociation should have entered into; that no belief should have been given to such men as Bonaparte and Talleyrand; that it was fortunate the negociation had failed; and that we ought to resolve to be exterminated to the last man, rather than treat with Bonaparte until he relinquished his determination *not to suffer us to have any connection with the continent*. But, Mr. Whitbread was of opinion, that there was not sufficient grounds apparent for breaking off the negociation; that from the moment Mr. Fox became politically dead, an anti-pacific spirit began to appear on our part; and that, as matters now stood, the possibility of a peace with France appeared to be cut off. He therefore proposed to insert words to the following effect in the latter part of the address to the King: "To assure his Majesty of the firm determination of that house, to co-operate with his Majesty in calling forth the resources of the United Kingdom, for the vigorous prosecution of the war in which this country is unhappily still engaged; and to express to his Majesty an earnest request, that his Majesty will, in his paternal solicitude for his people, as far as may be consistent with the honor of his crown and the interests of his kingdoms, afford every facility to the restoration of the blessings of peace."—This amendment ought, in my opinion, to have been adopted; and, my Lord Howick must excuse me, if I think his closing argument, to wit, that one man's blaming ministers for too much readiness to make peace, and other's blaming them for too much readiness to break off the negociation, was a *proof* that the ministers had acted wisely, had no force at all in it, & was nothing more than one of those old Pitt-quirks, by which, with the aid of a place and pension majority, his Lordship's solid arguments had

been so many times answered.—What were the opinions of Mr. Percival to Mr. Whitbread? Suppose I knock my neighbour down without sufficient provocation, and a man still more violent than myself, blames me for not splitting his scull, while another man blames me for having struck him at all,—am I to plead the contradictory opinions of these men as a proof that I have acted wisely and justly?—As to the matter itself,—what, I should like to know, can possibly be gained by reviving the big talk of Pitt? He hectorcd about carrying on war for ever, rather than suffer Bonaparte to exclude us from all connection with the continent; but, he could quietly slip out of place, under false pretences, while peace was made by others, giving up all the objects for which he had pledged himself to contend. For my part, I am thoroughly convinced, that the Emperor will, as long as our system of taxing continues, agree to no terms of peace which shall not be, in his conviction, calculated to work for our destruction as rapidly, and even more rapidly than war. Never, in my opinion, as long as that system lasts, will England know an hour of real peace. But, of what use are high sounding words, without deeds herewith corresponding? And, as it may become advantageous to obtain even a short cessation of arms, why should not the way to negociation be kept open? There is nothing, whether as to its effect at home or abroad, worse than being compelled to recede, either in one's conduct or one's words, and, I am greatly deceived, if Lord Howick expects to be able to keep the ground upon which he now stands or affects to stand, with respect to France. I am for no disgraceful terms of peace; but to talk of *recovering the continent* is now madness; and I would be willing to make peace immediately, leaving Napoleon to take what he can in Germany, in Poland, and in Italy, Sicily included. I know of no treaty of alliance that we have with Sicily. I know of no reason whether of justice or of policy, for our carrying on war for a day for Sicily any more than for Hanover. I would give up nothing that should tend, in anywise, to weaken ourselves; but I would make not the smallest sacrifice for Russia or any other connection. There was a state of things, in which such connections were amongst our best means of defence, as well as of offence against our formidable enemy; that state of things, thanks to the Pitts, is completely overturned.—There is no longer a trace of it remaining; and yet, these Pitts now call upon us to carry on war, until the last man in England shall be exterminated, rather than give up connections with the continent!—If we will give up our maritime rights, or only a part of them, Napoleon will give us a connection with the continent: he will give us Hanover even now, and suffer us to have certain other connections; and, though this would be to sacrifice us to those connections, and to the private feelings and interests belonging to them, I suspect, that *there are persons in this country*, who, upon such terms, would willingly see a peace concluded to-morrow. That is what, in our negociations with France, we have to guard against; and, we may be assured, that all the big talk about *our honor* has in it, at bottom, nothing more than the wish, if not the settled intention, of sacrificing England to selfish connections; & that, as to the honor of *this country*, it never enters into either the heads or the hearts of those (I mean the news-writers, of course) who are everlastingly repeating the word. It was said in one of those speeches that the *people* are unanimous in their opinion, that the war ought to

be continued. Yes, for the defence and future safety of England, Ireland and Scotland; but to tell them that we are at war for connections with the continent, is not the way to make them approve of its continuance; for while they are perfectly unanimous as to a war for the safety and honor of their own country, they are not much less unanimous in scouting the idea of continuing the war for the sake of the continent, every part of which they plainly see at the feet of the conqueror.

There came out, however, in the course of the debates, some observations, which, as published in the news-papers, are well worthy our attention. The first that I shall notice, relates to Hanover, and I shall give them here, as I find them in the speech published under the name of Lord Grenville, as follows: "Now, as to Hanover, this was a *nice and difficult point*, and no misrepresentation should be allowed to go abroad respecting it. Never was the issue of the negociation connected with its fate.—*Never did any interested feeling arise from it*. But should it be alienated for *our sake*? What if he thought that we owed such a debt as that we acknowledged to Russia, to Sweden, to Naples, *how much higher* the debt we owe to our own Sovereign? And surely we would avoid the disgrace of such a sacrifice, which would confound us with those who made such shameful sacrifices to their own fears, or their own interests. Hanover was attacked, not as a German territory, not as connected with the Germanic corps, but *solely because France was at war with England*; & while we were invulnerable here, the enemy was determined to *wound us through Hanover*. But to adopt the saying and maxims of a *great statesman*, it seems to be, that, under such circumstances, *Hanover should be as dear to us as Hampshire*; and whenever it was attacked, *for British interests*, it should be defended by British magnanimity.—*But the same feelings respecting Hanover, prevailed at Paris as here*; and from the *first moment* of the negociation, it was resolved it should be restored to its lawful sovereign. Indeed it was needless to do otherwise; for they well knew that British honor would never have consented to surrender it."—Now I do not say that Lord Grenville uttered these words:—I comment upon them because I find them published in a newspaper;—and because I am convinced that they express doctrines which, if adhered to, must accomplish the extinguishment of the remains of British liberty. Who the "*great statesman*" alluded to is, I know not; but he who he may, widely do I differ from him in feeling and in opinion; and, what ever may be the feelings of the author of this publication, I can assure him, that Hampshire will think itself as little indebted to him as to Lord Temple. Hanover as dear to us as Hampshire! To him, to this author it may be, but, for my part, I trust I should be ready to shed my blood to the last drop rather than see the latter a department of a vassal kingdom of France, while I have no scruple to say, I care just as much about the former as I do about the Dutchy of Brunswick or the Principality of Hesse. Hanover as dear to us as Hampshire! I know not what the people in the North may think of this; but it really and literally comes home to my fire-side; and a great consolation it must be to one to hear, that one is considered, by this author, as having no greater claims upon the government than a Hanoverian hero!—When the people of England, with the King which they had introduced at their head, made the settlement of the crown of this realm upon the family that now

wears it, they made the provision recited in our motto.\* The makers of this law foresaw the consequences that would unavoidably result from leaving it in the power of the crown to make war for foreign possessions, belonging solely to the King; and the fair construction of the law is, that war should not be waged by this country, without *previous consent of Parliament*, for the sake of any foreign possession, the private property of any prince sitting upon this throne, whether he were *then* born abroad, or whether he should thereafter be born in England. The words "*not being a native of this kingdom*," applied immediately to the successor of Queen Anne; but they also applied to his descendants. They applied to him as the head of the house; for the provision made part of the compact with his successors as well as with himself. The doubtful expression of "*in case the crown should hereafter come, &c. &c.*" was used because it was not, when the act was passed, certain, that Queen Anne would die without children; and the whole tenor of the act clearly shows, that the object of the provision was, to prevent this nation from being involved in wars for the sake of dominions, the property of the prince, and totally separate in interest from the kingdom of England. Yet we have been at war for Hanover, and that the previous consent of Parliament was not obtained we all well know. Nay, if the French had stood out, we are plainly told by this author, that we should have been at war for Hanover now, and *solely for Hanover*; for, that, under such circumstances, *Hanover is as dear to us as Hampshire*! And what are these circumstances? Is there any thing peculiar in them? Were we in alliance with Hanover? Had that gallant and generous nation lent us any aid, either in men or in money, previous to its being conquered? No: this is not pretended. There is no pretext of obligation, either express or tacit, set up. The circumstance (for there is but one) is,—*Hanover was conquered because France was at war with England*." Well, and will not Hanover *always* be conquered under similar circumstances? And must we make war (*or continue war*), which in effect is the same thing) against her every time she conquers Hanover? And, must we never make peace without obtaining the restitution of Hanover, cost what it may? During the *last war*, Hanover as well as England was engaged against France; but Hanover thought proper to make peace without consulting us or our interests. Then it was loudly and vehemently contended by Lord Grenville and the whole of the ministry, that Hanover, though his Majesty, our gracious King, was the Sovereign of it, was, and ought to be, regarded as a state totally separate from, and having no connection whatever with the kingdom of Great-Britain; and I remember well, that when some persons, amongst whom was Mr. Sheridan, regretted that the pacific example of the Elector of Hanover was not followed by the King of Great-Britain, they were called Jacobins and Levellers! But now, behold, when Hanover is conquered; when France has gotten complete possession of it; or when she has given it to another power; now we are to fight and pay for it; now we are "*not to give it up*," now we are to look upon it, in short, as being as near and dear to us as one of the counties of England! We

\* "That in case the crown and imperial dignity of this realm shall hereafter come to any person, not being a native of this kingdom of England, this nation be not obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories, which do not belong to the crown of England, without the consent of Parliament." Act of William III. 12th and 13th, Chap. 2.