



AND

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Our are the plans of fair & faithful Peace, Unwar'd by party rage, to live like Brothers.

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LETTER,

From the Hon. E. GERRY, to Mons. Ch. M. Talleyrand.

[The following Letter is in answer to an Official Note from Mons. T. published in the Patriot of May 20th. It casts new light on the mysterious X. Y. Z. negotiation, & will be read with interest by every one who wishes to see the complete justification of Mr. Gerry, against the aspersions of the French Machiavelian.—Editor Boston Pat.]

To His Excellency

CHARLES MAURICE TALLEYRAND, Late Minister of Foreign Relations, and now a Prince of Imperial France.

SIR:—Your official letter, dated Paris, the 11th Fructidor, 6th year, (the 28th of August, 1798) to Mr. Pichon, then Secretary of Legation at the Hague, has been lately published by his Excellency Mr. Adams, late President of the United States, and contains remarks on my conduct, whilst on the embassy you refer to, which leaves no alternative but that of a public answer. To me it appears immaterial, whether your object in writing that letter, was merely to obtain the negotiation which resulted from it, or intended to extend to personalities; for admitting the former, what apology can be offered for unmerited and unnecessary censures on a preceding Minister, in order to obtain a successor? The letter states, "that you used your endeavor to enter on a negotiation with Mr. Gerry, in the spirit of substituting calmness for passion, & confidence for suspicions, from a conviction that distrust alone was the cause of the misunderstanding between the two republics." Admitting the fact, you will readily grant, Sir, that the distrust on the part of the United States, existed long before the date of my commission to negotiate with France, and resulted from a series of measures on her part, highly injurious, and, as the United States conceived, unjust towards them. And have not the dispatches of the three Envoys to their government proved to a demonstration, that the dark and crooked policy of negotiating with them by secret agents, whom you recognised to me as having acted under your authority, increased that distrust and finally defeated the negotiation? On the first approach of those agents, so clearly was I convinced of what would be the result of conferences with them, that I proposed to my colleagues to terminate their agency without delay, by the following declaration to them—viz: "To the question, whether the propositions, informally and confidentially communicated to us, as private citizens, at the request, as it is stated, of Mons. Talleyrand, in his private capacity, will be adopted as the basis of a treaty? this answer is given: that it is highly probable some of the propositions communicated on the evenings of the 19th and 20th of October (being the 28th and 29th Vendémiaire) will be considered as the basis of a project of a treaty, and others as inadmissible; but that it is impossible to discuss them or to come to a decision on them, until they are presented to us in our official characters." After the rupture of the negotiation, by the dissolution of my colleagues, and the publication throughout Europe of our dispatches, then indeed, you "used," and it might be stated, you repeated, "your endeavors to enter on a negotiation with myself;" not because it was practicable, or promising success, but because it was necessary to allay the indignation of the French nation and directory against yourself, as the sole cause of the rupture of the negotiation with the three envoys. Can these facts be controverted? Are they not fully proved by the dispatches of the envoys, and by your correspondence with myself?

Your letter next states, "that your correspondence with Mr. Gerry, until the day of his departure, is a curious monument of advances on your part, and of evasions on his." That it is a curious monument of advances, or a monument of curious advances, on your part, made with conviction of the impossibility of their being accepted by him, is readily admitted: and permit him to enquire, whether you urged him to enter into a negotiation which was warranted by, or one which was directly repugnant to the powers given him by his government? You advocated his right to treat separately from his colleagues, because the government of the United States had commissioned, "jointly and severally, three envoys extraordinary & Ministers plenipotentiary, of whom he was one, to treat with the French re-

public. Had his colleagues, by any other means than the agency of that republic, been disqualified from acting, then indeed would he have had a separate authority, & would have exercised it: but, sir, your political abilities require no arguments to prove, that a separate power was not by his commission given to one envoy to treat, when the others were by the French government officially charged with misconduct and dismissed from the embassy. If solid reasons did actually exist for the dismissal, was not it incumbent on the French Directory to have stated them to the government of the United States, that the latter might have corrected the evil? Was it your object, by urging that envoy to negotiate separately, to induce him to a measure which would have terminated beneficially to the two republics, and honorably to the negotiators, or to one, which, by admitting the right of the French government to proceed in the negotiation, would have sacrificed, on his part, the rights, honor and indignance of his government, and disgraced himself? Let him enquire further, sir, whether you was authorised by the government of the United States (for your own government could not authorise you) to construe for their minister the powers which they had delegated to him? Was it not, to say the least, indelicate to make the attempt, and unjust to refuse him the right of being governed in this construction by his own judgment? Could he have met the advances of which you boast with a due regard to the rights and independence of his country or to his own honor? Most assuredly he could not; and for not meeting them he incurred your censure. As to the evasions with which you charge him, they were refusals, and so you considered them, to close with your propositions. Your letter next states, "that it was wrong to suppose you confined yourself to vague protestations, that among that series of official letters, which will doubtless be published at Philadelphia, you select one wherein he (Mr. Pichon) will see that you make very positive propositions, without any mixture of preliminary conditions. That this letter was followed by three notes upon the articles to be discussed, and that you intended to complete the others in this manner, if Mr. Gerry had not refused to answer thereto." But let any candid man read our correspondence, and declare, if he can, that your protestations were not altogether vague from the beginning to the end—did you not know, before the publication of the dispatches of the envoys, that, superior to the pretexts, the envoy you had selected to negotiate declared himself, for the reasons herein stated, unauthorised to treat? Did you not, in consequence of those reasons, and from a conviction of their truth, pledge yourself and prepare informally with him a treaty, and to send a minister to the American government for a ratification of it? And did you not, after the promulgation of the dispatches, depart from the arrangements, and renew propositions long before made to and rejected by him for negotiating separately? If then, sir, your protestations were not vague, why did you not, in the informal mode agreed on, discuss fairly and substantially the important subjects of the negotiation?—Why, in lieu thereof, did you propose a formal epistolary negotiation, and even in this, confine yourself to the correction of a consular convention which was soon to expire? Why did you not enter on the most important object, the project of a commercial treaty? Of what use, without such a treaty, was a consular convention? Your beginning with the smallest object of the smallest object of the negotiation, and indeed your whole conduct in that discussion amounted, in my mind, to proof positive, that you was governed by no motive or expectation of attaining the important objects of the negotiation, but that your sole view, as before stated, was to amuse the French government and nation, and to divert from yourself their indignation, resulting from the rupture of negotiation. Your letter then proceeds, "when it became necessary to abandon the idea of treating with that envoy, who thought it important only to know how a negotiation might ther-after be resumed, I gave him the most solemn assurances concerning the reception that a new plenipotentiary would receive." But did that envoy think it important only to know how a

negotiation might thereafter be resumed? You know, sir, he did not. In his letters to yourself of the 4th and 20th of April, 1798, the first being before, and the last subsequent to the departure from Paris of one of his colleagues, he early proposed to "confer with you informally and unacquainted, on any subject respecting his mission, and to communicate to the government of the United States the result of such conferences." He gave you, agreeably to your request, the outlines of such a treaty as he thought would have been acceptable to his government, and repeatedly urged you to come forward, on your part, with propositions "for terminating all differences, for the restoration of harmony and friendship; and for the re-establishment of commerce between the United States and France;" and to effect those objects he assured you of his immediate and cheerful cooperation. Look at your correspondence with him, which you appear to have forgotten, and you will there find a record of these and numerous other facts, proving his unremitted exertions while in France, to establish a commercial treaty and restore harmony between the two republics. Is it not then much to be regretted, sir, that you have hazarded such unfounded assertions, and produced the painful necessity of detecting them?

Your letter then proceeds to state, "that you wished to encourage Mr. Gerry by the testimonies of regard that his good intentions merited." "Although you could not dissemble, that he wanted decision, at a moment when he might have easily adjusted every thing. That it does not thence follow, you designated him; that you will even avow that you think him too irresolute to be fit to hasten the conclusion of an affair of this kind." Testimonies of regard, and professions inspire neither confidence; they are seldom fully practised and always illusive. Had you manifested such to him, he must have candidly declared to you, "Immo Danaos et dona ferentes." His primary object was to promote, on principles of reciprocity, the honor, interest and welfare of his country. In the pursuit of these, you were fully convinced that he was above encouragement, and that all your impediments and discouragements were of no avail.

That he "wanted decision" to close with your degrading propositions, is conceded; it is demonstrated by the correspondence you refer to; and it therein appears also that he was 'irresolute' to do wrong; an irresolution which he frankly avows, which he prefers infinitely to "diplomatic skill" or diplomatic artifice, and which, permit me, sir, from a long experience and full conviction that in public as well as private concerns, "honesty is the best policy," to recommend to your consideration and patronage.

As a duty which I owe to myself, I have transmitted copies of this letter to yourself, through French and American channels, which will ensure the delivery of it; and had you adopted a similar measure; by sending to me a copy of your official letter to Mr. Pichon, in which you very freely use my character, you would have received an immediate answer.

Accept, Sir, assurances of all due consideration and respect.

Cambridge, July 1809. E. GERRY.

THE VENERABLE PATRIOT AND SOLDIER GENERAL STARK.

The Anniversary of the battle of Bennington has been lately celebrated on the spot by 1200 freemen, with the highest demonstrations of gratitude for the event, and a desire to perpetuate its remembrance. After various exercises appropriate to the day, the ceremonies were concluded by reading the following letter from the veteran General JOHN STARK, who bore so conspicuous a part on the 16th of August, 1777, the day which the company had assembled to commemorate.

At my Quarters, Derryfield, July 31, 1809.

My Friends and Fellow Soldiers,

I received your's of the 22d inst. containing your fervent expressions of friendship, and your very polite invitation to meet with you, to celebrate the 16th of August in Bennington.

As you observe, "I can never forget" that I "commanded American troops,"

on that day in Bennington. They were men that had not learned the art of submission, nor had they been trained to the art of war. But our "astonishing success" taught the enemies of liberty, that undisciplined freemen are superior to veteran slaves. And I fear we shall have to teach the lesson anew to that perfidious nation.

Nothing could afford me more pleasure than to meet "the sons of liberty" on that fortunate spot. But as you justly anticipate, the infirmities of old age will not permit; for I am now fourscore and one years old, and the lamp of life is almost spent. I have of late had many such invitations, but was not ready, for there was not oil enough in the lamp.

You say you wish your young men to see me, but you who have seen me can tell them, that I never was worth much for a show, and certainly cannot be worth their seeing now.

In case of my not being able to attend, you wish my sentiments—them you shall have as free as the air we breathe. As I was then, I am now—the friend of equal rights of men, of representative democracy, of republicanism, and the declaration of independence, the great charter of our national rights:—and of course the friend of the indissoluble union and constitution of the states. I am the enemy of all foreign influence; for all foreign influence is the influence of tyranny. This is the only chosen spot of liberty—the only republic on earth.

You well know, gentlemen, that at the time of the event you celebrate, there was a powerful British faction in the country (called Tories) and a material part of the force we had to contend with was Tories. This faction was rankling in our councils, till they had laid the foundation for the subversion of our liberties; but by good sentinels at our outposts we were apprised of our danger; and the sons of freedom beat the alarm—and, as at Bennington "they came, they saw, and they conquered." But again the faction has rallied to the charge, and again they have been beaten.

It is my orders now, and will be my last orders to all my volunteers, to look well to their centres: for there is a dangerous British party in this country, lurking in their hiding places, more dangerous than all our foreign enemies. And whenever they shall appear openly, to render the same account of them that was given in Bennington, let them assume what name they will: not doubting that the ladies will be as patriotic, in furnishing every aid, as they were at Bennington in '77, who even dismantled their beds to furnish cords to secure and lead them off.

I shall remember, gentlemen, the respect you and the inhabitants of Bennington and its neighborhood have shown me, till I go to the country from which no traveller returns. I must soon receive marching orders.

JOHN STARK.

P. S. I will give you my volunteer boast: "LIVE FREE OR DIE.—DEATH IS NOT THE GREATEST OF ALL EVILS."

REPORT

OF SECRETARY HAMILTON, ON DOMESTIC MANUFACTURES.

In perusing, lately some state papers, my attention was particularly attracted by an important and masterly report of Secretary Gen. Hamilton, on Domestic Manufactures, communicated to the lower House of Congress in January 1790. It takes up all the objections which have been brought forward against the introducing manufactures into the U. States, and in an able and lucid manner completely refuting them. As a specimen of the spirit of the report, and to shew the absurdity of some federalists who have charged the democrats exclusively with promoting Domestic Manufactures, merely out of malice and hatred to British commerce and not rather to sound policy, arising from the continued embarrassments we experience with foreign intercourse, as well as the oppressing policy of Europe in an unequal exchange of our raw materials for her manufactured commodities leaving an enormous balance of trade in her favor.

"The expediency of encouraging manufactures in the U. States, which was, not long since deemed very questionable, appears, at this time to be pretty generally admitted. The embarrass-

ments which have obstructed the progress of our external trade, have led to serious reflection on the necessity of enlarging the sphere of our domestic commerce: the restrictive regulations which in foreign markets abridge the vent of the increasing surplus of our agricultural produce, serve to beget an earnest desire, that a more extensive demand for that surplus be created at home. The complete success which has rewarded manufacturing enterprise, in some valuable branches, conspiring with the promising symptoms which attend some less mature essays in others, justify a hope, that the obstacles to the growth of this species of industry, are less formidable than they were apprehended to be; and that it is not difficult to find in its future extension, a full indemnity of any external disadvantages which are, or may be experienced, as well as an accession of resources favorable to national independence & safety."

He further adds that from the restrictions and impediments thrown in our way to the emissions of her own commodities—"In such a restriction we cannot exchange with Europe on equal terms, and the want of reciprocity would finally, if persevered in on the part of Europe, and submitted to on our part, would expose us to impoverishment, compared with the opulence to which our political and natural advantages authorize us to expect. 'Tis for the nations, whose regulations are alluded to, to judge for themselves, whether by aiming at too much, they do not lose more than they gain. 'Tis for us to consider by what means we can render ourselves least dependent on the combinations, rights and wrongs, of foreign policy."

"It is no small consolation, that already the measures which have embarrassed our trade, have accelerated internal improvements, which, upon the whole, have bettered our affairs. To diversify and extend those improvements is the surest and safest method to indemnify ourselves for any inconveniences which such has a tendency to beget. If Europe will not trade with us upon equal terms, and respect our rights, the natural remedy is, to contract our wants, and suspend our intercourse with her."—Charleston Gazette.

From the Democratic Press.

ENGLISH EMISSARIES.

The return of Cobbett to England, his reception, his pension and the declaration in Parliament by a Minister of the Crown, that he deserved "a statue of gold for his services in America," has established to the satisfaction of the most sceptical, that G. Britain has her emissaries and her presses in this country, and that she has the shameless effrontery to avow it in the face of the world. Let no man shut his eyes against the light of truth, or his mind against the lesson of experience: Let no man persuade himself that there have been hirelings of Britain here, but that there are none now. He who reads the newspapers patronized by our mercantile men, must be satisfied that, at this hour, there are many presses, many pens and many purses, devoted to England, and in opposition to the rights, interest and happiness of the people of the United States—

The purity of our post-offices does not admit of that examination of letters, which in Europe puts the government in possession of many important facts and tears the mask from many a foreign emissary. The following letter [which appeared in the Register of the 17th ult.] was first published in the National Intelligencer, and carries with it an air of authenticity which is irresistible, and communicates facts not unimportant.

An English emissary, a hired writer of the government of England, writes to his employers to announce his arrival in this country—that "the government here is despicable and despised, and the people disaffected and seditious"—that something might be done for "lawful Princes" and, with the approbation of "his friends in Europe," he would set up an "American Weekly Monitor" to excite enmity towards France, and to give the greater influence to the advices which were to be sent out; they were to be directed to "Col. Barclay, the British Consul General," at New York.

Events have shewn that the "friends in Europe" of this emissary, thought