

CONSERVATIVE SENATE.

Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations, to His Majesty the Emperor & King.

Sire—Your majesty has raised France to the highest pitch of grandeur. The victories obtained over five successive coalitions, all fomented by England have produced these results; and it may be said that for the glory the power of the great Empire we are indebted to England.

On all occasions your majesty has offered peace; and without enquiring whether it would be more advantageous than war, you considered, sire, only the happiness of the present generation—and you always shewed yourself ready to sacrifice to it the most promising future prospects.

It was thus that the treaties of peace of Campo Formio, of Luneville and of Amiens, and subsequently those of Presburg, of Tilsit and of Vienna were concluded; it was thus that your majesty five times sacrificed to peace the greater part of your conquests; more desirous of making your reign illustrious by the public happiness, than of extending the dominion of your empire, your majesty put limits to your own grandeur, while England, re-kindling incessantly the flame of war, appeared to conspire against her allies and against herself, in order to make this empire the greatest that has existed within twenty centuries.

At the peace of 1783, the power of France was strengthened by the family compact, which firmly attached to her system of politics, Spain and Naples.

At the period of the peace of Amiens, the respective strength of three great powers was increased by twelve millions of inhabitants of Poland. The houses of France & Spain were essentially enemies, and the people of these nations were still farther separated by their manners. One of the greatest continental powers had lost its strength by the annexation of Belgium to France than she had acquired by the possession of Venice; and the secure positions of the Germanic body had still further increased the power of our rival.

Thus France after the treaty of Amiens had a strength relatively less than at the peace of 1783, and much inferior to that which the victories obtained during the wars of the two first coalitions, gave her the right to claim.

Notwithstanding, scarcely was the treaty concluded, when the jealousy of England was evidently in a high degree excited. She was alarmed at the constant increase of the eternal riches and prosperity of France, and she hoped that a third coalition would snatch from our crown Belgium, the provinces of the Rhine and Italy. The peace of Amiens was violated. A third coalition was formed, three months afterwards it was dissolved by the treaty of Presburg.

England saw all hopes frustrated. Venice, Dalmatia, Istria, all the coasts of the Adriatic, and those of the kingdom of Naples, came under the French dominion; the German body, established upon principles contrary to those which founded the French empire, fell to pieces, and the system of the confederation of the Rhine converted into intimate and necessary allies the same people, who, in the two former coalitions, had marched against France, and indissolubly united them to her by common interests.

The peace of Amiens, then became in England the object of the regrets of all her statesmen. The new acquisitions of France which thenceforth they had no hope of ravishing from her, rendered them more sensible of the fault which they had committed, and demonstrated the full extent of it.

A man who during the short interval of the peace of Amiens, had come to Paris, and had learned to know France and your majesty, came to the head of affairs in England. That man of genius comprehended the situation of the two countries. He saw that it was no longer within the ability of any power to make France go back, and that true politics consisted in stopping her. He felt, that by the successes obtained against the third coalition, the question was at an end, and that they must no longer think of disputing with France the possessions she had justly acquired by victory; but that they ought by a speedy peace, to prevent new aggrandizements, which the continuance of the war would render inevitable. That minister did not hide from himself any of the advantages which

France had reaped from the false politics of England; but he had before his eyes those which she still might reap. He believed that England would gain nothing, if none of the powers of the continent should lose more. His system of politics was to disarm France, to cause the confederation of the north of Germany to be acknowledged in opposition to the confederation of the Rhine. He felt that Prussia could be saved only by peace, and that upon the fate of that power depended the power of Saxony, of Hesse, of Hanover, and the fate of the mouths of the Ems, the Jade, the Weser, the Elbe, the Oder and the Visula, so necessary to English commerce. A man of a superior mind, Fox did not content himself with uselessly regretting the rupture of the treaty of Amiens, and the losses henceforth irreparable; he wished to prevent still greater ones, and he sent Lord Lauderdale to Paris.

The negotiations began, and every thing pre-geared a happy issue to them, when Fox died.

They then only languished. The Ministry were neither sufficiently enlightened, nor sufficiently cold-blooded, to feel the necessity of peace. Prussia, instigated by that spirit with which England inspired all Europe, put her troops in motion. The Imperial Guard had orders to set out; Lord Lauderdale appeared afraid of the consequences of the new events which were preparing—He proposed to sign the treaty, to include in it Prussia, and to acknowledge the confederation of the North of Germany—Your Majesty, with that spirit of moderation of which you have given such frequent examples to Europe, consented to it. The departure of the Imperial guard was delayed several days; but Lauderdale hesitated; he was of opinion that he ought to send a courier to his court, and that courier brought him back the order which recalled him a few days afterwards. Prussia no longer existed as a preponderating power.

Posterity will mark that period as one of the most decisive in the history of England, and in that of France.

The treaty of Tilsit terminated the fourth coalition.

Two great sovereignties, lately enemies, united to offer peace to England; but that power, which notwithstanding all her presentiments, could not prevail upon herself to subscribe to conditions which left France in a more advantageous position than that in which she was after the treaty of Amiens, would not open negotiations; the inevitable result of which would insure to France a still more advantageous position. We have refused, they said in England, a treaty, which maintained the independence of France, the North of Germany, Prussia, Saxony, Hesse, Hanover, and which guaranteed all the openings for our commerce; how can we now consent to sign with the emperor or the French, when he has just extended the confederation of the Rhine as far as the North of Germany, and founded on the banks of the Elbe a French throne, a peace which from the nature of things, whatever might be the stipulations contained in it, would leave under his influence Hanover; and all the markets of the North, those principal arteries of our commerce?

Men who calmly consider the situation of England, answered: Two coalitions, each of which ought to have lasted ten years, have been vanquished in a few months; the new advantages acquired by France are the consequence of those events, and England can no longer oppose them; doubtless we ought not to have violated the treaty of Amiens. We ought since to have adhered to the politics of Fox. Let us at least profit now from the lessons of experience and avoid a fault. Instead of looking back, let us contemplate the future: the peninsula is still entire and ruled by governments, secret enemies to France. Hitherto, the weakness of the Spanish ministry and the personal sentiments of the old monarch have retained Spain in the system of France. A new reign will develop the germs of hatred between the two nations.

The family compact has been annihilated, and this is one of the advantages which the revolution has procured to England. Holland, though governed by a French prince, enjoys her independence; her interest is to be the medium of our commerce with the continent, and to favor it in order to participate in our profits. Have we not feary if the war continues, that France will establish

her influence on the peninsula and her custom houses in Holland.

Such was the language of men who knew how to penetrate into the future. They saw with grief peace proposed by Russia. They doubted not but that the whole continent would shortly be detached from England, and that an order of things, which it was so important to prevent, would be established in Spain and in Holland.

In the meantime, England required the House of Braganza to quit the Peninsula and fly to Brazil. The partitions of the English ministry sowed discord among the princes of the House of Spain. The reigning dynasty was removed forever, and in consequence of arrangements made at Bayonne, a new sovereign, having a common power and a common origin with France, was called to the government of Spain.

The interview of Erfurt gave an opportunity for new proposals of peace—but they likewise were repulsed. The same spirit which had caused the negotiation of Lord Lauderdale to be broken off, directed affairs in England.

The fifth coalition broke out. These new events still turned to the advantage of France. The only ports, by which England pretended an avowed communication with the continent, passed with the Italian provinces, into your majesty's possession, by the treaty of Vienna, and the allies of the Emperor saw the great increase.

The orders issued by the British council had overturned the laws of the commerce of the world; England, whose existence is wholly attached to commerce thus cast disorder among the commerce of nations. She had torn from it every privilege. The decrees of Berlin and Milan repelled these monstrous novelties. Holland was in a difficult position; her government had not an action sufficiently energetic; her custom-house offered too little security, for the centre of the commerce of the continent to remain much longer isolated from France. Your majesty, for the interest of your people and to insure the execution of the system which you opposed to the tyrannical acts of England, was forced to change the fate of Holland.

Notwithstanding your majesty, persevering in your system and in your desire of peace, gave England to understand that she could preserve the independence of Holland, only by recalling her orders in council, or adopting pacific views; the ministers of a commercial nation treated lightly an overture so highly interesting to their commerce. They answered that England could do nothing with regard to the fate of Holland. In the illusions of their pride, they misconceived the motives of that proceeding; they pretended to perceive in it the confession of the efficacy of their orders in council, and Holland was annexed. Since they have willed it so, sire, I believe it useful at this time, and I propose to your majesty to consolidate this union by the constitutional forms of a senatus consultum.

The annexation of the Hanse-towns, of Lauenburg, and of all the coast from the Elbe to the Ems, is commanded by circumstances. That territory is already under your majesty's dominions.

The immense magazines of Heligoland will always threaten to empty themselves upon the continent, if a single point should remain open to the English commerce upon the coasts of the North Sea, and if the mouth of the Inde, of the Weser and of the Elbe be not shut to it forever.

The orders of the British council have entirely destroyed the privileges of the navigation of neutrals, and your majesty can no longer supply your arsenals with provisions, and have a sure route for your commerce with the North, but by means of internal navigation.

The repairing and enlarging of the canal already existing between Hamburg and Lübeck, and the construction of a new canal will join the Elbe to the Weser, and the Weser to the Ems, and which will require but four or five years of labor and an expence of from fifteen to twenty millions, in a country where nature presents no obstacles, will open to the French merchants a way economical, easy, and free from every danger. Your empire may trade at all times with the Baltic, send to the North the produce of your soil and of your manufactures, and draw from thence the productions necessary to your Majesty's navy.

The flags of Hamburg, of Bremen and of Lübeck, which now wander up

on the seas denationalized by the British orders in council, will partake of the lot of the French flag, & will concur with it for the interest of the common cause, for the re-establishment of the liberty of the seas.

Peace will arrive at last, for sooner or later the great interest of the people, of justice, and of humanity, prevail over the passions and over hatred; but the experience of sixty years has taught us that peace with England can never give to commerce more than deceitful security. In 1756, in February 1793, in 1805, with regard to Spain, as in May 1803, at the period of the violation of Amiens, England commenced hostilities before having declared war. Vessels which navigated upon the faith of the peace, were surprised; commerce was plundered; peaceable citizens lost their liberty, and the ports of England were filled with the disgraceful trophies. If such scenes are to be one day renewed the English travellers, merchants their properties and their persons seized in our ports from the Baltic sea to the Adriatic Gulph will afford the means of retaliation; and if the English government to make the people of London forget the injustice of the war should again give it the spectacle of captures made in contempt of the law of nations, it will also have to shew the losses so occasioned.

Sire, as long as England shall persist in her orders in council, your majesty will persist in your decrees. Your majesty will oppose to the blockade of the coasts, the continental blockade; and to the pillage on the seas, the confiscation of English goods on the continent.

It is my duty to say so to your majesty; your majesty cannot henceforth hope to bring back your enemies to more moderate ideas, otherwise than by your perseverance in this system.—There must result from it such a state of inconvenience to England that she shall be forced at length to acknowledge that she cannot violate the rights of neutrals upon the seas, and claim their protection on the continent; that the only source of her evils is in her orders of council, and that that aggression of France which will long excite her uneasiness and her jealousy, she owes to the blind passions of those, who, violating the treaty of Amiens, breaking off the negotiation of Paris, rejecting the proposals of Tilsit and Erfurt, disdaining the overtures made before the annexation of Holland, have given the last blows to her commerce and to her power and conducted your empire to the accomplishment of its high destinies.

CHAMPAGNY, Duke de Cadore, Paris, Dec. 8, 1810.

DOCUMENTS

Accompanying the President's Message.

CONTINUED.

Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Smith.

London, Sept. 28th, 1810.

Sir—I have already sent you a copy of Lord Wellesley's reply to that part of my letter of the 14th instant, which particularly respected the case of the Alert. The amount of that reply was, that government could not interfere, and that the case must be left to the court of admiralty.

I now transmit (subjoined) his answer to that part of my letter which regarded the effect of the blockade of Elsinore; as it was interpreted by Sir Jas. Saumarez) to the passage of the Sound; from which it appears that it is not yet intended to close that passage.

No notice has yet been taken of the residue of my letter, concerning the four American seamen taken from the Alert.

As I have transmitted you a copy of Lord Wellesley's reply to my application for the release of the Mary, from which it is to be inferred that she would be immediately released, I ought now to mention that so far from being released, she is to be forthwith proceeded against as prize. These things require a large stock of patience.

Lord Wellesley to Mr. Pinkney.

The Marquis Wellesley has the honor to acquaint Mr. Pinkney, in answer to that part of his letter of the 15th inst. relating to an alleged misconception of the order of council for the blockade of Elsinore, that it is the intention of his Majesty's government that that blockade should be strictly confined to the port of Elsinore, and that it does not affect any vessels professedly bound up the Sound, unless it should appear from their papers that they are bound to Elsinore.

Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Smith.

London, Oct. 3, 1810.

Sir—Lord Wellesley's communication concerning the passage of the Sound, was supposed by a merchant here, to whom I shewed it, to be ambiguous, by reason of the expressions "bound up the Sound," &c. The ambiguity has however been removed (if indeed there was any) by a note which I have just received from the Foreign Office, in answer to one from me.—It says that "no vessel will be subject to the restrictions of the blockade of Elsinore, but such as may be going to that port, in whatever direction they may be passing the Sound." It says further "that the equivocal in the original communication was certainly not intentional."

Extract of a letter from Gen. Armstrong to Mr. Smith, dated Paris, Jan. 18, 1810.

Mr. Champagny stated that the order given in relation to our ships, &c. in Spain, was a regular consequence of the system declared in his letter of the 22d August last, and which had been promulgated throughout the United States. "It is obvious (he added) that his Majesty cannot permit to his allies a commerce which he denies to himself. This would be at once to defeat his system and oppress his subjects, by demanding from them great and useless sacrifices; for if the system be not strictly observed every where, it cannot any where produce the effects expected from it.—Still (he said) the property is only sequestered, and becomes a subject of the present negotiation." As our remonstrances have been sufficiently frequent and free; as this was a meeting merely of conciliation; and as the closing remark of the minister indicated rather the policy of looking forward to our rights, than backward on our wrongs, I thought it most prudent to suppress the obvious answers which might have been given to his observations, and which under the existing circumstances should not have been omitted. I accordingly contented myself with expressing a hope that our future intercourse should be a competition only of good offices.

In conformity to the suggestions contained in your letter of the 1st Dec. 1809, I demanded whether, if Great Britain revoked her blockades, of a date anterior to the decree commonly called the Berlin decree, his Majesty the Emperor would consent to revoke the said decree; To which the minister answered, that "the only condition required for the revocation by his Majesty of the decree of Berlin, will be a previous revocation by the British government of her blockade of France, or part of France (such as that from Elbe to Brest) of a date anterior to that of the aforesaid decree; and that if the British government would then repeal the orders in council, which had occasioned the decree of Milan, that decree should also be annulled." Our interview closed here, and we have had no meeting, either accidental or by rendezvous, since.

[Here follow Mr. Champagny's letter to Gen. Armstrong, dated Feb. 14, and the correspondence between Gen. A. and Mr. C. which followed it; which were inserted in the Register in June last.]

Extract of a letter from Gen. Armstrong to Mr. Smith, dated Paris, 3d May, 1810.

"Mr. Lee arrived here some days ago, with two letters from Mr. Pinkney, copies of which with my answers, are enclosed."

"I need scarcely observe how impossible it is for me to make this, or any similar statement, the ground-work of a new demand for a repeal of the Berlin decree."

Mr. Pinkney to General Armstrong.

London, March 27th 1810.

Sir—I had the honor to receive, by Mr. Powell, your letter of the 25th of January. In pursuance of my instructions, I have addressed a letter to the Marquis Wellesley, his Britannic Majesty's principal Secretary of State for foreign affairs, inquiring whether any, and if any, what blockades of France instituted by Great Britain, during the present war, before the first of January, 1807, are understood by this government to be in force? Lord Wellesley's reply to that letter, not being so explicit as I wished, I have written a second letter requesting explanation. In his Lordship's answer to my second letter, I am informed that the blockade notified by Great Britain, in May 1806, (from the Elbe to Brest) has never been formally withdrawn but that the restrictions which that blockade established, are comprehended under the more exten-