



## AND North-Carolina State Gazette.

Vol. XII.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1811.

No. 632.

### American Politics.

FROM THE BOSTON CHRONICLE.

#### NAVY—No. IV.

It is generally observed, that the best mode for the republicans to adopt is, to approve of whatever the federalists condemn, and disapprove of whatever they applaud. Nine times out of ten this will be found the most correct decision. On the question of the NAVY we shall find, that in no instance have the federalists been more universally united than in recommending a system of marine to be adopted by the United States. These men are sensible, that we are invincible on the land, and therefore wish to entice us on the ocean.—What a favourable circumstance to the British would it have been, if General Joseph Warren and his brave troops on Bunker's Hill had been drawn from these commanding territorial heights, to contend with the British frigates in Boston harbor. If the Tories had been requested to give their advice on this occasion, they would unanimously have recommended to the yeomanry of Massachusetts to decide the great question of AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE by low "low water mark." The British would be very willing to risk a controversy on the element on which they ride triumphant, and if they can persuade us to relinquish all the advantage we hold on shore and hazard a naval engagement, they would extol us in rhodomontade as brave fellows, but would ridicule our folly and indiscretion. The caricatures they would present of us would be the figures of the frog and the ox; and while they inflated us with pride to swell to the bulk of the latter, they would anticipate the pleasure of seeing us experience the ridiculous catastrophe of the former.

While the English partisans are advocates for a navy, they are equally as clamorous in opposition to gun-boats. The most formidable strength we can bring forward in defence of our harbors, is what can be embraced within this kind of marine equipment. The British are cautious and timid with respect to their navy.—They never wish to hazard their ships where danger may be lurking unperceived.—The gun-boat system has always been most violently opposed by them. They have ever attempted to laugh this mode of warfare out of countenance. But we have reason to suppose that there is no system more dreaded by their friends than this. A British commander we are willing to acknowledge is prepared to meet danger when it is discovered. The British navy is equal to all exigencies when the object of assault is apparent. If the U States had within their respective harbors or on their coast two or three 74 gun ships, and five or six frigates, the British would feel no apprehensions of danger, but would exult at their prospect of success. They would accurately know the force they had to encounter, and will always be prepared to meet it. From sun-rise to sun-set they would have them in sight, and after the evening shade they would go to their nightly resting places composed as the old roosters during the late eclipse. But upon the gun-boat system, if they were to lie within our harbors during the night, the constant apprehension that some of them were floating down the channel, and positively under their stern, would keep them in such conditional alarm, that even if Nelson was to command in person, he would soon become discomfited in his enterprise. A gun-boat is like a floating battery, it can move at almost any period, and the damage such a machine may do to a first rate man of war on an unexpected onset, would keep up such a consternation on board, as to wear down the spirits of a ship's crew more effectually than a dozen real engagements. The British are particularly cautious in being exposed to accident and surprise. The small forts opened on Dorchester point effectually drove away the British fleet, and relieved Boston from a state of siege. A few strong well manned gun-boats, which could be set in motion with expedition, and by watching the most favourable opportunity, would become more terrific to a British squadron lying within our harbors, than twenty frigates.—The battle of the keys is descriptive of the general consternation which takes place among the ship's crew, when the danger is lurking in their own visionary apprehensions: every wave would become a

gun-boat, and every breeze would be as terrific as the thunder of a 42 pound cannon.

The conclusion therefore to be drawn from the foregoing premises, is, that a marine force composed of line of battle ships, frigates, &c. would be so inferior to the force they would have to contend with, that no protection whatever would arise to our commerce from them; but that our seaports would be more secure from depredations by a judicious arrangement of gun-boats; as the uncertainty of their movements would keep such a constant alarm among the ship's crew (particularly in the night) during favorable tides and winds, as would render his force less expensive, more expeditious, more formidable, and more likely to succeed, than any we could bring forward. The capture of a gun-boat would not poorly compensate for the risk of losing a mast by the fortunate discharge of a cannon, which might take place at an unexpected moment. Timidity is a peculiar trait of an Englishman's character. He is strong in defence, when it depends on enterprise to effect his purposes. But place him in a situation where uncertainty is prevalent, and he becomes the sport of the most visionary apprehensions. The Cock-lane ghost excited a most dreadful turmoil in the public mind; and the paroxysms of a crazy king, (as announced by his physicians) affects the nation more sensibly as to their fears and anticipations, than the defeat of twenty thousand of their allies. Uncertainty is the most powerful weapon that can be wielded against Englishmen. Fulton's torpedo (whether it ever could be carried into operation or no) would forever keep the British from lying long within our waters. If the commander of the fleet, presumed to brave out his courage by disregarding the project, yet seven eighths of his crew would be momentarily expecting to ascend in columns of fire and brimstone towards the region wherein comets and blazing stars perform their portentous evolutions.

We conclude this number by observing, that a navy of frigates, &c. would be disastrous to our commerce; but that the system of gun-boats as to internal security, ought to be pursued. The wisdom of Jefferson and Madison directed us to this point.

#### NAVY—No. V.

The question is not altogether whether we are competent in our pecuniary resources to establish a navy, but what is to be done after it is furnished. Talk about "short sighted pocket hearted avarice," is rather a boyish mode of reasoning, and favors too much of a foolish *spenathrift indiscretion*, without calculating the utility which is to arise from the undertaking. We have dashers in theological politics, as well as in moneyed speculations. They always laugh at the expenditure, as if magnitude of the sum was the only thing required to show our *spunk*. But though the cost should not be brought into view as the sole reason for not adopting the system, yet it ought to be a subject of serious investigation, for when the business is accomplished, and the money is spent it may be too late to remedy the evil.

But it seems the British fleet is to meet its match by keeping all the American force together, while they attack the separate detachments of their opponents. This force however is admitted to be equal to "30 sail of the line."—If then we are to oppose this armada, what force is it requisite for the United States to bring against it? Suppose a fleet of this magnitude should be on our coast, is it probable that our fleet would be all in one port, so as to be able to rally them in the most formidable manner on an immediate onset? If the British fleet may be divided by stretching along our extensive coast, it is equally probable that our ships would be distributed in the several seaports. If the whole American marine should cruise in company, the whole 30 sail of the line of the enemy would be equally consolidated. Communication would be speedily made to the admiral as to the disposal of our fleet, and whatever mode we adopted, the same would be taken by our opponents. It is a farcical idea to talk about attacking a British fleet in detachments, for it is more probable we should be separated than they. We must suppose that a proportionate strength of 30 ships of the line would on all occasions be so arranged as to encounter our marine. We are therefore to throw aside this visionary mode of

reasoning, and come directly to the enquiry, what number of ships and seamen are requisite for us to employ to encounter 30 ships of the line, which it is admitted might be sent to oppose us? Here the controversy is at issue, and on the decision of this question the whole system of marine rests. We shall wait till we hear what we are to do with 30 ships of the line on our coast!!

#### REMARKS

On Mr. Genet's Essay on Armed Neutrality. (By the Editor of the Albany Register.)

In introducing the above Essay to our readers, we take the liberty of remarking, that however ingenious this plan of an armed neutrality may appear on paper, it must be evident, and our wonder is, how it escaped the author himself, that G. Britain would render it nugatory in practice. That she would not submit to it, is to be irresistibly inferred from the whole tenor of her past conduct towards us. She is determined to subjugate our commerce, and she would therefore resist this effort by demanding of our convoys permission to search the vessels under their protection. They would refuse to comply, and she would then resort to force to compel them. They would also employ force in resisting—and thus we should arrive at the very point intended to be avoided, namely, war.

It suits the character of monarchies like that of England to do indirectly, what the laws of candor and of honor requires, should be directly avowed and executed. Hence the mean and perfidious manner in which we have seen G. Britain seize upon a valuable Dutch possession in the West Indies, without a previous declaration of war—& hence also have we witnessed her perfidy in capturing the Spanish money ships in 1805. Many other examples of her perfidy might be quoted. But a republic should never forget that its foundation is virtue, and that virtue and honor are inseparable companions. If therefore we are justified, as we certainly are, in adopting an armed neutrality, which would inevitably lead to war, we are equally justified in coming directly to the point, and proclaiming war against G. Britain without any reserve. To this course G. Britain has done every thing in her power to drive us, and to this course we are bound to resort by every principle that has ever been held sacred in the just and equitable laws and customs of nations; and his no American who is not totally ignorant of legal and moral obligations, or totally corrupt, abandoned, and regardless of his country's independence, will attempt to deny. On war alone depends the salvation of our commercial rights, and we should be sorry to see the government of our country any longer temporizing with modern Carthage. By attempting an expedient, like that of the embargo, or this plan of an armed neutrality, we may lose much, but shall gain nothing. In a decisive, vigorous war, our losses would be counterbalanced by our gains, and we should convince the world that our declaration of independence is not a dead letter.

We cannot close these introductory remarks, without observing, in justice to Mr. Genet, that whatever we may think of the utility of the plan contained in the above essay, or of any other half way step towards war—we nevertheless entertain the highest opinion of his talents, and are perfectly satisfied of his pure devotedness to the cause of this, his adopted country. His former essays have thrown much light upon our diplomatic controversy with England. In regard to the chasing, hailing and chastising of the *Little Belts*, by Commodore Rodgers, he has proven America in the right by the acknowledged principles of national law, as well as by positive treaty stipulations. For this service to America he has been rewarded by the filth and blackguardism of British hirelings; and we observe with regret, that the old dispute which he had with our government, while he acted as French minister, and which these despicable British minions have raked up against him, has also been thought worthy of recollection by one of our republican editors. We disapproved of Mr. Genet's conduct in those days as decidedly as the Tory editors have since approved of worse conduct, by far, on the part of Copenhagen Jackson. But our republican brethren should recollect that Mr. Genet was not only acting under instructions, which he was

bound to obey but that his enthusiasm in the cause of liberty led him to believe that her destiny in the world depended upon a close connexion between France and America. Under the influence of the best of feelings, the noblest of sentiments, and with an imperfect view of the American character, he was undoubtedly carried beyond the bounds of discretion. But be that as it may France has since deserted the cause of liberty, and Mr. Genet having solemnly abjured the character of a French citizen, and sworn allegiance to the United States, agreeably to our constitution and laws alone, ought to restrain us from doubting or impeaching his fidelity, till he shall have exhibited some proof of treachery to the interests of America—but that proof, we are certain, none but a British minion will pretend to find in his laborious researches for the vindication of our national rights.

#### EDMUND CHARLES GENET.

The following is the character given of Mr. Genet, by Madame Roland, in her Appeal to Posterity.

In the choice of an Envoy to the U. States, Brissot was actuated by no personal interest; he was the last man in the world to be so influenced.—He mentioned Genet, who was just returned from a residence of five years in Russia; and who, besides his being already conversant with diplomatic affairs, possessed all the moral virtues, and all the information that could render him agreeable to a serious people.

That proposal was wise; it was supported by every possible consideration; and Genet was preferred. If this be an intrigue, let us pray that all intriguers may resemble Brissot. I saw Genet; I desired to see him again; and should always be delighted with his company. His judgment is solid, and his mind enlightened; he has as much amenity as decency of manners; his conversation is instructive and agreeable, and equally free from pedantry and affectation.—Gentleness, propriety, grace, and reason, are his characteristics; and with all this merit, he unites the advantage of speaking English with fluency. Let the ignorant Robespierre, and the extravagant Chabot declaim against such a man, by calling him the friend of Brissot; let them procure, by their clamours, the recal of the one, and the trial of the other—they will only add to the proofs of their own villainy and stupidity, without hurting the fame of those whom they may find means to deprive of existence.

#### THE ARMY ESTABLISHMENT.

FROM THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER

There is no part of the world in which the military establishment is relatively to its extent so expensive as in the U States. Although this, by keeping the armed force within certain limits and averting the dangers that have generally flowed from its inordinate magnitude, is not unattended with benefit, yet the great expense is productive of serious evils. It has a powerful tendency to render the regular army unpopular and even odious, and in periods of emergency, when an occasional force is raised, the feeling of the nation is apt to be excited to a still higher pitch. Thus the organ of national defence, and in a certain sense, the guardian of our rights, is exposed to popular indignation, instead of being an object of popular esteem. There are some who consider this jealousy, or even contempt for a standing army, as the best antidote or corrective of the dangerous abuses to which it is alleged to be ever prone. But this sentiment is not founded in human nature. It is probably to the odium attached to a standing army that most of the abuses committed by it are to be traced. By such treatment the army becomes set apart as totally distinct from the community, and as being influenced, not merely by different, but by opposite interests. This estimation decides its complexion, and often gives it the very character so much deprecated. In ceasing to consider itself as the defender of the rights of its country, it has taken the first step towards their destruction. It may well then be questioned, whether the jealousy of a standing army, pushed too far, has not been among the most fatal instruments in the subversion of liberty. The love of glory is the very soul of a soldier, and if, in defending the rights of his country, he

misses the reward at which he aimed, is it surprising that, true to the sentiment that led him to be a soldier, he often turns his arms against his country, and extorts by his sword that admiration with which he would have been satisfied as a voluntary gift.

Let it not be inferred from these remarks that we are the friends of a standing army. On the contrary, we believe it to be among the greatest evils of political institutions. And we are confident that if the militia of the United States were efficiently organized, a much smaller regular force than the present would be sufficient for the defence of the country. We are satisfied of another thing; that until the militia is so organized, the liberties of this nation cannot be considered as safe. But, although there exists no insurmountable obstacles to such an organization, which would not probably be attended with so great an expense as the present extraordinary regular force in service, yet there seems to be a deplorable supineness and local jealousy that act as a dead weight against every attempt that is made for the amelioration of the militia system. When, however, this improvement shall be made, the organization of the regular force, and the estimation in which it is held, will be of little consequence, as it will henceforth form too inconsiderable a body, to be either burthensome or dangerous to our liberties. Let this be accomplished, and we shall be content. But, until this shall be done, the condition of the regular force should command our earnest attention.

The experience of the United States evinces, that even in a period of peace, the annual expense of each soldier does not fall short of two hundred dollars. From which it follows that an army of five thousand men will cost the annual sum of a million of dollars. This expense will be considerably increased during actual war, and, in such a state, it is not extravagant to estimate the requisite force at fifty thousand, which will produce an annual expense exceeding ten millions. To say nothing of the danger to which a republican government may be exposed by such a force, who will undertake to calculate the effects of such an establishment on the prosperity of the nation.

The subtraction of fifty thousand men from the active labor of the country by adding to the aggregate consumption in a ratio only inferior to the decreased production, could not fail most sensibly to affect the general interest. The foresight of such a disastrous effect will, it is to be feared, even in the most pressing junctures, render our public counselsaverse to the establishment of a large armed force, while the knowledge of foreign powers of our indisposition to take such a step will embolden them to the commission of outrages, which they might not otherwise perpetrate. It has in fact grown into an adage that the only way to avert war is to be prepared for it.

May not a sufficient remedy be provided for these serious and complicated evils? Is it not to be found by requiring the soldier, when unemployed in military service, to occupy himself in labors of utility to the community? We have a country of vast extent, opening a career of unlimited internal improvements. No objects, within the compass of a national and individual exertion, so imperiously call for accomplishment. The roads and canals of a confederated empire are literally the sinews of the system, by which its various powers are brought into action. They assimilate all the parts, unite the diversified interests, harmonize the discordant materials, and unite the otherwise separate societies into one harmonious mass. They have the powerful and beneficent effect of imparting strength to the whole system from the varying interests of the several parts of the political machine. The wants of one part are supplied by another, and thus the redundant production of every part is taken by the others. The truth ought never to be forgotten or disregarded that the duration of our confederacy of republics must depend on the facility of their intercourse with each other. The foreign world, it is true, requires a portion of our products; but even in our present state of infancy, it does not consume more than a twentieth part of our aggregate produce. The internal consumption is therefore the great resource, and in proportion as this is rendered easy, will labor be enabled to employ itself to the greatest advantage.