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. ' ' ,: . . . - l ; f : v, ) : .. y ;i' .-v--y; y y mmMmBmmmmmmmmm . . ' , ; warrMbyVVte.to live ttke Brother , , ,,, , ; rj:., 4, : JV J"i--i7y T; " - '7 , t ' , -i -FRlDAYEBRUARy'4; MR. GILES'S SPEECH. i SenU 0ftJ & S:ate-Dc. 17, 1811. The BUI for riieT Addition! MUiury Fortx. being under contKletttion on mo tJonyif Mr-Anderton to strike out the word ten, for the purpoe of inferting a imal-lei- number of reKimenti,"Mr. Gilct roe, and ubmitted.in ubtance,the following obMtr&tiOQJ t Mr. GILES s&H,be found himtelf in a Ycry unprepartd state, called upon to oppose a letf unexpected motion, i ne obicct of tbt mover haa not betn Tery prechelf exprned ; ba he h-d men tianed the number of 13,C 00 infantry a preferible to 20 O00 about the number proTided for by the BilL1 ilr. G. said it was also understood that a force of ten thousand tnenof every descript.on, would more comspond with the cxecu tire views, and fully answer the execu tiie requHition. This, heeirev d wjs the fact, and should soconsldcfjtin the course of the observations be proposed to make. No;wUhtandiighi! circum tta.cChowcVtr, tonsidersng the late oc currences on ourwcstcrnfronueiStand the feelings oF thr esiern people so jusl "exHtd thereby, ficc. he acknowledged that the motion had come from ihe and from a gentleman the most unex p-cted to him of all who represented the uestcrn portion of the United States because fmtn the long-course of mi litary services, bonor-biy rcndiivd by that grnUcman dunt-g the Revolutiona ry War, he must have become wrll ac quainted with the absolute necessity ot a due degree of momentum in militaiy aHVir. Mr. Cilei said he did not propose to go into a rIl exposition of our furtign relations at this lime ; y. t the motion furnished a most extensive scopv for ob servation, because if it should unf iru sa'.ely succeed, it would essentially dt range, as he conceived, the wlole views of the committee who reported the bill. He would therefore present to the Se nate the must prominent and important considerations which he presumed had operated on the committee, and had certainly on himself, to induce the re commendation of twenty-five thousand men, as the smallest postible quantum of force demanded by the crisis ; tode tnonstrate tht adv-mugea of a iorce at least to that ex'ent, over that which seemed to be contemplated by the hon. mover, and still more over that which is said to consist with theexecu ive project. In 'he consideration of this sabj-rct it is important to turn our attention to the objects fur which a military force is demanded, to enablf u the better to ap portion the means to the objects in tended to be tficcted. For tht purps be begged the most seriou at'entionof the Senate to the President's message a; the c- mraenceratnt of the session. 11 1 must now add (obse'ves the Pre sident) that the period is armed, which claims from the legislative guardia-s of the national rights, a system of more ample provisi ns fur maintain ng hm. Notwithstanding the scrupulous justice, the protracted moderation, ard ;he mul tiplied efforts' on Ibe pirt. of the U. S. to substitute for the accumulating dsn r to the peace of the two coui'tries. all the mutual advantages ofre-et.b fished friendship and confidence ; we have seen that the British cabinet, per severes not only in withholding a reme dy for other wrong so long and loudly calling far it ; but in the execu ion bro'c home to the threshold of oi.r territory, cf measures which, under existing cir cnmstincesf have the character, as the affect, of-war on our lawful commerce. With this evidence of hostile inflex ibili'y in trampling on rights which no indeperdent'naiioncan riinquish,Con gress will feelie duty of putii.g the U. Slates into ah armor and an attitude de manded by the- crisis and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations. 44 I recommend accordingly," that ade- quate provision , oe maue tor nil ng me ranks and prolonging the enlistment of the regular troops ; for an auxiliary force to be engaged for a more linked term ; for the acceptance of volunteer corps, whose patriotic ardor my cour aparucipition in urgent services ; for detachments, as they may be wanted,' cf other portions of the Militia, and for tuch a preparation of the great body as will proportion its u'fulncss to its in trinsic Capacity.' - Here we End, in the first place, th mpt solemn and imperious call on Con-1 irress. In the character of the Legish tive Guardians of the National RighU for asysttm of more ample provisions for malntaininsr them," The President then very properly and emphatically proceeds to tell us why he. makes this a lemn call upon the Legislative utrar dians of the Nation at this timel He tells us, in substance, that not withstand ing "the scrupulous justice, the pro traded moderation, and the multiplied -efforts on the part of the U. States," to induce Great Britain to recede from her hostile aggressions upon their essential sovereign rights, so far from yielding to these polite and pathetic invitations, she ration, u mu iicccaiujr touuk i hid increased her aetrressions, and had fensive on our part J. and that Congress ...nniMi a maviiP.. hirh. under ex- is.ing circumstances, have the character as will as the effect of War upon our lawfurcommmerce and that these measures are in their execution 41 bro't home to the threshold ot our territory. Ccu'd the President have chosen lan guage more emphatic to shew the im perious character of tlie call made upou Congress to furnish him with adequate physical means to retrie ve the honor and redress the wrongs of the nation i Lest there might be some possible mis t ic on the pan of Congress, he tells us xplicitly, that the aggressions of Great Britain have the character as well thief- feet of fftzrupon ou- lawful commerie, and that this If'ar i brcught hme f the JAre hold tf our territory. But, sir, the President does not stop here: He tells us that notwithstanding our protracted moderation, 8cc- G. B. per severcs with hostile infl-.xibility in tram pling on our essential sovereign rights ; rights at least, " which no independent nation can relinquish.' Here, then, it i evident that the President conceives, that our independence, as a naiion, is b rough' intbques'ion and put at hazard. Can any subject present a more awful nd imperious call upon Congress to ex ert ai d apply the whvle energies of the nation, than a question of Inoepeno knck ? The plain English of all this communication, he understood to be. .hat all the inefficient measures which h3Vc been adopted in relation to the bel ligerents for three years past, had not answered the expectations of their pro Lctors ; but instead of the expected re cession, had produced, on the part of Great Britain at least, inflexible hostilt y. This was a very natural result, and me which he had always anticipated, s was well known to this honorable bo dy But the Administration having learnt wisdom by these feeble experi ment had now determined to change i s course ; and for the pu pose of rrn- deiingthis hostility more flexible, had at Imgth resolved, instead of commercial restrictions, to try the effect of phy ical force. An adequate force is therefore demanded by the executive ; and the ad- quacy ff that force is very properly re ferred to Congress, where the responsi lity is placed by the constitution ; where v ought to res ; lor one, he was willing fo take his full share of it. But the President goe on further. Afier de ignating the objects, he points out the tandaid for ascertainingthe adequacy of the force demanded for their effectua tion. In his oihcial responsible mes sjge, he tells us that w Congress will feel the duty of putting the U States into an armor and an attitude demand ed by the crisis, and corresponding with he national spirit and expectations." t be standard here pointed out for cal culating the quantum of force to be sup plied, is " the crisis which bad been previously described in the most solemn and imp sing terms, and 11 the national spirit and expectations." Whether the committee had reported too great a crce for subduing the crisis, he was willing to submit to the verdict of the national spit tt and expectation " But it is now said, or intimated in substance, that this official responsible standard is only ostensible, and that the true standard for estimating thequan turn of force demanded, must be de rived from the decrepid state of the ;reasur, and the financial fame of the gentleman at the head of that depart ment. i'This subject will require a dis tinct 'consideration ; but in the' mean lime it is sufficient to say, that the com mittee unanimously refused to be inffu need by any corrsiderationr, but those resulting from the' official responsible communication, 'andtheir own rcflec lions upon the state of the nation as dis closed thereby , They unanimously re jected informal inofficial communications It will be observed too. in the mes sage, the President," in bis more aped fic recommendaions after designating the kinds of force suited to the occasion, leaves the quantum of each to be jud ed of, and decided by Congress; where the responsibility didnd ought to rest ; and he was unwlllingi by receding from his constitutional duty, to , revert this responsibiliryupon the executive. , It thus appearing, said Mr. Giles, that i the force demanded was for the purposes of war, if unfortunately we should be driven by Great-Britain to that last resort ; and that although' the war would be undertaken upon princi pies strictly defensible ; yet in its ope- was to determine exclusively upon the adequacy of the means f .r conducting it; he would now proceed to enquire mot t particularly, 1st-whether the com n.ittee hid recommended a force more than adequate to the purposes of the war ; and 2d, whether it was within the capacity of the U. States to supply the force thus recommended ? Mr. G. said, that in estimating the quantum of force demanded by the ex isting crisis, it appeared to him gentle, men had not given sufficient considera tion; to the attitude assumed by the U. S ates in relation to the Hondas, to the . xtension of our southtrn and western frontiers, to the late hostile acts and threatening in that quarter; nor to the importance of Orleans ; its exposed po sition and defenceless situation These circumstances, however, entered deeply into "he consideration of the committee, 8c induced it to conclude that the whole military establishment now authorised by law, if completed, would not be more than sufficient, perhaps insufficient to answer the necessary objects of the go vernment in the scenes just described ; v. was therefore in. ended thattne wnoie of that force should be'left free to act therein according to circumstances, and that the additional force now recom mended should act exclusively in the northern and eastern portion of the U- nion. This force no gentleman will pre tend can be too great for our objects in tha quarter, in the event of war, unaid ed bi the existing establ shmmt. Hcnc it was matter of great surprise to him ihatthe western gentlem-n should wish to diminish the number of men now pro posed to be raised ; because he believed thit every man deducted from the pro posed force, would take one from the force intended by the committee to pro tect our southern and western frontiers. These gentlemen, he presumed, must be better judge than himself, howmany of these men they can generously' spare from their own protection ; but for his part he thought thtre was nut one to spare frjm these objects, and thecom- mutee were willing to give the whoje of them that destination With respect to the protection of Or leans, he knew it was the expectation of the late administration, that in the event of war Great Britain would possess her self of that city ; and it was not their intention to incur the expence of being constantly prepared to repel the-first in cursions of the enemy : he did not know the intention of the present administra tion in that respect, but presumed it was acting on the same policy. In case the British should take possession of Or leans, the western people must necessa rily bs called on to drive them out, and he doubted very much whether it would be either a very acceptable occupation, or a very easy task. He had always disapproved of this policy, and in the e- vent of war, he thought it wise, not only to be prepared for defence at all points, but to give the first blow. He believed, in -the end, it would be found, not only the wisest, but the most economical po licy, both in blood and treasure. Having presented to the Senate the objects to which the existing military establishment ought to be' assigned, ac cording to the views of the committee, he would proceed to enquire, whether the additional force recommended, would be more than competent to the objects to which it must necessarily be assigned, and which ought, unquestionably, to be effected by it. In case of war, an event he deprecated as much asf any gentle man present, the new army would have to man ''your fortifications on the sea board from Norfolk to the extremities of our territory North and East, and to occupy Canada. 'These ate the contem plated and iridispensaUe objects of this armyi iq the estimation of the executive and the honorable mover, as well as of jtbe com mUtee The question i( there fore turn' upon the accuracy and coirest ness of their respective calculations as to the quantum of force necessary to ef fect these objects s - ; i L Mr.' Giles! said he had a-conversatibn with rhe Secretary for the Department of War, in his character oF chairman of the committee ot foreign- relations, in which the Secretary did endeavor to de mprisirate to him that a smaller num ber of men than 25.000, would answer tnese oojeccs ; out so tai trom producing this conviction, it satisfied him that the number was too small. He thought that every inference drawn by the honorable oecreiary, ougnt 10 nave oeen invenea. For instance he was asked) how many men were indispensably hecessarr to indispensably necessary man the fortifications at New-York The honorable Secretary replied 2,000 ; but he intended to make 1,000 answer and would rely for the resJ 'of the complement on the local militia. Now, said Mr Giles, he inferred if 2,000 men were necessary for that most exposed and important position, that 1.000 would nbt answer with the precarious and ac cidental aid of the local militia ; that 2,000 ought to be calculated on for that service ; and if with the aid of the local militia, they could protect New-York a gainst the force Great Britain might dc tarh against that city, they would per-, form 'heir full share of the toils and pe rils ,of the war. Two thousand men, completely furnished with all the means of annoyance, possessed of all the skil! that military science could afford, and impelled by all the subordination and management that miliary discipline could impose, wi h the aid of the local militia also, would deserve well of their ccuniry, if they should preserve New York from the grasp of Great Britain in case she should think proper to direct the force she might h,ave at command against that city. .Then why s-nd I 000 on a service, when we know that 2,000 are necessary, and perhaps incompe tent I Is it because the United States have not the capacity; to send 2 000 ? That question shall be examined pre sently. The same observations will ap ply to the protection; of Rhode Island, yrhere 2,000. more will be necessary ; and 1,000 wil) be as few as can possibly be detached for 'he other fortifications. Admitting then 5,000 men to be neces sary to man the various fortifications on he sea board, and supposing every man to be raised, as proposed in the bill, there will be a disposable force of only 20000 men for the occupation of Canada. But ( upon the executive project, there would be left for that service only 5 ,000 men ; unless indeed the western and southern frontiers should be left unprotected, or the f t tifications on the sea-board should be only half manned, and of course left to the sport of the enemy Mr. Giles said, he apprehended that in the first onset of the war, G Britain would di rect her force to the occupation of New- Yo k and Orleans ; and if she should possess herself of those two points, he would venture to predict that the admi nistration which commenced the; War, would not finish it ; especially under a system of policy, which would only fur nish one half of the means deemed ne cessary for their protection- yes, Sir, known to be inadequate at the time of applying it. What 'apology could be made to an injured nation under 3uch circumstances rV We knew 2 000 men to be necessary for- the defence of New York but we sagely determined to ap ply 1,000 only tothat object for fear of 1 1 incurring the expence of the requisite number This would be self condem nation. The people would lose all con- - fidence in such calculators, and would certainly make the experiment of a change. Cnder such circumstances, Mr. G. said, he would be the first to cry out for a change of the administration ; for, it would not be. possible to lose by it. Defend New York with all the judgment and skill you can command ; fill the for tifications with the' full complement of troops, amply provided ; call in thcJo Cal militia, Sec. and he should not be, sur prised if the British should get; posses sion bf tha city .But therr there woufd, its duties will have been peformed, and J Uie result wouia rest . upon uic wnuuc 11 of war : but a sincrle ' act of neclect or 1 1 misconduct would certainly jaeprivc the) administration of. the public confidence, . T w ... ; V ,... . w . .. II. change upon the termination of the war. Ij Therefore, takfi care of these two points I J jnr yiie iaio9 ne aiso requcstea we 1 1 session of New-York and prleans; and merely local. But he belief ed simdar you should get! possession, of tCanadaf impressions pervaded Europe and iArhe you would bti y tvi, glad jo make the ex- ricaand had tinfonunately hon. Secretary to consult .with theTresU dent andipfoim Jifmashe PridenVs secfetarylijethey to have the numb whether he iptfad a preference. for any - , ther number I' The refiiy, after the con-! sqKatipneiy-p President had no opmion to brrer oh that point, i He eionsidered jt a subject of leV gislativq discreUoni ?cc.; Of course fny' informal : cxecuttTieviews ;.oug;titYmji.''tw;; : I be substituted for ;our own discretion and respbnsbitit'y0 Mr. Giles said h knew it had .been suggested, and per-" iinaps iromvery jgn aumoniy, inai no thing was necessary to induce G. -1 tain to . recede from ber aggressu Bri- aggressions but to convince her, that instead of 'Op posing to them inefficient - comniercia restrictions, they would be resisted with physical force ; and that raising, tea thousand men, would produce this con , vi ctidrjf withput ' incurring further ex pence This suggestion furnished some of his strongest! objections to limiting the force to be raised, to ten thousand men . , So far from producing that con viction cn the" British cabinetf he : was convinced it would produce precisely the opposite effect The British cabi- , net would look' at the means provided r : for effecting the .object, as, the best1 evi dence of the object iUtlf. , And as, these , means wouia.De vtcwea so utterly m- - adequate to the purposes of war, the ca binet would necessarily v conclude:, j that" we were not tn earnest ; , that we were upon the most serious sub- joking, eveq a ject . that; war was not intended, and would not be resorted 4o under any cir cumstances This impression, the ne cessary result of our for mtjr measures, has become! so general', both at home and abroad, ithat we have much to do to retrieve our lost reputation ; we do not s and upon original ground Our mea sures must be of a Tery different cha racter! from what they have been? to produce the desired conviction, either at home or t abroad Having changed our principle of action from com mercial restrictions, to physical force, limiting that force to ten thousand men would be in his judgment, as much trifling with the energies of the nation, as inef ficient commercial restrictions had here tofore been trifling with the character ' and interests of . the Ration, and her fear- -ed was dictated by ; the same unfortu- nae imbecile spirit and policy. Mr. G. said that whilst upon this part of: the subject, he begged to b excused for reading a few paragraphs from a news paper, which' he accidently picked up last evening Containing the annuncia tion of the Presideht'e message at Que bec ; the very point-to which the pro posed force might probabljl be directed. It fully demonstrates the impressions existing; there, and which have i been produced by! our former measures. " Prtsidenti Jfqe Happilj, the, expec tation of Mr. Madison's speech, steps :in op portunely, as something of an antidote ,to the effect of the European dearth. Front that ; speech we shall learn that the terrible beitA John,Bull does not suffer his thotuand armed vessels, manned and equipped to an enormous expence,. to lie. wholly idle, fyut that they aift guilty of the audacious tyranny of being, ' in some degree, SvCbeck ph. the .violent inclina tions ox Dame Columbia to extend her, arms to cherish, aid and assist ber admired hero Napoleon, in effecting JbhnVannihilation.-- Much will the speech complain ? that th4 ove-. reign, of the ocean is not powerful to! no pur- ; pose, and doesjnot descend to, arid put himself ; on-a level witthhe habecility of the U. States, with their dozen ships. Unpardonable j g06 that the Leviathan is not as pot the wer. , less as the Cod t that the Jackall, whom nx, - I ture meant for: the Lion's provider is not per 4 nutted to divert its provender to the support of the Tiger, with a view to thr destruction the Lion, yrf i.'l.4v; ; 'k;4-'l":;. V - The speech may not say these things in direct terms ; .but such will, unquestionably -be'its ?nieawngfrV-.- ;. - With syllogisms 'twill make a clatter, With' abstract rights threedeckers batter; An empty purse at mtllions shake.v I , And no trade 'gainst, a (tm trade stake ' Of rotting produce count the gain, .o.f. ' r . A seaboard boast shut from the main 1 S1 ;To seamen recommend the ; loom, r. . And oh each matt to fix the broom ; i Merchants, for tack of foreign wares,! ! To rttail applefVplttnibs and pears.0,- Limit all our mighty efforts to Ip.dOO . men! nd, it twill afford a better subjeci ror enoincr pasquinauc, man inc rrcsic . dent's menaP-e had done for the one c .-. just read. 1 e should iwt have ventuTJvy; edto read theaearagjaphatdth r. r-r .-! . -) - ; i,- :.: - v f way mto thejFrench nets. Nor should he have thought these sarcasms worui tera were u noi ior . 5;-.' ! ", ,rJ, Hi it; -, -.1': it W ' & - " - - , -..jf-ii "r ...Mi ' .. .- . ft: 'i.
The Weekly Raleigh Register (Raleigh, N.C.)
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Feb. 14, 1812, edition 1
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