



"Ours are the plans of fair, delightful Peace,
"Unwarp'd by party rage, to live like Brothers."

MR. RANDOLPH.

The following letter of this gentleman to his Constituents, just before he sailed for Europe, shews the temper of his mind on parting:

FROM THE ENQUIRER.

To the Freeholders of Charlotte, Rockingham, Prince Edward and Cumberland.

MY FRIENDS—for such indeed you have proved yourselves to be through good and through evil report—I throw myself on your indulgence, to which I have never yet appealed in vain. It is now just five years since the state of my health reluctantly compelled me to resist your solicitations (backed by my own wishes) to offer my services to your suffrages. The recurrence of a similar calamity obliges me to retire, for a while, from the field of duty, and if I shall find it impracticable to return by December next, my resignation (already written) will be tendered to the Governor in time to prevent your being unrepresented in the next session of Congress. It would be offered now, but that the approaching close of the session would render a re-election nugatory as to present purposes. The state of my affairs (as is well known to some of you) requires my presence at home—but self-preservation imperiously enjoins a suspension of all business whatever: and indeed, with all my deficiencies for the station in which your partiality has been pleased to place me, I have never yet postponed your interests to my own.

Should the mild climate of France & the change of air restore my health, you will again find me a candidate for your independent suffrages at the next election, (1823.)

I have an especial desire to be in that Congress which will decide (probably by indirection) the character of the Executive government of the confederation for at least four years—perhaps forever:—since now, for the first time since the institution of this government, we have presented to the people the army-candidate for the Presidency in the person of him, who judging from present appearance will receive the support of the Bank of the U. States also. This is an union of the purse and the sword with a vengeance—one, which even the sagacity of Patrick Henry never anticipated, in this shape at least. Let the people look to it; or they are lost forever. They will fall into that gulf which, under the artificial military and paper systems of Europe, divides Dives from Lazarus, and grows daily and hourly broader, deeper and more appalling. To this state of things, we are rapidly approaching, under an administration, the head of which sits an *incubus* upon the state, while the lieutenants of this new mayor of the palace are already contending for the succession, and their retainers and adherents are with difficulty kept from coming to blows, even on the floor of Congress. We are arrived at that pitch of degeneracy, when the mere lust of power, the retention of place and patronage, can prevail, not only over every consideration of public duty, but stifle the suggestions of personal honor, which even the ministers of the decayed governments of Europe have not yet learnt entirely to disregard. Should God spare me, you shall be informed how it has come to pass that, after settling the Florida question at the expense of a vast sacrifice of territory "south of 36 and a half of north latitude;" we are yet embroiled with Spain—and, in passing, it may be as well to recollect that the command of the Red River and the Arkansas (the gates of New-Orleans) will have to be contested, not with the imbecile and puny government of Spain, but with a young and rising and therefore ambitious Republic.

JOHN RANDOLPH, of Roanoke. On board the steam boat Nautilus, under weigh to the Amity, Saturday, March 16, 1822.

P. S. I did not leave my seat until the fate of the Bankrupt bill (to which my mite was contributed) was ascertained. In case of need I was ready to vote on the 3d reading.

J. R. of R.

Letters, via New-York, to the care of the Postmaster, will reach me. My address is "care of John & William Gilliat, London."

J. GALES has now on hand a considerable stock of Wrapping Paper, large and small, of a good quality. March, 1822.

HEMP AND FLAX SEED.

Report of the Committee on Agriculture on the petition of Anthony Dey and James Macdonald.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, March 12, 1822.

The Committee on Agriculture, to which was referred the petition of Anthony Dey and James Macdonald, Report: The petition alleges, that the said Macdonald, at the expense of the said Dey, has invented and constructed a new and useful machine for breaking and cleaning of hemp (and flax, in an unrotted state, so that the said Dey has discovered the means by which hemp and flax, after being cleaned in an unrotted state in their machine, may be bleached by a process hitherto unknown; that they believe their method of dressing hemp and flax to be of very great importance to the agricultural interest of the country, and, therefore, ask an extension of the exclusive right to make, construct, use, and vend to others to be used, the said invention and discovery.

From the evidence adduced by the petitioners, it appears, that they have invented a machine for breaking and cleaning hemp and flax, in an unrotted state, which is different in its principles & construction from any machine that ever has been used for that purpose, and that the said Dey has also discovered a process, never before used, for bleaching hemp and flax after it has been dressed in an unrotted state. And, also, it appears by the certificates of respectable gentlemen, who have witnessed the operation of the machine, that it will, by the power of one horse, with the assistance of one man and three boys, separate the integument and wood from the fibrous part of the hemp and flax plants, and clean the same, at the rate of one pound in a fraction of time over a minute, fit for bleaching.

The petitioners further assure us, from the operation of one machine by horse power, with the attendance of one man and three boys, from 1 600 to 2 000 lbs. of unrotted hemp, or flax, may be cleaned in a day, yielding from 400 to 500 lbs. after it is bleached; and that, by the addition of another machine, which can be moved by the same horse, with the addition of one man and one boy more, from 800 to 1000 lbs. may be cleaned at an expense not exceeding five dollars. And the committee are informed by Mr. Dey that one man can bleach 350 lbs. of hemp, or flax, after it has been cleaned by their machine, in a day, at an expense of one dollar and seventy-five cents for the article which he uses in the process.

From these calculations, it appears that any quantity of unrotted hemp or flax taken from the field, where it is raised, may be broke, cleaned and bleached, at a rate less than two cents per pound, delivered in a bleached state; and, allowing one cent per pound for the plant, as it comes from the field, the whole cost (except for the wear of the machine) in growing this valuable plant, and breaking, cleaning, & bleaching it, will be less than six cents per pound. The Committee are not informed what the cost of hatching or combing it, (which is done after it is bleached) and preparing it for the manufacturer, would be, but presume it will not exceed two cents per pound. If the information the committee have received, and their calculations, are correct, either hemp or flax may be raised, dressed, and prepared for the best manufacture, at an expense of eight cents, and not exceeding in any case ten cents, per pound.

By the experiments of the petitioners, and others, it is found that flax, dressed and hatched in the ordinary way, after it has been dew-rotted, yields nine pounds from one hundred pounds of the plant which has been rotted, being sixteen pounds less than is produced from one hundred pounds of unrotted flax, cleaned and bleached by the method which the petitioners have discovered. But no experiments have yet been made to determine the difference in the weight of the plant, before and after it is rotted; therefore, it cannot now be ascertained how much will be saved, in quantity, by this method of breaking and cleaning it before it is rotted. It cannot, however be doubted, that the common process of rotting flax, especially by dew, destroys or injures many of its fibres, and, of course, the quality, as well as the quantity, must be, in some degree, diminished.

The Committee have examined the machine, and have seen it operate, and believe it will prove one of the most important and valuable discoveries. The committee have, also, examined the hemp and flax which has been bleached in this new method and hatched, and find that the colored matter and harshness of the fibres are removed, and that the flax is rendered very white, and as soft and fine as silk. This method of bleaching hemp and flax, it is believed, will be of great value to the grower and manufacturer of these plants.

Considering hemp and flax among the most valuable plants which can be cultivated in this country, and believing there is an abundance of soil in every state in the Union which is well adapted to their culture, and growth, the committee are highly pleased with the invention and discovery of the petitioners. If hemp and

flax can be raised in this country as easily and as cheap as in any other, and these inventions should prove as valuable as the committee believe they may, the cultivation of these plants will engage the attention of a large portion of the agriculturists, and become exceedingly important to the United States. It may be seen by the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury of the quantity and value of merchandise imported, that, during the year ending on the 30th of September, 1821, 86,192 cwt. of hemp, valued at \$510,489 (being about \$120 per ton,) hempen goods, of the value of \$226,174; duck & sheeting, of the value of 894,276; cordage, of the value of 107,867; and linsens, bleached and unbleached, of the value of 2,564,159, were imported into this country, amounting to 4,302,963, and that the whole value of the exports of domestic and foreign produce of the same kind, amounted only to \$22,976, leaving the value of 3,479,187 in the merchandise produced from the hemp and flax plants to be consumed in this country.

As the petitioners desire an extension of time, and further protection than is secured by the patent law in its present form, and as it is the peculiar province of the Committee on the Judiciary to report any revision or amendment of that law which may be necessary, your committee recommend the adoption of the following resolution:

RESOLVED, That the Committee on Agriculture be discharged from the further consideration of the petition of Anthony Dey and James Macdonald, and that it be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

Message of the President of the United States to Congress, upon the subject of the Fortifications on Dauphine Island and Mobile Point.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.

Congress having suspended the appropriation, at the last session, for the fortification at Dauphine Island, in consequence of a doubt which was entertained of the propriety of that position, the further prosecution of the work was suspended, and an order given, as intimated in the message of the 3d of December, to the Board of Engineers and Naval Commissioners, to re-examine that part of the coast, and particularly that position, as also the position at Mobile Point, with which it is connected, and to report their opinion thereon, which has been done, and which report is herewith communicated.

By this report, it appears to be still the opinion of the Board, that the construction of works at both these positions is of great importance to the defence of New-Orleans, and of all that portion of our Union which is connected with, and dependant on, the Mississippi, and on the other waters which empty into the Gulf of Mexico, between that river and Cape Florida. That the subject may be fully before Congress, I transmit, also, a copy of the former report of the Board, being that on which the work was undertaken, and has been, in part, executed. Approving, as I do, the opinion of the Board, I consider it my duty to state the reasons on which I adopted the first report, especially as they were, in part, suggested by the occurrences of the late war.

The policy which induced Congress to decide on, and provide for, the defence of the coast, immediately after the war, was founded on the marked events of that interesting epoch. The vast body of men, which it was found necessary to call into the field, through the whole extent of our maritime frontier, and the number who perished by exposure, with the immense expenditure of money and waste of property, which followed, were to be traced, in an eminent degree, to the defenceless condition of the coast. It was to mitigate these evils, in future wars, and even for the higher purpose of preventing war itself, that the decision was formed, to make the coast, so far as it might be practicable, impregnable; and that the measures necessary to that great object have been pursued with so much zeal since.

It is known that no part of our Union is more exposed to invasion, by the numerous avenues leading to it, or more defenceless by the thinness of the neighboring population, or offers a greater temptation to invasion, either as a permanent acquisition, or as a prize to the cupidity of grasping invaders, from the immense amount of produce deposited there, than the city of New-Orleans. It is known, also, that the seizure of no part of our Union, could affect so deeply and vitally the immediate interests of so many states, and of so many of our fellow-citizens, comprising all that extensive territory and numerous population which are connected with, and dependant on, the Mississippi, as the seizure of that city. Strong works, well posted, were, therefore, deemed absolutely necessary for its protection.

It is not, however, by the Mississippi only, or the waters which communicate directly with, or approach nearest to New-Orleans, that the town is assailable. It will be recollected that, in the late war, the public solicitude was excited, not so much by the danger which menaced it, in those directions, as by the apprehension that, while a feint might be made there, the main force, landing either in the bay of Mobile or other waters between that bay and the Rigolets, would be thrown above the town, in the rear of the army, which had been collected there for its defence. Full confidence was entertained that that gallant army, led by the gallant and able chief who commanded it, would repel any

attack to which it might be exposed in front. But had such a force been thrown above the town, and a position taken on the banks of the river, the disadvantage to which our troops would have been subjected, attacked in front and rear, as they might have been, may easily be conceived. As their supplies would have been cut off, they could not long have remained in the city, and, withdrawing from it, it must have fallen immediately into the hands of the force below. In ascending the river, to attack the force above, the attack must have been made to great disadvantage, since it must have been, on such ground and at such time as the enemy preferred. These considerations show, that defences, other than such as are immediately connected with the city, are of great importance to its safety.

An attempt to seize New-Orleans and the lower part of the Mississippi, will be made only by a great power, or a combination of several powers, with a strong naval and land force, the latter of which must be brought in transports which may sail in shallow water. If the defences around New-Orleans are well posted, and of sufficient strength to repel any attack which may be made on them, the city can be assailed only by a land force, which must pass in the direction above suggested, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile. It becomes, therefore, an object of high importance to present such an obstacle to such an attempt, as would defeat it, should it be made. Fortifications are useful for the defence of posts, to prevent the approach to cities, and the passage of rivers; but, as works, their effect cannot be felt beyond the reach of their cannon. They are formidable, in other respects, by the body of men within them, which may be removed and applied to other purposes.

Between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile there is a chain of islands, at the extremity of which is Dauphine Island, which forms, with Mobile Point, from which it is distant about 3 1-4 miles, the entrance into the Bay of Mobile, which leads through that part of the State of Alabama, to the towns of Mobile and Blakely. The distance between Dauphine Island and the Rigolets is 90 miles. The principal islands between them are Mascare, Horn, Ship, and Cat Islands, near to which there is an anchorage for large ships of war. The first object is to prevent the landing of any force, for the purposes above stated, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile—the second, to defeat that force, in case it should be landed. When the distance from one point to the other is considered, it is believed that it would be impossible to establish works so near to each other as to prevent the landing of such a force. Its defeat, therefore, should be effectually provided for. If the arrangement should be such as to make that result evident, it might be fairly concluded that the attempt would not be made, and thus we should accomplish, in the best mode possible, and with the least expense, the complete security of this important part of our Union, the great object of our system of defence for the whole.

There are some other views of this subject which, it is thought, will merit particular attention in deciding the point in question.—Not being able to establish a chain of posts, at least for the present, along the whole coast, from the Rigolets to Dauphine Island, or on all the islands between them, at which point shall we begin! Should an attack on the city be anticipated, it cannot be doubted that an adequate force would immediately be ordered there for its defence. If the enemy should despair of making an impression on the works near the town, it may be presumed that they would promptly decide to make an attempt in the manner and in the line above suggested, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile. It will be obvious, that the nearer the fortification is erected to the Rigolets, with a view to this object, should it be on Cat or Ship Island, for example, the wider would the passage be left open, between that work and the Bay of Mobile, for such an enterprise. The main army being drawn to New-Orleans, would be ready to meet such an attempt, near the Rigolets, or at any other point not distant from the city. It is probable, therefore, that the enemy, profiting of a fair wind, would make his attempt at the greatest distance compatible with his object, from that point, and at the Bay of Mobile, should there not be works there of sufficient strength to prevent it. Should, however, strong works be erected there, such as were sufficient, not only for their own defence against any attack which might be made on them, but to hold a force, connected with that which might be drawn from the neighboring country, capable of co-operating with the force at the city, and which would doubtless be ordered to those works, in the event of war; it would be dangerous for the invading force to land any where, between the Rigolets and the Bay of Mobile, and to pass towards the Mississippi above the city, lest such a body might be thrown in its rear, as to cut off its retreat. These considerations show the great advantage of establishing, at the mouth of the Bay of Mobile, very strong works, such as would be adequate to all the purposes suggested.

If fortifications were necessary only to protect our country and cities, against the entry of large ships of war, into our bays and rivers, they would be of little use for the defence of New-Orleans, since that city cannot be approached, so near, either by the Mississippi, or in any other direction by such vessels, for them to make an attack on it. In the Gulf, within our limits west of Florida, which has been acquired since these works were decided on and commenced, there is no bay or river, into which large ships of war can enter. As a defence therefore against an attack, from such vessels, extensive works would be altogether unnecessary, either at Mobile Point, or at Dauphine Island, since ships of war, only, can navigate the deepest channel. But it is not for that purpose alone that these works are intended. It is to pro-

vide, also, against a formidable invasion, both by land and sea, the object of which may be to shake the foundation of our system.—Should such small works be erected, and such an invasion take place, they would be sure to fall at once into the hands of the invaders, and to be turned against us.

Whether the acquisition of Florida may be considered as affording an inducement to make any change in the position or strength of these works, is a circumstance which also merits attention. From the view which I have taken of the subject, I am of opinion, that it should not. The defence of New-Orleans, and of the river Mississippi, against a powerful invasion, being one of the great objects of such extensive works, that object would be essentially abandoned, if they should be established eastward of the Bay of Mobile, since the force to be collected in them would be placed at too great a distance to allow the co-operation, necessary for those purposes, between it, and that at the city. In addition to which, it may be observed, that, by carrying them to Pensacola, or further to the East, that Bay would fall immediately, in case of such invasion, into the hands of the enemy; whereby such co-operation would be rendered utterly impossible, and the State of Alabama would be left wholly unprotected.

With a view to such formidable invasion, of which we should never lose sight, and of the great objects to which it would be directed, I think that very strong works, at some point within the Gulf of Mexico will be found indispensable. I think, also, that these works ought to be established at the Bay of Mobile, one at Mobile Point, and the other on Dauphine Island, whereby the enemy would be excluded, and the complete command of that Bay, with all the advantages attending it, be secured to ourselves. In the case of such an invasion, it will, it is presumed, be deemed necessary to collect at some point, other than at New Orleans, a strong force, capable of moving in any direction, and affording aid to any part which may be attacked, and, in my judgment, no position presents so many advantages, as a point of rendezvous, for such force, as the mouth of that Bay. The fortification at the Rigolets will defend the entrance by one passage into Lake Ponchartrain, and also into Pearl River, which empties into the Gulf, at that point. Between the Rigolets and Mobile Bay, there are but two inlets, which deserve the name, those of St. Louis and Pascagola, the entrance into which, is too shallow, even for the smallest vessels; and from the Rigolets to Mobile Bay, the whole coast is equally shallow, affording the depth of a few feet of water only. Cat Island, which is nearest the Rigolets, is about seven and a half miles distant from the coast, and thirty from the Rigolets. Ship Island is distant about ten miles from Cat Island, and twelve from the coast. Between these islands and the coast, the water is very shallow. As to the precise depth of water in approaching those islands from the Gulf, the report of the topographical engineers not having yet been received, it is impossible to speak, with precision; but admitting it to be such, as for frigates, and even ships of the line to enter, the anchorage at both is unsafe, being much exposed to northwest winds. Along the coast, therefore, there is no motive for such strong works on our part; no town to guard; no inlet into the country to defend; and if placed on the islands, and the entrance to them is such as to admit large ships of war, distant as they are from the coast, it would be more easy for the enemy to assail them with effect.

The position, however, at Mobile Bay, is essentially different. That bay takes its name from the Mobile river, which is formed by the junction of the Alabama and Tombigbee, which extend, each, about 300 miles into the interior, approaching at their head waters, near the Tennessee river. If the enemy possessed its mouth, and fortified Mobile Point and Dauphine Island, being superior at sea, it would be difficult for us to dispossess him of either, even of Mobile Point; and holding that position, Pensacola would soon fall, as, without incurring great expense in the construction of works there, it would present but a feeble resistance to a strong force in its rear. If we had a work at Mobile Point only, the enemy might take Dauphine Island, which would afford him great aid in attacking the point, and enable him, even should we succeed in repelling the attack, to render us great mischief there, and throughout the whole Gulf. In every view which can be taken of the subject, it appears indispensable for us to command the entrance into Mobile Bay; and that decision being taken, I think the considerations which favor the occupation of Dauphine Island by a strong work, are conclusive. It is proper to observe, that, after the repulse before New-Orleans, in the late war, the British forces took possession of Dauphine Island, and held it till the peace. Under neither of the reports of the Board of Engineers and Naval Commissioners, could any but sloop of war enter the Bay, or the anchorage between Dauphine and Pelican Islands. Both reports give to that anchorage 18 feet at low water, and 20; at high. The only difference between them consists in this: that, in the first, a bar leading to the anchorage, reducing the depth of water to 12 feet at low tide, was omitted. In neither case could frigates enter, though sloops of war of larger size might. The whole scope, however, of this reasoning, turns on a different principle—on the works necessary to defend that bay, and, by means thereof, New-Orleans, the Mississippi, & all the surrounding country, against a powerful invasion, both by land and sea, and not on the precise depth of water in any of the approaches to the bay or the island.

The reasoning which is applicable to the works near New-Orleans, and at the Bay of Mobile, is equally so, in certain respects, to those which are to be erected for the defence of all the bays and rivers along the other parts of the coast. All those works are also