the question of prize or no prize; and with
it the legality of the blockade. If, in that
of a repeal of the acts, establishing ports
of entries in the State, the legality of ihe
seizure must be determined, and that
would bring up thequestion of the consti
tutionality of giving a preference to the
ports of one Slate over those of another;
and, so if we pass from water to land, we
will find every attempt thero to substitute
force for law, must, in like manner, come
under the review of the courts of the U
nion, and the unconstitutionality would
be so glaring that the executive and le-
DO
gislative departments, in their attempt to
coerce, should either make an attempt, so
lawless and desperate, would be without
the support of the judicial department.
1 will not pursue the question farther, as I
hold it perfectly clear, that so long as a
State retains its federal relations so
long, in a word, as it continues a member
of the Union, the contest between it and
the General Government must be before
the courts and juries; aud every attempt,
in whatever form, whether by land or wa
ter, to substitute force, as the arbiter in
their place, must fail. The unconstitu
tionality of the attempt would be so open
and palpable, that it would be impossible
to sustain it.
There is indeed one view, and one on
ly, of the contest, in which force could be
employed; butthat view, as between the
parties, would supercede the Constitu
tion itself; that nullification is secession,
and would, consequently, place the State,
as to the others, in the relation of a for
eign State. Such clearly would be the
effect of secession; but it is equally clear,
that it would place the State beyond the
pale of her federal relations, and thereby,
all control on the part of the other States
over her. She would stand to them sim
ply in the relation of a foreign State, di
vested of all federal connection, and hav
ing none other between them but those
belonging to the laws of nations. Stand
ing thus towards one another, force might
indeed be employed against a State, but
it must be a belligerent force, preceded by
a declaration of war, and carried on with
all its formalities. Such would be the
certain effect of secession; and if nullifi
cation be secession if it be but a differ
ent name for the same thing such, too,
must be its effect; which presents the
highly important question, are they in
fact the same, on the decision of which
depends the question whether it be a
peaceable and constitutional remedy, that
may be exercised without terminating
the federal relations of the State, or not?
I am aware that there is a considera
ble and respectable portion of our State,
with a very large portion of the Union,
constituting, in fact, a great majority,
who are of the opinion, that they are the
same thing, differing only in name; and
who, under that impression, denounce it
as the most dangerous of all doctrines,
and yet, so far from being the same, they
are, unless indeed I am greatly deceived
not only perfectly distinguishable, but to
tally dissimilar in their nature, their ob
ject, and effect; and that, so far from de
serving the denunciation, so properly be
longing to the act with which it is con
founded, it is, in truth, the highest and
most precious of all the rights of the
States, and essential to preserve that ve
ry Union, for the supposed e ffect of des
troying which, it is so bitterly anathema
tised. I shall now proceed to make good my
assertion of their total dissimilarity.
l;irst, they are wholly dissimilar in
tlicir nature. One has reference to the
lartus themselves, and the other to their
"gents-. Secession is a withdrawal from
the Union; a separation from partners,
and, as far as it depends on the number
withdrawing, a dissolution of the partner
ship. It presupposes an association, an
union of several States or individuals, for
a common object. Wherever these exist,
secession may, and where they do not, it
cannot. Nullification, on the contrary,
presupposes the relation of principal and
agent; the one granting a power to be ex
ecuted, the other appointed by him, with
authority to execute it; and is simply a
declaration on the part of Ihe principal, made
tn due form, that an act of the agent, trans
cending his power,is null and void. It is a
right belonging exclusively to the relation
between principal and agent, to be found
wherever it exists, and in all its forms,
between several, or an association of
principals and their joint agents, as well
as between a single principal & his agent.
The difference in their object is no less
striking than in their nature.
The object of secession is to free the
withdrawing member from the obligation
to the association or union; and is appli
cable to cases, where the intention of the
association, or union has failed, cither by
nn nhiisn nf nnwer on the Dart of its mem-
bcrst or other causes. Its direct and
immediate object, as it concerns inc ivicnaraw
ing member, is the dissolution of the associa
tion or union. On the contrary, the ob
ject of nullification is to confine the agent
within the limits of its powers by arrest
ing his acts transcending them; not with
the view of destroying the delegated or trust
power, but to preserve it by compelling the a
gent to fulfil the object for which the agency
or trust ivas created; and is applicable only lo
cases where the trust "or delegated powers
are transcended on the part of the agent.
Without the power of secession, an asso
ciation or union, formed for the common
good of all the members, might prove
ruinous to some, by the abuse of power
on the part of the others; and without
nullification, the agent, might under the
color of construction, assume a power
never intended to be delegated, or to per
vert those delegated, to objects never in
tended to be comprehended in the trust,
to the ruin of the principal, or, in case of
a joint agency, to the ruin of some of the
principals. Each has, thus, its appropri
ate object; but these objects in their na
ture are very dissimilar; so much so, that
in case of an association or union, where
the powers arc delegated to be executed
by an agent, the abuse of power, on the
part of the agent, to the injury of one or
more of the members, would not justify
secession on their part. The rightful re
medy in that case would be nullification.
There would be neither right nor pretext
to secede; no right, because secession is
applicable only to the acts of the mem
bers of the association or union, and not
to the act of the agent; nor pretext, be
cause there is another and equally cfii
cient remedy, short of the dissolution of
the association or union, which can only
be justified by necessity. Nullification
may, indeed, be succeeded by secession.
In ihe case stated should the other mem
bers undertake to grant the power nulli
fied, and should the nature of the power
be such as to defeat the object of the asso
ciation or union, at least, as far as the
member nullifying is concerned, it would
men become an abuse of power on the
part of the principals; and thus present a
case where secession would apply; but in
no other, could it be justified, except it be
for a failure of the association or union
to effect the object for which it was crea
ted, independent of any abuse of power.
It now remains to show, that their effect
is as dissimilar as their nature or object.
Nullification leaves the members of the
association or union, in the condition it
found them, subject to all its burdens,
and entitled to all its advantages, com
prehending the member nullifying, as
well as the others; its object being, not
to destroy, but to preserve, as has been
stated. It simply arrests the act of the
agent, as far as the principal is concern
ed, leaving, in every other respect, the
operation of the joint concern as before;
secession, on the contrary, destroys, as
far as the withdrawing member is con
cerned, the association or union, and re
stores him to the relation he occupied to
wards the other members before the ex
istence of the association or union. He
loses the benefit, but is released from the
burden and control; and can no longer be
dealt with by his former associates, as
one of its members.
Such are clearly the differences be
tween them -differences so marked, that
instead of being identified as supposed,
they form a contrast, in all the aspects in
which they can be regarded. The ap
plication of these remarks to the political
association or Union of these twenty-four
States, and the General Government
their joint agent, is too obvious, after what
has been already said, to require any ad
ditional illustration; and 1 will dismiss this
part of the subject with a single addition
al remark. .
There are many who acknowledge the
right of a State to secede, but deny its
right to nullify; and yrt, it seems impos
sible to admit the one without admitting
the other. They both presuppose the
same structure of the Government, that
is a Union of the States, as forming poli
tical communities; the same right on the
part of the States, as members of the U
nion, to determine for her citizens, the
extent of the powers delegated, and those
reserved, and, of course, to decide whe
ther the Constitution has or has not been
violated. The simple difference, then,
between those who admit secession, and
deny nullification, and those who admit
both, is, that one acknowledges that the
declaration of a State pronouncing that
the Constitution has been violated, and
is, therefore, null and void, would be ob
ligatory on her citizens, and would arrest
all the acts of the Government, within the
limits of the State; while they deny, that
a similar declaration, made by the same
authority, and in the same manner, that
an act of the Government has transcend
ed its powers, and that it is, therefore,
null and void, would have any obligation;
while the other acknowledges the obliga
tion in both cases. The one admits that
the declaration of a State assenting to
the Constitution bound her citizens, and
that her declaration can unbind them; but
denies that a similar declaration, as to tho
extent she has in fact bound them, has
any obligatory force on them; while the
other gives equal force to the declaration
in the several cases.
The one denies the obligation where
the object is to preserve the Union, in the
only way it can be, by confining the Go
vernment formed to execute the trust
powers, strictly within their limits, and
to the objects for which they were dele
gated, though they give full force where
the object is to destroy the Union itself;
while the other, in giving equal weight to
both, prefers the one because it iircscrves,
and rejects the other because it destroys;
and yet the former is the Union, and the
latter the disunion party! And all this
strange distinction originates, as fir as 1
can judge, in attributing to nullification
what belongs exclusively to secession.
The difficulty, as to tho former, it seems,
is that a State cannot be in and outof the
Union at the same time. This is, indeed,
true, if applied to secession the throw
ing off the authority of the Union itself.
To nullify the Constitution, if I may be
pardoned the solecism, would indeed be
tantamount to disunion; and as applied to
such an act, it would be true, that a State
could not be in and out of the Union at
the same time; but the act would be se
cession. ;.
But to apply it to nullification, proper
ly understood, the object of which, in
stead of resisting or diminishing the
powers of the Union, is to preserve them
as they are, neither increased nor dimin
ished, and, thereby, the Union itself (for
the Union may be as effectually destroy
ed by increasing, as by diminishing its
powers by consolidation, as bv disunion
itself,) would be, I would say, had I not
great respect tor many who do thus ap
ply it, egregious trifling with a grave and
deeply important constitutional subject.
Mr. Crawford's Opinions. LeUer from the
Hon. Wm, H. Crawford, to the Committee, at
Alford s Cross Roads, on the 22d ult.
Wood Lawn, (Ga.) Sept. IS, 1832.
Gentlemen:; Your invitation to a din
ner, at Alford's Cross-Roads, on the22d
inst. was received by yesterday's mail.
My official duties have commenced, and
will not terminate before the second week
in November next; it will therefore be
impossible for me to attend the proposed
dinner. In compliance with your second
request, viz: "To lay before the people
my views of tho measure to bo pursued
in the present crisis, and in particular in
relation to a Southern Cnnvnntmn
ordinary limits of a letter will hardly ad
mit of the development of my views on
this important subject, which will render
them distinctly intelligible. Without
further preface or circumlocution, I will
proceed to state them as far as they can
i.St rte(,n a lctlcr' 1 am 1,16,1 for the
call of a Convention to revise ihe Federal
Constitution. LeUnti-Tariff Stales pa$
resolutions in their State Legislatures
requiring Congress in the terms of tle
Constitution to call u Convention to re
vise the Constitution. To this measure
three objections have been made. lst
That the Tariff States will not concur itl
the measure, which must therefore
2. That if they should concur, they will
have the majority in the Convention, and
will prevent any change or modification
in it desired by the South and 3d, That
it will produce delay without the possibi.
lily of effecting any good. In my judT.
mcnt neither of these objections are va
lid. To the first, it may be replied, that
if the anti-Tariff States pass resolutions
for the said purpose and the Tariff States
refuse their concurrence, it will be consi.
dercd by the anti-Tariff States as a de
claration on their part that they are de
termined to perpetuate the abuses they
have introduced in Federal Legislation.
The anti-Tariff States;will then see the
necessity of taking their ultimate mea
sure, which they will then be in situation
to take understanding!)'; because they
will have discovered, the strength of the
new confederacy which can be formed.
If the number and population of the
States disposed to secede and form a new
confederacy are not sufficient for self pro
tection, I should deem it unwise to sepa
rate; for if the separatists will be com
pelled to form a connection with some
powerful Foreign State, "to secure their
protection, it would, in my opinion, be
better to submit to the evils of ihe Tariff,
and even the system of Internal Improve
ments, (which, in my opinion, are worse
than the Tariff, and more clearly uncon
stitutional,) than to throw themselves in
to the arms of any foreign State, whose
history and character is known to me.
2d. If the Tariff States should concur in
the call of a Convention, it is by no means
certain they would reject the amendment
or modification desired by the South.
The conduct of the same men, in Congress
and in Convention, would probably be
different. In Congress, the only subject
of inquiry would be what power has been
granted by the Constitution. This ques
tion has been so often abusively determi
ned, that it in fact is no inquiry at all.
They have several times determined that
the power to pass a protective Tariff and
to make Internal Improvements has been
granted. There is, therefore, no reason
able ground to hope for a change by Con
gress in that regard. In Convention, the
question would be, what powers shall be
granted? The Southern members would
state candidly what powers they were
willing to grant, and what they would not
grant, and declare the continuance of the
Union depended upon the admission of
the modification they had proposed.
This declaration from the members of the
South, would necessarily have great
weight. The Southern and Eastern
members would then determine whether.
Union, with these was preferable to Disu
nion and the Tariff. If the nronositinn
should be rejected, and a sufficient num
ber of the states would adhere n th
south for self defence, a separation would
then take place, peaceably; I have no
doubt.
1 am opposed to a Southern Convention, till
after a General Convention has . been tried and
failed. In other words I am opposed to any un
constitutional, or extra constitutional measure,
until every measure of redress promised by the
Constitution, shall have been fruitlessly exhaust
ed. Let us keep ourselves in the right; and put
our opponents in the wrong. 3dly. This objec
tion appears to my mind rather a recommenda
tion than an objection.
Any measure of resistance, whether nullifica
tion or secession, is so fraught with awful conse
quences, too much caution and deliberation, can
not be exercised. One of the most marked de
n?;'.fhe wied, in the Scriptures, is,
that their feet are sicift to shed blood." Let
us not in a matter of this kind, bring ourselves
within the description of the wicked in the scrip
ture. We know not to what consequences the
measures now in embryo may lead. The deci
ded advantage which the call of a Convention
has over nullification, is, that it is calculated to
obtain all the information necessary on the ulti
mate decision of the question, in a peaceable, con
stitutional mode, whereas, nullification can only
obtain it, if at all, after the barriers of the Consti
tution shall be oasspd. Ti w;u Ua, c uni
. .... . wv owsu, iian it-
ject nullification as a peaceable, constitutional
uiwauie. ror i verily believe, that no man in
his senses ever has believed it tn hp
ii as a revolutionary measure 'hpriiieo trftfr nnn-
!lj?nl measure of redress tias not been tried,