m M'Z jrf&t fcr$ AtSi jtc a?'
B9 Tgttfc A.
Whole Yo. .?;.
Tarborough, (Edgecombe County, X. C.) Friday, October 24, 1834.
Ol A" O ;j7
77p 'Titrb-imwrh Frn- Vcv"
BIT C.Kokge IloWA'ili,
- - . ' ;
01 , J i:rce I)ol-
id
jkt year, ii p.tut in advance
;J"' ;it t!u" iH.Mti.ni of the suhscriptien vcar. For
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urnt!i. M.bsmrs arc at libenv to dicoutr.uie at
any tune, oa sum- notice thereof and pivia- arrears
those realms at a distance must invariably :iv in
ailvjmcivM'Sive a responsible reference in tiiiw iciiiitv.
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continuance. Longer ones at that rate for every 16
inn-. Advertisements must be marked the number
o! insertions required, or thev will be continued until
w!r rwhf ordered, and charged accordingly.
Letters addressed to the Editor must be post paid,
if tacy m.iv not Ik- attendeil to.
From the Globe
Jovy. Hieing, Snutfuml, and Knight,
the Sennits resolution forbade the course
thev contemplated. Yet they came on
lo W .ishintoii, and eem to have had
scarcely any other business than lo ask
tor Ihat, which tin? Senate itself has de
nied them the right to demand. A!
though the whole Department, with all
its hooks and papers, in relation to its
management, was thrown open to tliem,
these iieiitlerncfi have adjourned over,
arid we understand that Mr. Southard is
already in Jersey, and Mr. Ewinir
soon to make his appearance in Ohio.
It is certain that the elections in these
Slates require tl:eir attention. As thev
have not been able to add any thin" to
the misrepresentations of their lastre
port against the Post Office Department.
to aid them in t lio elections, we thought
vfthr. Smart I'osl Officr Committer S ."""" -n. tliuuali.
Zinih i'ottmattrr Gnural ' "0 ,1",''r",,",,' ll,u,1
i, ii,. ' plemand nt Mr. Harry for what thev knew
1 lie country aln,lv ol,S,rvl .,, , s bU, , nluso accor,li I ,
c...l...;...-.l ,1,, ,..t.:,,,t ,,u S?,m.,.i., u, r.solmi,,,, f ,10 Sonu.o, H.nt .l,,y mi-l,,
, I" ',uijm;lk0 something out of that refusal, by
m i.w...... vji OC HOC I VIN !( m
I
ipartment I he Sen-
ivvecutivi
ale's
IllfltlV
ins solemn
tin? law
vote ot censure passed upon him and a
without the iilinir ,,f charges hv the Ilou
misrepresenting it, and at a moment
when it would be too late for correction.
, s nnpeachmi.nt of the I'roM.lcnt's ,Illve therefore ol,tnined the response
it.ves (or the removal o the deposites-1 0f the Postmaster General for publica-
inn vuuvieiion lor a violation ot tion, that the People
sand the constitution the final j the whole matter, ai
miht understand
nil be prepared to
meet any imposture, which these instru-
se ! merits nl tlm lMnl.- ii-iinlit ..tfnM.ni r,.
oi uepresentattves, or even hcarm- thelot); with intant exposure.
party accused public opinion has alrea-i --
dy denounced as the most hiuh-handed llie 01!- M- Haurv,
act of usurpation ever witnessed inanv1 Postmaster (General.
freeGovertitiHMit. 'i'he English (Sovern-' SlR: Tlie co,m "f the Senate on the
ment itself furnishes no parallel even ... ! , V"" aslx l,orll,c pcctii. ofall the ri-
it "si'irCli iml I r . .ii letters and papers m your edict-coucernmir
lt Mar Chamber Judicature. And what ; lhe remeval of II. Sariord, and the anpointmctu
added to its enormity, is the fact, that of J. Herrou, as Postmasters at Pntaa.n, Ohio.
the majority ennasred in it, were perfect- j Very respectfully, sir, your ohed't scrv't,
ly aware that power they exercised a-j FKLIX GRUNDY, Chairman.
gainst rirht, was put in their hands by thoi Washincton, '22d Sept. lfciM.
treachery of certain Senators who auda-1 "
ciously Violated authentic legislative in-j 1 OST ()"C)A,ENT,
structiotis from their immediate constitu-t e.n. i i,.,,.,, i tt0jcr ' . '
Mn: I have Uk honor to aekutm ledge tlie rc-
CIl.Vi jceipt of the ofJicial note, which it became vour
I ins monstrous outrage upon tin con-'duty as Chaira.an of the Committee of the Sen-
Stitution the rights of the People tin ; ate on the Post Office to address me, asking, in!
rights of the People's Representatives, 0t lir'f of the Cmmiitee, for the inspection ofj
and therfihts o( the Cxecntive Depart-' a" llu or,rm:l ami papers" m mv uiace,
ment, is now improved upon lv Mesrs.il,",Cenii" the removal oi l!. Satlord, and the
Evvin- Southard, and Knil.t-three : o""1 PlU"
men, who notoriously misr.Mirrif:nt lli.tir j "'hirerely died to comply u-UI, the calls
UWU constituents, and who are, in tact, I f the CommitU e lor information, I feel reslrain
the mere; instruments of the? Junto in theiedin this instance hv a regard for those fiinda-
CSenate which is at war with the principles mental principles which mark the division be
of the States which they should represent.
This trio, it will be seen by the response
tween tlie co-ordinate branches of our Govern
ment, and which, in their application, show lioiv
i . i . . ...
nf Alninr Itrirrv ivloidi v.. m.mw.v lar me committee may justly proceed in its in-
. , ,, ., I ,1 ."; i , , t 'mtines. In (h elming to comnlv with this ca , I
asume(l llnj r hl to prosecute a scruti- ,1 i t . " , ,
. . . , i am lnlluenctd by m desire to conceal the papers
ly into the motives ot the 1 otmaster j (()f ullidl ai u ' (m Js ns!h resnectimr the
12 i - i i ... . . . . ' . o
ijo:o;( in in
removinLT anl uppointin Ins
Deputies. And with t'ji.i view, have
called upon linn (or his correspondence
in relation lo a certain removal and ap
pointment. Their object is to make it
a precedent for throwing open ids bosom,
and that of every individual who has
written to him throughout the United
States, upon the subject of a t emoval or
appointment
oliice at Putnam, Ohio; nor do I hesitate by tea
son of any thing in the nature of the motives
w hich induced me to make the change at that
office fully to set them forth. The course I a
dopt is dictated by higher and more important
considerations.
As the Committee have already called for, and
been informed of the facts in this rase by an
official communication, slating what appears up
on the books of the Department respecting the
time of the appointment of Mr. Herron, ami the
Rut the rnot extraordinary feature ofj state of his accounts, no motive of the call for an
this demand, on the part of the Senate's inspcciiou of the letters and papers is perceived,
trio of impeaching Inquisitors, is, that
they have made it in defiance of a cote oj
tluir own bod if the. Senate! The ques
tion was fairly made fully considered
and finally decided upon, by a majority
of the very body under whose authority
they act arid it was solemnly resolved,
that the Senate had no i igjit to prosecute
an inquiry into the reasons of the Post
master Genera! in making his removals
ami appointments. And yet in the face
of this positive interdict of a majority of
the Senate several of their own political
friends voting that the Senate had no
rijjht to look into the motives of the Kx
eeutive officer in tlie discharge of his up
propriate functions this Committee of
Impeichers demand of Mr. Rarry the
tay of his secretary, that they may pry
into his motives, for removals and ap
point ments, through his correspondence
Messrs. Kwinir, Southard, and Kniglii,
knew before they left their homes, that
other than a desire on the part of the Committee
to ascertain the reasons of the change; and if
principles forbid that, as the head of an Execu
tive Department, I should he called upon to
yield these, they also deny lo the Committee the
right of inspecting the letters and papers as de
manded. The principles applicable to this subject flow
from the constitutional organization of our Gov
ernment, and from the character w hie h that or
ganization has impressed upon the Senate. Tlie
constitution recognising three kinds of powers,
separates accordingly those of our Government
into three divisions. Each division of powers
being intrusted to a separate body of magistracy,
constitute the three Departments of the Govern
ment. As these Departments are co-ordinate,
the magistracy of one branch is not responsible
to another, by reason of any supposed constitu
tional inferiority or subordination to it; but the
dficers of every branch are alike responsible, by
die distinguishing feature of our institutions, to
he People. This responsibility I have ever felt
tnd acknowledge.
As the operations of the Government should
be the just execution of the People's will, in
modes compatible with the organic I iw which
they have adopted, I deem it the duty of the pub
lie officer intrusted with discretionary powers, to
observe the indications of that will, and act con
formably to its requirements. The expression
ot these views will prevent misapprehension, and
destroy the supposition that I would claim the
right to exercise power arbitrarily and without
control. They will show that w hilst I will not
give the reasons of action to those who assume
to ask tliem without right, I do not affect to im
pair the responsibility for acts, which 1 shall ever
acknowledge to that great tribunal, w hose judg
ments in our country are happily as correct as
they are filial.
As an Executive officer, subordinate to the
President, in whom is vested the general Execu
tive powers of the Government, I feel the respon
sibility to him v. hich flows from my relation of
infeiiority to the Chief Magistrate This re
sponsibility of an officer in one Department of
the Government to the Head of that Department,
results from the very nature of Government, and
is felt in every branch.
In addition to these accountabilities of every
officer to the peoph., and to his chief, the consti
tution has specially provided in certain cases for
a responsibility to another Department ofthe
Government. This responsibility appears to
have been created for the purpose "of practically
enforcing, m relation to the executive and judi
cial departments ofthe Government, that accoun
tability to which ail are alike snlject the legis
lative being responsible by the means of fre
quent elections. The process to enforce this re
sponsibility to the nation, is that of impeach
ment; in pursuing which, tlie legislative branch
lavs aside its appropriate character, and exer
cises judicial functions. The power of impeach
ment, vested in the Legislature, confers upon it
no right to take part in the performance of exec
utive or judicial duties. It is a right merely to
try ofiicers of other Departments for acts of of
fence, and might hae been vested in a tribunal
specially constituted for the purpose.
It seems to result from the independence of the
departments of the Government in their appro
priate spheres, except so far as is specially pro
vided by the constitution, and from the different
nature of their respective functions, that no De
partment can take part in tiie performance of du
ties properly pertaining to another; that execu
tive functions are to be exclusively committed to
executive ofiicers, free from the control ofthe
members of the Legislature; and that the judg
ments of the courts are to be rendered without
the interference either ofthe executive or legisla
ture. It is this complete separation of the pow
ers of Government vested in different bodies of
magistracy, which, next to the responsibility of
j every branch to lhe People, constitutes the chief
guai auiee in goon government.
Duty and the interest ofthe nation alike re
quire, therefore, that each body of magistracy
should guard with jealousy the powers intrusled
to it from the encroachments of other branches
of the Government. The first instance of as
sumption by one department of powers belong
ing to another, or of a control successfully exer
ted by oae Department over another in tlie per
formance of duties confided by the constitution
and laws exclusively to the latter, may be the
commencement of a series of violations of con
stitutional principles, to end only in the total
destruction, however formally they may be pre
served, of the barriers which the wisdom of the
People has placed between tlitm. Whilst these
principles deny to the Legislature a participa
tion in the performance of executive acts, they
do not in any manner affect its right to prescribe,
by constitutional enactments, the duties of exec
utive ollicers.
Without noticing the peculiar organization of
the Post Ufnce Department, distinguishing it
from other Executive partments, 1 will ob
serve, that the power of appointment lo office is
in its nature an executive power. Accordingly,
the constitution vests it in the executive branch
of the Government, with some few exceptions,
such as Clerks of Courts, ofiicers of Congress,
'izc. whose appointment being otherwise specially
directed, proves the correctness of the position
assumed, and shows, that whilst the frainers of
the constitution proceeded upon certain general
principles, they admitted exceptions where pro
priety and convenience dictated them. In ap
pointing a Postmaster at Putnam, Ohio, there
fore, the Postmaster General performed an exec
utive function. In the discharge of this duty,
the legislative branch had no right to interfere
or participate. The time of the appointment,
and the person to be selected, were matters for
Trans m it V".V to tlie Committee on the Sdot Octo
ber,
executive consideration. To the discretion of
the Postmaster General, under the responsibili
ties before mentioned, it was by lhe constitution
md laws exclusively referred to determine when,
land whom to appoint. The reasons to influence
the conclusion were submitted to him. They
may have existed in public memo ial, u. private
letters, or in his own mind. Ue wa, not bom.d
to submit their sufficiencv to ihe jodgiiien of ei
ther House of Congress, or any of their comaiit
tees. The law vested in him the fma! determi
nation, and ti.e power to act accoruiimlx . ( au
it be urged, now when au appointment i$ made,
that a Committee ofthe Senate, whkh would
have had no right to a pre examiuat'm t, the
case, to which he was not bouno by law to sub
mit it before acting upon it, has a right lo exam
ine the reasons upon which he proceeded? f or
what purpose is the exercise of tlie light claimed?
Is it that the Committee may revise, ;om!, ii pr p
er in their opinion, reverse the decision which
he made? And if so, would it not be better at
once to provide for taking beforehand the opin
ion of lhe Senate, or its Committee, and thus?
save the necessity for two d cisien?
If the Committee have the riuht to look for
reasons in the letters on file in tl;e Department,
is it not equally entitled to examine the Head of
tlie Department personally, and ak v hat motive
induced him to make the appointment? If not,
the inquiry might be very impel fe t, for in a
particular case there might be no papers on file
relating to the appointment, or the Head of the
Department might have been governed bv a
reason within his own knowledge, but not stated
in any document received by him. And if the
principle which alone can sanction the inquiry of
the Committee be correct, and the appointing
officer be bound to exhibit his reasons, is it not
necessary, in order that this exhibition, whenev
er required, may be perfect, that a record should
be made ofthe reasons in every case? Yei was
this ever deemed requisite, or even proper in anv
Executive Department.
The appointment of superior officers ofthe
Government is vested in the President and Sen
ate. When the President nominates an individ
ual for office, has the Senate a right lo demand
an inspection of all the letters and papers re
ceived by him relating to it? And if the Senate
should ask for such inspection, y it i)e saK) t,e
President is bound to give it? The Presideut
may, and perhaps actually does, lay before the
Senate, such of the papers received bv him re
specting the appointment, as he deems proper,
for the purpose of informing Senators of the
character and qualifications ofthe person nomi
nated. It is believed, however, that no one
would express the opinion, that he is bound to
lay all the papers before the Senate; and vet this
is the case of an appointment vested in the Presi
dent and Senate jointly. There might be some
utility in requiring, that each branch of the ap
pointing power should have the benefit ofthe
information received by the other. If the Senate
possessed the light to demand ofthe President
the reasons why he made a nomination, might it
not with equal propriety be urged, that the Pres
ident may demand ofthe Senate, and tlie Senate
be bound to answer, why it rejected it? To the
establishment of this doctrine it is presumed the
Senate would object, and yet it is the result to
which we would arrive by sanctioning the princ i
ple involved in the call ofthe Committee.
If the Senate have no right to call upon the
President to assign lhe reasons for, or submit the
papers respecting a nomination to which its con
sent is asked, with less propriety can it be said
that it possesses the right in itself or by its Com
mittee, to demand of the President or any other
Executive oflic er, the reasons of an appointment,
which that officer has, by the constitution and
laws, the exclusive power of making. It seems
to be a clear result, that the right of the Senate
to an examination of papers or masons must be
less, if possible, in a c ase of appointment with
which it has no concern, than in that wherein iti
approbation must be had.
The course pursued by the Committee, if sanc
tioned and coirdnucd, might end in the virtual
subjection ofthe power of appointing and remov
ing Postmasters, to its will. If papers and let
ters are to be inspected and reasons examined by
a Committee, which can remain constantly in
session in any, or all cafes, if it so resolve, the
legal forms of appointments may be preserved;
the Postmaster General may continue to affix:
his signature to commissions; but all must per
ceive, that he would do this under an influence.
increasing by its natural tendency to an absolute
control in the hands of others, to vv horn all par
ticipation in the power of appointing Postmasters
is denied by law.
The constitution of the United States, art. 2d
sec. 2d, provides, that Congrpss may, by law,
vest the appointment of such inferior officers as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Pursuant to this provision, Congress has enacted,
that the Postmaster General shall establish Post
Offices, and appoint Postmasters at all urh pla
ces, as shall appear to him expedient on the post
routes that are or may be established by law.
In the Postmaster General, therefore, was vested,