Europe And The League
lly FRANK H. SIMONDS
Copyright, 1924, By McClure Newspaper Syndicate.
Washington, May 31.?The recent French election, with its
overturn of Poincare, has not only had immediately considerable
political consequences in international relations but is bound to
have important and even decisive results so far as the League of
Nations is concerned. When Ramsay MacDonald became prime
minister of Britain, there was general appreciation of the fact
that his foreign policy would revolve around the idea of giving
to the League of Nations something of the position and influence
Mr. Wilson had dreamed for it.
While Poincare was premier,
however, there was small chance 1
that - this MacDonald purpose
could be fully realized. It is true
that after his overturn in the
French chamber last April,
Poincare formed a new cabinet
in which at least two members
were believed to be named be
cause of their British views. j
These two men were Loucheur and
Jouvenel. Loucheur was a strong'
believer In Anglo-French co-opera
tion, Jouvenel was perhaps the most1
conspicuous French champion of the
League of Nations.
It was fair to assume, then, that 1
even had Poincare lasted, France J
would have shared In bestowing up-:
on the League at least u modest'
fraction of the power MacDonald de-1
sired for it. Yet It is probably be-J
yond question that In his heart I'oln
care believed as little In th<- League
as a very large number of his fel
low countrymen. The key to Poin
care is to be found In the fact that
he comes from Lorraine, that with
in his own memory his countryside
has twice been occupied by the Ger
mans and that his family memories jl
go back to at least two other lnva-l
sions, those of 1814 and 1815.
For Poincare the real protection
for France did not lie In any League!
Covenant, rather It was to be found
In a series of alliances. That ho
would have preferred the British al
liance to all others, goes without
saying, but he Insisted that any An
glo-Fronch compact should be in fact
an alliance, what it is now rashlon
able to call an old-fashioned alliance
In which each nation pledged its
armed strength to the other in case
of war, such an alliance as bound
Franco to Hussla and Austria to Ger
many In 1914. And tills alliance
Britain steadfastly declined to make.
Poincare for Alliances
Undor the circumstances, Poincare
was driven to make such compacts
as he could, and there was built up
that series of alliances which bind
France to Poland, to Belgium, toll
Csocho-SIovakla and are nt least i
planned to unite France and Ruma
nia and perhaps Yugo-Slavla. All of
these alliances have the common
foundation of a desire to preserve the
territorial status created by the
peace treaties and in the case of a
number, a common menace coming
from Germany.
This system of alliances was bit
terly criticized In Britain, where It
was regarded on the one hand as cer
tain to bring new wars and on the
other as a direct menace to British
prestlgo and Influence on the contin
ent. It was not more popular in It
aly, which felt herself become a
world power but never-the-less con
demned to see France occupy a dom
inating position on the continent. As
for Germany. It was passionately de
nounced In Berlin as a French meth
od of fastening chains upon the Ger
man people.
Lloyd George had endeavored to
block this French pollcy.he had ev
en undertaken to build up a British
system on the continent, and his ma
jor play was made at the Genoa con
ference just two years ago. But his
difficulty had lain In the fact that
there was no common Interest be
tween Britain and the continental
powers. France, like the other con
tinental states which had prolHted
by the war was ready to fight rather
than see the decisions of the Peace
Conference with respect to European
frontiers modified, but the British
were totally unwilling to pledge
themselves to enter a new struggle
Just to aid Rumania in keeping Bes
sarabia. or Poland In retaining East
ern Gallcla. In point of fact the Brl
tl?h, Lloyd George Included, were
quite ready to see the Russians ac
quire both these provinces provided
at that price there could be peace
In Europe.
Against Lloyd George, then, Poin
care played successfully. He won the
support of continental states at Ge
noa. After Oenoa, his kystem of al
liances and understandings continued
to grow. When he marched Into the
Ruhr, there was no European com
bination to oppose him; Indeed Bri
tain stood alone in her outspoken ob
jection. Moreover, before the Ruhr,
French and Italian support of the
Turk against the Greek had led to
Rrltlsh humiliation and Lloyd
Oeorgn'a personal disaster and dis
missal. All through the passive re
sistance In the Ruhr, France stood
secure from any Influence
Pnlncura lto. ke.1 by French
So far. moreover. It Is perhaps
correct to aay that Poincare had the
support of the mass of the French
people. France was weary of Ger
man evasion and France was equally
wesry and Indignant at what seethed
British selfishness. Poincare found
French prestige at low-water mark.
Me had manifestly restored it. He
hsd accepted the German challenge
ovor reparations and hsd met eva
sion by occupation and passive resis
tance by military exploitation. Right
up to the moment passive resistance
broke down. I doubt If there was
any considerable body of opponltion
to Poincare In France outside of
communistic and extreme socialistic
real
seen the Ruhr occupation as a sher
iff's operation, but when the sheriff
had seized the property, having ov
ercome the resistance, then In some
fashion actual payment continued to
be lacking. Moreover France began
to feel uneasy at the unmistakable
severity of the criticism of the out
side world and particularly at the
sharpness of British and even some
American accusations.
France did not feel herself mili
taristic or imperialistic, but she did
feel acutely the fact that she was ac
quiring this reputation in the world.
Moreover, although it was clear that
Poincare had restored French pres
tige and given France not a little of
the Influence which she had exercised
in the old days of the ancient regime
and of the first empire, he had also
earned for his country something of
the old distrust of Europe and per-|
haps the eventual formation of new|
coalitions like those which had ul
timately overcome both Louis XIV|
and Napoleon the Great.
France, the mass of Frenchmen,
desired reparations payments. They J
also desired security with even great
er earnestness, but most sensible)
Frenchmen had come to realize that)
the France of the Twentieth Century
was no longer in the position to playj
the role of the France of other cen-|
turles, that the role was at once tool
great and too expensive, that It could |
mean only a brief period of Euro
pean supremacy at most and then a
long and perhaps final stage of weak
ness.
In that mood the French people
Anally overthrew Poincare. They had j
followed him in his occupation of the
Ruhr. Put, perhaps a little lllogl
cally, they were not prepared to fol
low him In a policy which without
later rewards seemed certain to al
ienate most of Europe and particu
larly Britain and America. So, for
the time being at least, France has
renounced the Poincare system,
which in its essence sought to estab
lish and fortify French supremacy
on the continent by a system of al
liances.
Two Courses Open to French
There are two other courses open]
to the French ministry which is now
to take ofNce. It may seek to ar-j
rive at an understanding with Great)
Britain on terms which are possible.
It may undertake the even more dif
ficult task of reaching some form of
jtrrnngement with Germany. Ah be
tween the two courses, one might
conjecture that the preference of|
Herrlot would be for Germany, since)
the mantlo of Caillaux has fallen j
upon his shoulders, while Brlandj
would by preference seek to restore)
something of the old friendship be-|
tween Britain and France. But any
understanding with Britain would
now have to be based upon some
considerable recognition of MacDon
old's aspirations for the League of!
Nations. By contrast, an understan
ding with Germany would in the na
ture of things start with some form!
of association of the Ruhr and Lor
raine Iron and coal industries and at
some stage, still remote, aim at Bri
tain, if only economically.
Now we have had fairly clearly
sketched what MacDonald would
like to make of the League*. He
would not consent to any Franco
British alliance. He would not con
sent to any treaty of guarantee made
directly between France and Britain.
He would, by contrast agree that
Britain would come to the aid of
France, If she were wantonly at
tacked by Germany?and I think he
would hardly hesitate, If It were left
to him, over nn agreement, to sup
port Germany In case of a wanton
French attack.
Far beyond all this detail, how
ever. he would like to make of the
Leacue a body with real Influence
So far only minor questions have
been referred to the League. There
have been wars since Its creation,
that between Poland and Russia and
that between Greece and Turkey ris
ing to the dignity of considerable
conflicts, and the league has not
been able to act effectively. But there
I have been even more Important dls
jputes between Great Powers, dis
putes between France and Britain.
France and Germany, etc.. and the
league has not been able to Inter
vene.
So far, the league, despite Its
handling of certain affairs like those
of Upper Silesia and Memel, has been
no more than a side-show. Its best
service, perhaps, that of salvaging
Austria, has been economic rather
than political and without any rela
tion to peace or war. The great
problems which still divide Europe,
those of reparations, security, arm
amenta and' the like, have been dis
cussed, so far as they have been dis
cussed effectively, between nation.*
over the green table, not around the
Geneva board.
Ambassadors' Conference Dominant
The Conference of Ambassadors,
not the Council of the League of Na
tions. has been the dominant force
In Europe alnee the Paris conference
adjourned. When there was no
agreement In this conference, as was
frequent. th?n there was chaos In
Europe. In the meantime tha League
had been dealing with minor ques
tions, creating and operating a ma
chine which It was hoped by the pro
Leaguers might one day become
seased of sufficient prestige and
perlence to take over larger
curlty. to take the two together; Id
other words, the greatest thing that
could conceivably fall to the lot of
the League t,o administer would be
a settlement actually reached be
tween Germany, France and Britain.
with Belgium ana Italy subscribing.
this settlement to cover both the
matter of German payment to
France and some guarantee of peace
in Europe, peace between Germany
of her neighbors. Insofar as Oie fin
ancial phase was concerned, the
League might repeat Us Austrian op
eration on an enormously Increased
scale. Insofar as the matter of se
curity was concerned. It might pro
vide the moral Influence In any new
dispute. It might, for example, de
cide whether some new threat to the
peace of Europe were justified or
mere aggression.
Now MacDonald Is very sure to at
tempt to persuade Europe, which In
reality means France and Germany,
with Russia In the background, to
consent to the expansion of the
League. He Is bound to seek to pre
vent the reappearance In Europe of
rival systems of alliances, to one of
which Britain will. In the end be
forced to Join herself, as she Joined
herself to the Franco-Russia combin
ation before the World War. He will
begin by Insisting that Germany be
permitted to Join the League and be
will seek to persuade het- to Join.
having persuaded France to consent
to the admission of Germany.
As I have said before, he had
small chance of great success before
I'oincare was beaten. He has a real
chance now of obtaining French ac
quiescence up to a certain point.
France is going presently to retire
from the Ruhr and French opposi
tion to German admittance Into the
League can bo assumed to disappear.
France will watch the British cam
paign for the League with something
like benevolent Interest, provided
only the expansion of the League
does not Involve the surrender of
French claims for reparations and
provided some way be found through
the League to Insure France againBt
a German war of revenge.
Want Leaitue With Force
Yet nothing Is m6re certain than
that presently we shall see a renewal
of the old battle between British and
French conceptions of the League.
The French will Join the British In
the effort to give the League author
ity. but It will Insist that with
authority goes power, that the
League shall not only have the mis
sion to decide, but the means to en
force decision. This was what Leon
Bourgeois asked for the League in
the days of the Paris conference.
when lie argued that the League
should be endowed with a general
staff and a standing army, or at
least should be able to draw upon the
allied and associated powers, who
had become members of the League,
for the necessary police force.
Falling such force, the League
could not. In. the French mind and*
In the minds of- continentals gener
ally, function successfully and there
could be no question of disarmament.
The League would not be nble to
provide security, to Insure protection
to Its members and Its members
would accordingly be compelled to
defend themseves through the medi
um of standing armies. And with
ntnndlng armies would come the
question of combining standing arm
ies. that is the old question of alli
ances. ..
The French election opens the
way for a discussion which would
have been of llttlo significance had
Poincare not been defeateiu but un
happily it does not open *he way to
any obvious solution of the matter.
The French people and the new
French government are willing ana,
ready to listen to a new International
discussion of tho League, so are
most If not all continental countries.
But this discussion Is not of Itself of
Immense promise, bo long as there la
no modification of the underlying el
ements In tho problems to be dls
cussed.^u thp administration of
the reparations problem, as adjust
ed by the Dawes reoprt over to the
League of Nations how nre you go
ing to make Germany pay up. If she
wilfully evades again? Who Is go
ing to use force and how Is the
force to be used? Some nation, one
or more nations must agree to apply
(he decision of the League, hut appli
cation may mean war, If Germany
resists, war not with the League but
with the nations of supplying the
force to carry out the League a deel
stons.
Then what about disarmament, a
proposition dear to the hearts of
MacDonald and his political associ
ates and to the friends of world
peace In Britain and America. Sup
pose the league brings forward a
plan of disarmament, who 1s to en
force It? Who la to make sure that
(while France la disarming, for exam
ple. Germany Is not arming and that
when France haa disarmed Germany
will not attack her? Because. It must
be obvious the French will not scale
down their army or the British scrap
their fleet, save aa they are certain
of safety after the operation.
Mr. Wilson agreed to give the
French a treaty of insurance, with
Britain as a second guarantor, be
cause he believed that In a short
time the League would gain such
moral Influence that the physical
guarantee would be of no Import
ance He gave It raltWr as a sop to
French anxieties which he did not
regard as real, than anything else
and he did not really think he was
giving much because he was satis
fled that the guarantee would new
Involve us In any real responsible
tic*.
Germany the Obstacle
If gny on? could Imagine that the
Germans would come forward In
good faith to Join the league, re
nouncing their hopes of regaining
lost lands and loat greatn?s. If It
were conceivable that all the great
powers of Europe wera ready and
willing to accept peace on the basis
of thlncs aa they are In Europe, then
It Is clear that the restoration of mu
tual confidence would change every
thing. But no one ran safely fore
that is the well-nigh Insurmountable
obstacle.
The desire for peace is not equal
in all countries in Europe and it uev
has been for that matter. There are
a number of countries which regard
war as a lesser evil than the ex
isting situation. None of thein
want to tight at the moment,
but none of them would think of re
signing the intention ultimately to
regain what was lost in the last
struggle. There are other nations
which prefer war to the surrender of
lands which they own now, mainly
as a result of the recent war and
none of these nations would think
of surrendering the power to defend
these lands, while there was danger
that such surrender would Involve
ultimate loss.
M. Polncare dreamed of a combi
nation of all the powers which had
acquired lands in the last war and
felt their titles menaced by ulti
mate German recovery to defend the
Paris settlement by arms if neces
sary. But this purely defensive ar
rangement came to have obvious ag
gressive possibilities, just as French
air fleets, designed to serve against
Germany constituted a theoretical
menace to Great Britain, whose air
coasts were practically defenseless.
For the moment the Poincare policy
has fallen because France has been
rather shaken by the unforseen con
sequences of what had seemed to
most Frenchmen only a policy of
self defense.
France is then in a mood to lis
ten to Ramsay MacDonald's propos
als for a relative considerable ex
pansion of the League of Nations.
France after mature reflection and
, some little experiment, remains un
I convinced that any system of allian
ces made with smaller European
states is worth as much as a real
Anglo-French understanding. To ob
tain such an understanding France
is prepared to go a considerable dis
tance with MacDonald in the matter
of the League. If experimenting
with the League results in the dis
covery of something more satisfac
tory than the system of alliances
France is ready to accept it.
MnrDonitld Real Champion
But you must see that always the
same objects will be sought not by
France alone, but by Poland, Bel
gium, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia and
Czeclio-Slovakia, namely security in
in what they posses plus the pay
ment of what they are owed. Not
all are concerned materially with re
paration* but all are with security.
Can Mr. MacDonald show these coun
tries through the League a certain
ty of unchallenged possession? Can
he show them in Germany, Hungary.
Bulgaria and Russia the absence of
any immediate or eventual challenge
to their possession of a method of
protecting this possession against
any challenge?
Or?and this is perhaps the pre
sent question?can the Prime Min
ister show them a method by which
the League can be expanded without
any menace to their present status
and with eventual promise for com
plete security? If there is a settle
ment between the Germans, the
French and the British today it will
be made outside the League and the
Dawes Report will be the basis of
economic adjustment while other
similar programmes will cover terri
torial and military arrangement.
But once these are made the great
problem is to get them under the
League of Nations, to make that as
sociation the executor of these agree
ments, with power to enforce and
with equal power to prevent both
evasion ana unjust exactions?
Up to the present hour the League
is no more than an experiment, an ex
periment conducted within very nar
row limits and as yet not applied to
any major problem. Mr. MacDonald
now means to apply It to the largest
problem In the world and the real
future of the League depends upon
his success. But for this yeur at
least the League Is bound to Increase
alike in news value and in world im
portance, for in the British Labor
Prime Minister it has found what It
has lacked ever since Mr. Wilson
failed and disappeared, a real cham
pion representing a great power, a
statesman ready to back it with the
full strength of his country and with
that Country's full consent, and on
the whole Mr. MacDonald will have
from France and from the Continent
generally more of a hearing that Mr.
Wilson ever obtained.
It would be an exaggeration, I
think, to say that Europe Is in any
sense converted to the League, but
after five years of chaos. It does de
sire a settlement and having passed
through a period of Idealism and a
later stage of nationalism It Is be
ginning to reexamine the League not
as new gospel, perhaps, but rather
as an available machine.
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