Signs That War Mood
Is Passing In Germany
Result French Election* ami Pledges of Herriol to Get Out
of Kulir Soon us Germany Gives Adequate Guarantee*
of Reparations Cuts Ground Under Reactionaries
Hy I'HANK H. SIMON'nS
< op>i iulu UK! I by McClurc S>mlical<*
Washington. June 2k. Now thai
the excitement and confusion of the
French election ami Its consequent
upsets is over. Willi Poineure and
Millerand oust?-d Ironi office, certain
facts are becominu patent.
At the outset it is manifest that
the changes, the election Itself and
the Inevitable dtsplarem* nt* which
followed, have ?-uormom:ly strength
ened French |iosition in the world.
Ther?> lias been a marked change in
British opinion whleh promises a de
gree of co-operation between the
wartime allies and. in addition all
over the world, in America as well
as in Kurope, the legend of a mili
taristic and Imperialistic France
seeking revenue and the destruction
of Germany has been abolished by
the victory of the Fr? noli liberals
and the demonstration of tle ir pur
pose.
But porliaps the most Important
consequence has !?? en the disclosure
of at least a faint si^n of division
amongst Gorman!* lit* innrlvrs. Willi
the comiim of Herrlot voices have
boon rai?<d in Germany to combat
the policy of the reactionaries, t?>
support the idea of som*1 form of
settlement with France other than a
settlement by "a new war. In a word
there in inor?' than a hint that Ger
many, last of all the great belliger
ents, in hfuinnin^ to cmertiC from
the war-mood.
To glance first at the amelioration^
of the French position In the eyes
of the world, it is to bo nol?~d at
once that the Dawes report while it
certainly disposed of any French pol
icy of destruction, assuming that
such a policy ? \ist*'d in France and
it is a large and. In my judgment un
warranted assumption, fatally com
promised the German purposes to
evade reparations and also did equal
damage to the effort of the Junkers,
under cover of patriotic emotion to
regain power and re-organize Ger
many for a n?w war.
Before the Dawes report came to
light the whole world was faced byi
the seemingly Insoluble puzzle off
finding a way to make Germany j ? >
without resorting to methods which
would rouse German resistance. You 1
had the vicious circle, Germany re-'
fusing to pay and proclaiming lier
bankruptcy, and France determined
to be paid and driven step by step to
adopt methods which > united Ger
mans In a passionate if hopeless re-1
slstance to all payments.
The Rise of the Reactionaries i
Polncare in Franc- succeeded to
power and was supported by the
.French nation in the use Of force, be
cause for France security and rep-'
arations were matters of life anil
death. I)ut Ludendorff. Tirpltz and
the old crowd In Germany In their
turn regained Influence and ultimate-'
ly a measure of power, because they
were able. to convince the mass of
the Gorman people that the course
of Polncare was designed to destroy,
Germany while ostensibly seeking to I
collect reparations.
France and Great Britain broke,
because the mass of the British peo
ple In turn came to suspect the
Polncare method, because they be-1
lleved that this method was actually!
responsible for British industrial suf-,
forlng and that there was a close
connection between the occupation of
the Ruhr and the continuance of
British unemployment. But the
break between France and Britain
served to encourage the Germans to
resist, while the resistance in turn
drove Polncare to more and more ex
treme measures.
The German resistance, following
the occupation of the Ruhr, the nine
months of passive resistance, which
bankrupt Germany and produced
economic and fiscal disorganization
of vast proportions was the culmln
atlon phase of thia post-war situa
tion. France with Belgium was to
all Intents and purposes again at
war with Germany, German Indus
trial regions were occupied by
French and Belgian troops, and Ger
man Industries were themselves ex
ploited by French agents protected
by French bayonets.
And all the time the French sit
uation In the world had worsened.
More and more, not with Justice per
haps but Inevitably, men and women
of various nations were coming to
hold France and not Germany re
sponsible for the unrest and unset
tlement in Europe. Franco was not
Isolated because there were too many
small nations sharing her danger*
and relying upon her military aid ss
the chief guarantee of their contin
ued existence, but France was in a
measure morally Isolated, particular
ly In the two great Anglo-Saicon
countries, although the American
sentiment was still much more sym
pathetic than the British.
Moreover, as I havo said, the most
striking consequence of the French|
course was the gradual restoration of j
the Influence of the old gang In Ger
many, which had born responsible
for all the sabre rattling before the
war. responsible for the program of
naval challenge to Britain, and. more
than all. responsible for the manner
In which Germany conducted the
war, the manner which slowly rous<d
the whole world acalnst the German
and brought America to Intervene
decisively In the critical year 1917.
When Pwitl Bwmfd lM|NMHlbl?
A year ago a new war between;
Franee snd Germany not onlyj
seemed Inevitable but not long to h<>i
delaye<J. The mass of the Germans!
had hero me convinced that France
under Polncare meant to destroy!
Oarmany; while the mass of French
men. seeing In Germany Increasing,
signs of hatred and pagalon. were
convinced that Germany waa seeking
first by evasion to complete the ruin
of Franc#' b^Kiin in IS7U and co!i(iii>
ui'd in 1914-1N. Franc*', following
iPolncare and Millerand, ami Ger
? many, following more ami more
(closely Tirpitz and Ludendorff, worn
{drifting unmistakably into new col
lision. Tli*' great question was
whether Germany. goaded into fury J
would strike while ?he was still
weak. in an access of madness, or
wail her time.
And. following the Ruhr occupa
tion. it was no longer possible, even
had they desired it. for moderate
men in Germany to counsel submis
sion and settlement. Germany was
invaded and th?? fact of invasion pr? -
eluded any examination of the caus
es. It sufficed to say that the
French w?r<* in the Ruhr to ror>e
the whole German people and to pro
mote unity, as Cl? mencenu's old
'phrase, "the Hermans are at Noyon"
united Frenchmen during the war it
self.
In tie1 fatal deadlock which had
coni?? about France could get no nal
reparations, but she could occupy
German territory and paralyze Ger
man industrial life. Germany eould
jevade all payment*, but she could
not prevent French-invasion. Both
I countries suffered excessively,, but
for neither was there -any escape
compatible with the conception each
I people had of its own rights and lib
erties and of its own unity and secur
ity.
At all times, of course, the vice in
flt?* situation lay in the fact thit the
inevitable failure of the Treaty of
Versailles to fix any sum of repara
tions decisively and the later failure
of the reparations commission to fl.x
any sum reasonably possible gave -to^
the Germans at least a shadow of a
basin for resistance. Germany, pal
pahlv .ask?-d to pay more than was
possible- asked in principle although
no impossible p;\ymonts were direct
ly demanded?found a ground for
eavdlng all payments.
The \nglo-\merlcmi Position
The world and particularly the
United States and Great Britain were
agreed that Germany should pay up
to the limit of capacity, but they
were equally agreed that to demand
more than was reasonable was at
once foolish and inequitable, nut.the
British situation was compromised
hopelessly by the fact that British
representatives had endorsed im
possible figures and the British
change had only come about when
it became clear that British interests
were to be best served not by the
collection of reparations but by the
Restoration of trade,
No solution of' the problem was
then possible until there had been
some fixation of the sum which Ger
many could be ask"d to pay. n fixa
tion so made as to satisfy the reas
onable opinion of the world that It
r? stcd upon economic and not politi
cal calculations. When such a fixa
tion had been made?and It was
made by the Dawes committee, then
instantly the whole German case col
lapsed. When France accepted the
report, as she well might, since It
corroborated all her claims that Ger
many could pay and pay largely, then
Germany was put before the world
In the situation of having to disclose
her real purposes.
Since, moreover, the Dawes report,
while fixing German obligations at
considerable sums. Insisted upon the
restoration of the economic unity of
Germany, which meant in terms the
return to the Germans of the Ruhr
industries, and since France accepted
this condition, there, too. was an end
of the German plea that France, un
der cover of reparations claims, was
seeking to destroy German unity. If
,the Ruhr were to be handed back to
the Germans, then there was an end
i ??f all all?-uation that France was
seeking to establish Rhineland re
I publics and what not. to revert to tli<
|projects of revolutionary and Napo
leonic France. indeed to rev. it to the
johl plans of Richelieu and Mazarin.
t If something inure were wanting.
1 even after the Daw.s i?port had
Icome, that was supplied when Polu
{care was defeated and Mlllerand
ousted. It was a repudiation, not so
.much of the occupation of the Ruhr
as of the failure of l'oincare to pre
jvent the Rhineland republic schonit ?
,of the military and other agents of
\ France, it was a repudiation, not so
much of what l'oincare had done as
the manner of doinu. the manner of
(speaking?and beyond all else ii u*as
J not so much a repudiation as a rec
ognition that l'oincare stood for cer
[ tain things in the eyes of the world
and particularly the German world.
1 . The Fall of Poincare.
I do not personally believe that the
French voters were so much moved
by th" Idea of repudiating Poincare
as of removing a man whose policies,
at one moment approved, perliapr
i still measurably endorsed, had made
him an impossible negotiator in the
?new phase which was c pcninc. The
French agree with Genera! Dawes
who has many times said that the in
vasion of the Ruhr wus responsible
for th?' existence of the Dmves com
mittee and therefore for iis report.
Rut for tlie mass of the French peo
ple the occupation beln?f a means
and not an end. a step toward ret
tlenient. it was clear the moment to
.employ the means had com*' and it
was not less clear that other Hands
were needed to complete the affair.
When France called Herliot to
succeed P-olncare. however, the last
pillar of German resistance collapsed.
The world, aud Rritnin and Ameri
ca particularly. Instantly accepted
the French election results as evi
dence of the good faith of France,
of the triumph of liberal and mod
erate views, of the removal of even
the shadow of imperialism. it
promptly recognized that now the
problem was purely one which con
cerned Germany. Would she show
herself ready to meet a fair bill pre
sented in a reasonable spirit, to com
ply with the conditions of the Dawes
report and with the other conditions
concerning the limitations or her
-armies and armament or would she
openly convict liersHT of fidelity to
the old faith?
Had Poincare won the recent elec
tions Germany woujd undoubtedly
have, rejected the Dawt-s report and
put the responsibility on Poincare.
And in doing this she would un
doubtedly have enlisted much British j
and even some American support.
The German election which preceded
the French by one week was based
on the assumption that Pofhcare
would win the French elections and
the victory of the reactionaries and
the reds was the direct consequence ?
of the Ruhr wnr and the expectation
of a continuation of this struggle.
Rut the victory of the French Left
was In reality a crowning disaster
for the German Right, it was a worse,
defeat for LudendorfT and his crowd
politically than The battle of August
R. 1018 was militarily. Their case
rested upon the assumption that
there was nothing for Germany but
a grim and despairing resistance to
forces and men determined to de
stroy?resolved upon the extinction
of the German state and the slavery
of the German people. Rut to urge
such purposes auainst Herriot. Pain
love. and Doumerge, this was palp
able absurdity.
Herriot's First Move
And when Herriot announced that
France would retire from the Ruhr
not when Germany had paid In full
but when she had given the pledges
and complied with the conditions of
the Dawes report, the old allegation
of the purposes of Franc cto stay on
the lower Rhine went glimmering.
Warning their fellow countrymen of
the necessity to face a vindictive and
remorseless France and thereby win
ning many seats and much strength
in the new German parliament, the
German Nationalists were suddenly
confronted not by a militaristic but a
moderate France, by Herriot and not
by Poincare, by Doumergue and not
by Mlllerand.
And what was and Is of utmost
significance Is the fact that with this
1 change there wan at last heard the
volet- ??f reasonableness in German>.
The existing ministry, the press,
speaking (or the Socialist and bour
geois parties?for the moderates gen
erally- t? uan to protest against pro
vocative declarations of the reactlon
arv lii-ht. I..-all to advocate nego
tiation. not resistance. In a word
for tile first time since 1914 tliere
was heard in Germany a languag"
Intelligible beyond German frontiers.
Meantime Herrlot. while speakln
Gerr.iany fair, selected General Nol
le t to be his minister of war and
General Sotlet had been for years
the head of the Allied Commlss on
Charted with the duty of disarming
C. rmany. Moreover, the allied gov
ernments had iust addr. ss. d a note
to Germany demanding that *?? r
manv consent to further extension of
the "operations of this commission,
based upon the conviction that Ger
many was openly evading the dis
armament clauses of the Treaty
, Versailles. General Nollet. moreov
er was able to cite the facts aud.?
'astonishing circumstances ? there
were prompt German declarations,
coming from the democratic Left,
that the effort was being made,
i ?ee then the position In which
Germany now llnds herself. She no
longer has a leg left to stand on. so
far as her claims to poverty are con
cerned An impartial International
commission with an American chair
man has reported how and h"?
much Germany can pay.
to this report means world-wide con
demnation and what is even worse,
inability* to raise money In loans in
either the United State* or Great
llritain. the only available sources.
\nd. to cap the Cllmav. she Is asked
at the same time to consent to Allied
supervision of her military affairs. II
she declines, then she convicts her
self of planning a war of revenge.
Hut to balance all tills there Is the
clear evidence that German acce pt
ance of the Dawes report and t.er
nian submission to Allied supervision
In the matter of arms and armies
will give German protection. It w II
Insure prompt evacuation of the
lliihr. It will lead to immediate? Ger
man admission to the I.eague or Na
tions. It will give Germany real mar
antics against any attempt. French
or Other, to bring about German dis
integration or German ruin. And It
will insure prompt financial aid.
without which the makeshift German
currency system, the wholly
ltentenmark. will collnps. and thus
precipitate, a new economic and In
dustrial, chaos with perhaps political
anarchy.
lleasoii vs. 1 tenet t'?n
With MacDonald in London, ana
Herriot in Paris, it will be possible
for a German government, and abo\e
all for a German government repr? -
sent ins the Democratic l.eft; or such
Left us exists In Germany, to do bus
iness. It can he sure of a hearing.
Acceptance of th. Dawes report and
of the disarmament demand ^ 111
stltute evidences of good faith which
will bring evacuation and financial
assistance and these will brlng ln
turn, a gain on the domestic side.
Hitherto no German government has
been able to get any real result sin
dealing with the Allies because it has
been unable to make the necessary
concessions. ^ !
I At last. then. It seems io me de
mocracy. the Left, or If you l,1<""'c
reason as contrasted with reaction
has a lighting chance In Gem >y. It
can deal Willi France and with mi
tain on an equitable basis, ' 'e ba.ls
provided by the Dawes repoit. It.can
deal with men who represent the r.
I volt In both the llrltirh ami
democracies against the war state of
mind. It can also deal with the
I'nlted States on the same basis, for
the Dawes report has practically
! unanimous endorsement In America,
i And If the elements in
which advocate a settlement with the
Dawes report as a basis are < ? feat
led by the reactionaries, then the* can
i at least be assured of their r,'v,'n';''_
! for one can easily Imagine what the
! feeling of a British .^^ ^01"*
: ment would '? toward a Von TlrplU
I ministry based up^n the double p.
Icy of repudiation and revenge. And
!lt requires no imagination to peiceive
1 that, given the present temper of
1 the French parliament, the ministry
$ HeJriot would be short. If beyond
Ithe Rhine a victory of French liber
allsm were followed by a triumph of
German Junkerdom. Either H? rriot
would have* to adopt Poincar- s pol
i icy en bloc or Poincare or ou?- of 2iis
| followers, Mauitiot for ?ixanipl* .
iwould be called upon to form a n? w
Igovernment and the French move to
ward liberalism and conciliation
would be stifled In short order.
In reality, then, we have come to
the supreme crisis of the after-war
period. Britain and France, by their'
domestic political transformations
have given indubitable proof of their
desire to Hud a settlement and to find
it on a basis which ha** international
]economic sanction. Five years after
the signing of the Treaty of Ver
sailles, its economic clauses have
| found interpretation which satisfies
Ialike the dictates of reasou and of
|Justice. Does Germany want war ori
'does she want peace? The question
is put up to her with the same dl-i
rectness as it was 10 years ago next
month.
(lermany Must Answer
The decision can not long be de
layed. Britain and France are now
eager to ro on with the negotiations,
and. with General Dawes a nominee,
the ?Republican Administration in
Washington will have every reason
for wishing to see his European con
tributions magnified by Immediate
results. A rejection of the Dawes
I Report, a direct and open rejection,
would not merely be flouting Amerl
|can opinion but also directly affront
ling the present administration which
obviously means to make large use
i of this achievement.
In sum, Germany has now reached
I the point where she must fish or cut
I bait. Her conquerors, who have been
? divided, have found a common basia
of agreement; namely, the Dawes Re-|
I port; and her two chief adversaries,
J France and Britain have, after j
? marked differences of opinion, come
. together through the operation of
similar shifts in the political . com
plexion of both countries. Thus to
I reject the Dawes Report out of band
j would be for Germany almost as fa
tal and certainly quite as'foolish a
! blunder as the invasion of Belgium
ten years ago. It would in the same
way silence her champions and con
! fuie her defenders.
And this fact is manifestly sinking
home k\ Germany. Perhaps It is
making more progress in the country
as a whole than in the present Reich
stag. which, as I have said was chos
en to. fight Poincare and finds itself
face to face with Ilerriot. Patently i
it is making progress in industrial
circlet, most concerned with a set
tlement, and most powerful in po
litic.*; vircit-jj. And the very fury of
the rc??ctlonarUs may fairly be
net down to their perception of the
change in their situation.
We art* going to see very shortly if
the German people have learned any
thing by reason of the events of the
past ten years. We are going to see
if there has been any real change in
the substitution of the republic for
the monarchy. And we are going to
know whether It is to be peace or
war, for the only alternative to ac
ceptance of the Dawes Report Is
forcible rejection. The two ways to
g"t the French and the Belgians out
of the Ruhr are patent: they will
leave when the Dawes Report Is com
plied with or tliey will leave when
they are driven out.
And if Germany decides for war,
she will once more face the world
isolated, condemned in advance as
responsible. The moral advantage
will again rest with her opponents,
and since the war would start on Ger
man soil, involve the Inevitable de
struction and devastation * of the
Ruhr and Rhine Industrial regions:
mean war wtli Poland and Ciecho
Slovaka as well as France and Bel
gium. mean economic ruin with only
a moderate chance of military suc
ces. It is reasonably fair to assume
that in the end Germany will yield.
If. further, yielding brings in the
end a decent settlement, such as the
Dawes Report envisages, the advan
tages which accrue to the liberal
elments responsible and the discredit
which must cling to the reactionary
methods and policies may in the end
just avail to save the Gorman repub
lic. ..Thus Germany, like France and
like Britain, may emerge from the
war atmosphere facing to the left,
that Is. toward more liberal and dem
ocntfc ideas. Not since 1848 has
there been any such posiblllty in Ger
many.
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