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W. F. WARDLAW, Editor and Proprietor.

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(Also per Annum.)

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OUR ASIATIC TERRITORY.

PROF. WOOLLEY ON "THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES."

What Shall We Do With Them?—A Careful Consideration of the Conquerors, the Conquered, and of the Island-ers Themselves.

One of the marked characteristics of the American people is its cheerful optimism. Too keen to hide from itself its blunders, it is nevertheless too hopeful to dwell long in their harmfulness, and, it must be confessed, too impatient to be guided always by the lessons of experience. This is a sign of youth and of strength. It betokens a nation accustomed to command success.

There is an example of this optimism at the present time. We command the harbor of Manila, but have not occupied the Philippines. This is a serious and a separate task. We have sailed into the port of San Juan, in Puerto Rico, have knocked down a few of the fortifications, and have called it again. What the sequel of these two actions will be we cannot know. But we guess it, and begin to discuss the future of both islands as if we held them in the hollow of our hands. Truly Columbia is the minkmaid of the fable.

In accordance with this national character, and disregarding the fate of the island and our fairing, let us consider what the policy of the United States should be if the close of the war with Spain finds the Philippines in their possession.

There are three—yes, four—interests to be kept in sight. These appertain to the former sovereign, to the inhabitants themselves, to the other trading powers whose commercial and political balance may be affected, and to the United States.

(1) The rights of Spain: Military occupation does not wipe out the sovereignty of an invaded territory. That sovereignty may be incapable of assertion, yet it survives—in suspense, as it were—until either revived or removed by a treaty of peace. Spain will thus retain rights, even in case of complete conquest, which must be eventually weighed and adjusted. What line this will take must depend upon the influence of other powers, upon our own sense of expediency, and upon the fortune of war in other directions.

(2) The rights of Philippine islanders: It would be unwarranted to say that no mention of these islands would be legitimate unless ratified by the wishes of their inhabitants. In a highly civilized community this is the modern tendency, though even then yielding to political exigencies, as in Alsace-Lorraine. But it is a practical question whether the Philippines could be anything but a burden to this country if their transfer proved to be against the will of their millions of inhabitants, many already in revolt, and who are absolutely foreign to our blood, our usages, our laws, our ideals.

(3) The interests of other Powers: Here the vital question is how far the United States, by possession of the Philippines, would place itself within the European vortex, to be buffeted and enjoyed, thwarted and urged on, by the great military Powers, shall we be similarly treated? Would we submit to such treatment?

(4) The rights and true interests of the United States: The right of conquest is something. The conclusiveness of bringing a better Government is something. The prospect of a favorable vantage ground for the extension of our Oriental trade is a temptation. But the problem is territorial complexity. Here are some of the considerations to be kept in mind while we are trying to solve it.

We are waging a war which we believe to be just. It is in defense of humanity and of our sorely tried national interests. Its object is the pacification of Cuba. The entire civilized world save Great Britain believes that it is a war of selfish aggression. We declare that our motives are pure, and that in the most formal way we are denying recognition to Spain. If under these circumstances we do seize and propose to retain Cuba at once perhaps, but Puerto Rico and the Philippines, one or both, with what face can we maintain our altruistic professions? In appearance and in fact we should be hypocrites.

SCOTT AND THE SOUP.

HE WAS WRONG IN SAYING IT WAS TAYLOR.

It Was Scott Who Embodied the Soup Incident in His Official Report—Summaries on the Political Advancement of Military Heroes.

Of course it was General Scott who wrote about the hearty plate of soup. Many letters from venerable men have refrained to, and my esteemed friend, Mr. Carnahan, of Rome, has sent me a kind message about my mistake in putting the soup on Taylor. I did nothing in history about it, and hence such things can only be established from memory—the memories of our oldest people. I am gratified to learn from these letters that some daily that there are left so many good old men with intelligent memories—men of four score years and over—and who like all old people now live in the past and love to recall the events that happened fifty and sixty years ago. Taylor and Scott were both Virginians and were very superior commanders. Scott was ambitious and arbitrary. Taylor was modest, retiring, and upright and a down-to-earth man and duty was his watchword. His nomination for the presidency was forced upon him and he grieved his wife greatly, for she said: "They seek to rob me of my husband and our children of a father. Her fears proved more than true, for the cares and anxieties of political life caused his early death, notwithstanding he had a cabinet of great and good men to share his burdens and relieve him of many responsibilities. His own George W. Crawford was his Secretary of War. General Scott was not only ambitious, but he was envious of Taylor and sought to embarrass him in Mexico by withdrawing troops from his command. At one time he reduced Taylor's force to 3,700 men, while he was opposed by 7,000 of the enemy. His subordinate officers advised a retreat or falling back to Point Isabel and there wait for reinforcements, but Taylor said, "No, I will advance or die in my shoes," and he did and won a signal victory. There was politics in war then, just as there is now, and my prediction is that neither Fitzhugh Lee nor Wheeler will be permitted to make sense enough to endanger the Republic's day and it is in our hands. Scott was a brave, exacting and accomplished officer, but was court-martialed three times for political effect, as was asserted by his friend, He fell short of his ambition to be President and his last words were, "James, take good care of my horse."

Parties have abundant reason to fear the popular advance of military heroes. Six of our Presidents have acquired office through military channels. Washington, Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, Pierce and Grant. It is astonishing how suddenly and rapidly an unknown man can advance to the highest pinnacle through the fortunes of war, whether they are accidental or meritorious. Here before we are six months ago published in the Register the name of Ulysses Grant is not in the air yet within the brief space of eight weeks he was made President of the United States. Had there been no war who doubts but that Grant would have ended his life unloved and unknown in his brother's tanyard at Galena. More probably he would still be living, for Spanish are healthy places and do not breed cancer. A few months ago Devey was unknown outside of a limited naval circle, but now his name is world-wide. What a commentary upon the science of government. A great man like Daniel Webster devotes a life to his study and becomes a polar star of statesmanship, acquiring by slow but sure processes the respect and confidence of all nations, but is passed from power to make room for a man who knows nothing but how to fight. The wonder is that we are still a nation and have a government. Fortunately these military heroes are generally men of mind and morals and have been educated to have regard for the supremacy of civil law. Our military Presidents made good Presidents. Old Hickory was arbitrary and fearless, but he was unselfish and had the good of the country at heart. Grant and more consideration for the rights of the States and of the Southern people than Stanton had or Andrew Johnson.

But the late civil war has passed into history and the one we are now engaged in will have to be called something else. It is continually spreading and no one can tell what it will grow to. Of course it must keep that until after the next presidential election—that is our politics, and election that is her politics too, and must preserve her dynasty. And so it is politics on both sides. The starving Cubans were in it at the beginning, but they are not in it now. The Monroe doctrine didn't apply to Cuba, but seems that it does to the Philippines. We don't know whether we are drifting, but must fall into line and exclaim with Deatur: "My country—right or wrong—my country." That sounds well, of course, but not so well as Davy Crockett's motto: "Be sure you are right, then go ahead." What we want is peace on earth and good will among men. I was down at Urdilla a few days ago—a sweet little village about fifty miles below Macao—and there I met an ex-majior of the Federal Army. He had but one eye, and strange to say, had found the man who shot out the other at the battle of Franklin. He has been living in South Georgia for twenty-two years and says they are the best people he has ever found—the best people he has ever found—the kindest, frankest and most hospitable. "When I was first sent down here," said he, "I was somewhat dubious about my safety and was cautious and reticent, but soon got over it. I have traveled over this region for the Standard Oil Company as purchasing agent for twenty-two years, and am content to spend the rest of my life here in Georgia.

Another objection to be found in the military burden involved. Some effort is necessary to picture to ourselves the change of military and naval establishments which would be necessary in case the United States became a continental power. The shift of ambition grows by what the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, the Philippines, etc., only what, not satisfy, the taste. We should require a foothold in China to compete in trade facilities with other Powers. We should insist upon the exclusive control of a Central American interoceanic canal. Indeed, many of these things are at present, looking at the question not from the theoretical and strategic, but the practical point of view. We should need Cuba as a key to the eastern approach to this canal. We should need coaling stations and dry docks—in other words, fortified and garrisoned ports—at convenient points in the Pacific and South Atlantic. All this means more territory to defend, more soldiers to defend with, more ships to keep up the coasts, more money. Not very good news, is it? But it would be construed as a sign of weakness, and she fears the consequences. She cannot let go. We are more fortunate, because we have not taken hold. We are a rich and prosperous people. This is largely owing to two causes (aside from race and form of government), cheap land and freedom from military duty. In the cheap Government land is becoming a thing of the past and men are wondering whether they can grow wheat at a profit and fertilize also, we are asked to assume the military burden.

One other objection to a national policy which must involve large expenditures for government relations with other Powers and trade rivalries reaching to the ends of the earth, relates to its effect upon domestic problems. We have several questions upon which national parties divide, a stable currency, a compromise tariff, and reform in various departments of national, State and municipal politics. These must be settled soon and wisely, as many believe, if this Republic is to successfully endure. But how can they be properly settled or adjusted if foreign policy are complicated with them? Take, for instance, the one hundred and fifty or two hundred millions of additional income which this policy of colonial expansion would require, or the actual war. (For war would be more costly than at present, just as a man is more likely to injure another if he has a weapon than if he has none.) To raise such revenue involves a dozen considerations like these: a national debt, issuing paper money, abolition of pension payments, lowering tariffs to make them more productive, an income tax, heavier internal taxation.

It is not true that currency reform and sound tariff legislation would be very much interfered with, if not altogether prevented, by the financial necessities of a colonial policy? While the financial advantages of it, through extension of trade and finding new markets, can add but indirectly and insignificantly to the national income, for the colonial requirements must first be met. Otherwise our administration would be no better than Spain's. The fact that the advantages of a colonial policy are carried away by the success of Great Britain in this direction, as Germany has been forgetting that English development has been the result of geographical isolation and centuries of effort.

Without wasting rhetoric, these are matters to be seriously weighed before we decide to keep the Philippines—if we shall find ourselves their masters. And for one I am inclined to think that if, before the war is fought, to a final issue, whether through mediation or Spanish initiative, peace should be restored on the basis of Cuban independence and a restoration of Manila, it would be a happy escape from a most perplexing situation.

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ANOTHER ACCOUNT OF CARDENAS.

Thrilling Description of the Fight by a Man Who Was in It.

John L. Ryan, of Troy, New York, has received a letter from John J. Madden, who was on the Winslow and at Esplanade Bay's side when the young officer was killed. Mr. Madden's letter is as follows:

"The papers have told pretty dear all about the fight, but I will give you some of the details. The cause of the fight began on Sunday, the 21st. We lay under the lee of Piedras Key at the entrance of Cardenas Bay. We saw smoke among some of the islands which fill the mouth of the harbor and went out to investigate. We saw some signals in one island and fired into the bushes. Soon after we noticed three gunboats coming full speed from Cardenas. We waited for them, and they opened fire on us at about 2,000 yards. We answered, and went 500 yards closer to them, as our guns are only 1-pounder rapid fire rifles.

"Their shots were wild and didn't come near us. We hit one gunboat and disabled her. She had to be towed out of action. The other two gunboats retreated behind the island. We did not follow, as we knew the channel was mined and they could make it pretty warm for us if they got us cornered, so we went to sea. We reported the engagement to Commodore Harry of the Machias. He summoned me near us. We hit one gunboat and disabled her. She had to be towed out of action. The other two gunboats retreated behind the island. We did not follow, as we knew the channel was mined and they could make it pretty warm for us if they got us cornered, so we went to sea. We reported the engagement to Commodore Harry of the Machias. He summoned me near us. We hit one gunboat and disabled her. She had to be towed out of action. The other two gunboats retreated behind the island. 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