Newspapers / The News-Journal (Raeford, N.C.) / Dec. 4, 1931, edition 1 / Page 6
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d '3'j My Experiences In tbe World War By Cteneral dolui J. Pershing ^ OevTri^ mi. to an cmantae br dM Nonh Aaterient 1 tllllUMrrT : I nmitmtlna towholaottoWPaoMitoJ- J W.N.U. ScnrlM Tlie division or me fourin corps (Dickman) those on the left of the First corps (Liggett) overwlielmed the hostiJe garrisons, and quickly over ran their positions, carr.ting tlie fight ing Into the open. The German resist ance on tliis part of the front was dis organized hy the rapidity of our afir vance and was soon overcome. Al though the enemy was - expecting an attack, he did not think it would take place so soon and it therefore came as a surprise. When the First division, ou the iparching flank of the southern attack, had broken through the hostile for ward positions, the squadron of ^•av- alry attached to the Fourth corps was passed through the breach. At 1:45 p. m. it pushed forward to reconnoitei the roads toward Vigneulles, but en countering machine guns in position was forced to retire. Western Attack Slower. On tlie western face' of the salient process was not so satisfactory. The Twenty-sixth division, in its attempt to make a deep advance toward Vigneulles, met considerable resist ance, and except for a battalion of the division’ reserve had not reacbedi the day’s’dbjectiva; * ' ■ The French at the'tip of the salient had attempted to follow up the flanks of our successful pene^tlons, but made only small advanc(^> .Upon tbe request of Gen. B. J. Blondlat, com manding the French Second Ckilonial corps, a regiment of the Eightieth di vision (Cronkhite), In reserve, was sent to his assistance. On the afternoon of the Twelfth, l^>aming that the roads leading out of tbe salient between the two attacks were filled with retreating enemy troops, with their trains and artUlery, I gave orders to the commanders of the Fonrth and Fifth corps to push forward without delay. Using the telephone myself, 1 direct ed the commander of the Fifth corps to send at least one regiment of the Twenty-sixth division toward Vig- aenlles with all possible speed. That evening a strong force from the Fifty-first brigade pushed boldly forward and reached Vigneulles at 2:15 a. m. the Ihth. It immediately made dispositions that effectively closed tbe roads leading out of the salient west of that point. In tbe Fonrth corps tbe Second brigade of the First division advanced in force about dawn of the 13th, its leading dements reaching Vigneulles by 6 a. The salient was closed and our that they "haa been held as prtsofiera, entirely out of touch with their own countrymen, for four years, though al ways within sight of the French lines. On my visit to several corps and di vision headquarters the following day I found all jubilant over the victory and overflowing with incidents of the fighting, reciting many cases of indi vidual heroism among the troops. CHAPTER LVIl / In accordance with the understand ing of September 2 we were now mov ing rapidly toward our second great offensive. Questions concerning the concentration and supply of the ele ments of the First army in the battle areas were being worked out by the staff of that army, who were given every possible assistance by the staff at G. H. Q. The general plan of action of the allied armies, as agreed upon at the conference of commanders in chief July 24, was, to state it dinply'hnd briefly, that the offensive should cOti- tinue. each army , driving forward as rapidly as possible. .The allied and American operations during the sum mer had resulted in, the reduction of the Chateau Thierry,. Afflll/ijisi And .St. rMlhiel sftllents and the grg. t offensive! was now under way. Iiiraedifttely m. troops were masters of tbe field. Could Have Passed Hindenburg Line The troops continued to advance on the 1.3th, when the line was estab lished approximately along the final objectives set for this offensive. In view of the favorable situaticm created just west of the Moselle river by ou'* successes farther to tbe left, a limited attack was made on that part of the front by elements of the Eiglity-see- ond and Ninetieth divisions, with good resnlts. Daring the night onr troops all along the line were engaged in organ bing their new pdSitions for defense, preparatory to the withdrawal of di visions and corps troops for partici pation in the Meuse-Argonne battle. September 14, 15 and 10 local opera tions continued, consisting of strong reconnaissances and occupation of better ground for defensive purposes Beginning the 13tb, several counter attacks were repulsed. The line as finally established was: Haudiomont. Fresnes-en-Woevre, Doncourt, Jaulny. Vandieres. Reports received the 13th and 14tli Indicated that the enemy was retreat log In cnn'idernhle disord“r. Without doubt an immediate continuation of the advance would have carried os well beyond the Hiiidenlmrg line and possibly iqto Metz, and the teuipta tion to press on was very great But we would probably have become deep ly involvjsd and delayed tlie greater Meuse-Argonne operation, to wliicb we were wliolly committed. During the figlitlng from September 12 to IG the German One Hundred and Twenty-fifth, Eighth landwehr. Eighty- eighth and Twenty-eighth divisions, re enforced the enemy’s line and several other divisions arrived in reserve po frttioni. September 10, in front of tlie First army, there were ten Gentran divisions and two brigades in tine and •even divisions in reserve. French Overjoyed by Release. Nearly 16,000 prisoners were, taken and some 450 enemy guns had fallen into our baod& Our casualties num bered about 7.000. As tbe enemy re treated he set fire to many large sup ply dumps and several villages. The few remaining French inhabitants who found themselves within our lines were overjoyed to be released from tlie domination of tbe enemy, but many were left destitute by the burning of their homes at tbe very naoment of detiverance. Oo tbe iStb General Petain came .by ny headquarters and we went to- father to St Ifthlel, where the peo- r' .|[^ioeluding children carrying French . ns a welcome which may when Me really west of the MMse rlV'er the battle line; had rraaihetf' practhshll^ -unchangeia; since lajr: It .JW8 nn this front the American airmy was ’fo plfly Its great part The disposition of the Belgian, Srit- Ish, French and American armies on the wide front between the North, sea and Verdun was suchr^hat they would, naturally converge as, they advanced.; So long as the enemy honid bold his ground on the east of this battle line frontal attacks farther west might drive him back on his snccessive posi tions, yet a decision be lohg delayed. , Yanks Face Strong Position. , , His main line of communication and supply ran through Garlgnan, Sedan and Mezleres. If that should'he in? terrupted before he could withdraw' his armies from Prance and Belgiu^ l the communications In the narrOw;'av'(^' nue which lay between the Atdeniies* forest and the Dutch frontier were so limited that he would be unable ade: quately to. .supply Ills forces, ,or, ,tq evacuate tliem before his min.wopl^ be accomplished. As our objeistlve was the Sedan-Carlgnan railroad. It was evident that the sector assigned to the American army was oppoMte the most sensitive part of the German front then being attacked. The danger confronting the enemy made It Imperative that he should hold on in front of the American army to the limit of his resources. Germans Strongly Fortified. The area between the Meuse river and the Argonne forest was ideal for defensive fighting. On the east the heights of the Meuse commanded that river valley and on the west the rugged, high hills of the Argonne for est dominated the valley of the Aire river. In the center the watershed between the Aire and the Meuse rivers commanded both valleysi with the heights of Montfaucon, Cunel, Ro- mange and of the Bols de Barricourt standing out as- natural strong points. From these heights observation points completely covered the entire German front The terrain over which the attack was to be made formed a defile blocked by three successive barriers, the heights of Montfaucon, then those of Cunel and Romange and farther back the ridges of the Bols de Barricourt and of the Bols de Bourgoyne. The Meuse river was unfordable; the Aire river fordable only in places. In addi tion to the heavy forest of the Ar gonne there were numerous woods with heavy undergrowth which were serious obstacles. These natural defenses were strength ened by every artificial means imagin able. A dense network of wire entangle ments covered every position. It was small wonder the enemy had rested four years on this front without being molested. Hindenburg Position Is, phjeptlve. In accordance with the principal mission, which remained ths same throughout this great offensive, the main attack of the First army was to Tim: NEWS-JOUttHAL, BAEFdttP, K- C- -‘if FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4; 1931 ^ / BEAUTIFICATION OF BETWEEN FAYETTEVII4*E AND FT. BRAGG PLANNED mr YOUTH and STRENGTH The tett-mlle stretch of highway between Payette^lle and Fort Bragg vrtU he deVelopM into one of the most attractive drives of the State l^plans made by officials of the city and post mature. DOtailB of the project were dis cussed ait a recent conference in the office of Brig. Gen. Manus‘'McClos- key, which was attended by General McCloskey, Col. ^J. Vf. Hartehoa, director of the Department of Cou- servatlon and Development; Mayor Quince Nimmocks, of Fayetteville; W. C. swing, member of the Board of Conservation and Development, Thomas' H. Sutton, Payette’ville, and Assistant Forester P, H. Clarldge, in charge of reforestation. The project was reported to have the full sympathy and active coope ration of Chairman B. B. Jeffress of the State Highway Commission, and Director Harrelson proffered the services of tl^e Department through Mr. Cttaxidge in helping to dirwt the planting. General' McCIosikey’s interest in conservation is attracting ■wide at tention. He has recently issued orders against the . cutting of any trees on the 121,000-acre ffeservatioa with out the approval of the command ing officer. T The post commander ihas ajso manifested deep interest in protect ing the forests of the reservation against fires. With ■these * efforts and other attention givem by the com- manderi it may he eatpected, since this section is in the longleaf pine district,: that thriety forests of this species'will be: brought ^back, ^ TwentjMwb : thousand acres on thie ■'pbst have been set asid'S 'as a game refuge by means of which consid erable sport has been furnished and an overflow of game has spread intb Cumberland, Hoke, Moore, and ■ Hat- nett counties. Tn conjunction with our advance, which would outflank the enemy’s posi tion south of the Alsne, the French Fourth army, by attacking successive ly the. positions between tbe Aisne and the Sulppes rivers, would be able to occupy the line Vouziers-RetheL After that it would operate in the direction of the plateau'east of tne Rethel-Sig- ny-l’Abbaye road. Aim at Tactical Surprise. . Our purpose was to effect a tactical surprise, if possible, overcome the enemy’s first and second positions in the area of Montfaucon and (Cote Dpme Marie) of his third position be fore the enemy could bring up strong re-enforcements. It was an ambitious plan and oiie ‘hat would require a rapid fadvance of ten miles through a densely fortified zone. From an estimate of the enemy’s reserves and their location It was realized that ue must capture Montfaucon and seize Cote Dame Marie by the end of the second day. It was thought reasonable to count on the vigor and aggressive spirit of our troops to make up in a measure for their inexperience, but at the same time the fact .was not overlooked that lack of technical skill might consider- fibiy reduce tbe chances of complete success against well organized de fenders. ,, General Petain bad already given It as bis opinion that we should not be able to get farther than Mont faucon before winter. he launched west of the Meu.se river.- its right to be covered by the river anrl by the operations of the French- Seventeenth corps on the east of the river, that corps being a part of our army. Our left was to be supported by a simultaneous attack by the Fr.en'ch, Fourth army. Our attack to tucjiitle the Argonne forest was to be driven with all possible strength In the gen eral direction of Mezieres. The first operation of our army was to have for Its objective the Hlnden- burg position on the front Brleulles- sur-Meuse-Romagne-sous - Montfaucon- Graiidpre. with a following ‘ develop ment in tbe direction of Buzancy- J^lezieres in order to force the . enemy beyond the Meuse and ontflank his positions on the Vouzlere-Bethel line from tbe east CHAPTER LVIll The Meuse-Argonne offensive opened tbe morning of September 26. To call It a battle may be a misnomer, yet it was a battle, the greatest, most pro longed In American history. Through 47 days we were engaged ip a per sistent struggle with the enemy to smash through his defenses. The attack started on a front of 24 miles, which gradually extended until the enemy was being actively assailed from the Argonne forest to the Mo selle river, 90 miles. In all more than 1,200,000 were em ployed and the attack was driven 32 miles to the north and 14 miles to the northeast before the armistice termi nated hostilities. The outstanding fact that I desire to emphasize is that, once started, the battle' was maintained continuonsly, aggressively and relentlessly to the end. « All dliBcultles were overridden in one tremendons sustalnied effort to terminate the war then-and; there In a victorious manner. Battle Opens Favorably. After three hours’ violent artillery preparation the attack began at 6:30 a. in. At the same Hmo. to (’•-ort the enemy’s attention pls'-'li''ro. ioi-ni raids and demonstrations were made the .Mense-Moselle front. The that time evidently came as a sor- 'prise to the enemy, and our troops were enabled quickly to overrun Ws forward positions. The vast network of nndestroyed barbed wire, the deep ravines, dense woods and heavy fog made It difldcoK to co-ordinate the movements of the assaulting Infantry, especially of some divisions In battle for the first time, yet the advance throughout was ex tremely vigorous. Third Corps Reaches Second Line. The Third corps (Bullard), nearest the Meuse, carried the enemy’s sec ond position before dark. The Thirty- third division (Bell), wheeling to the right as It advanced, ’occupied the west bank of the Meuse to protect the flank of the army. The Bols de Forges, with Its difficult terrain and strong machine gun defeases, wap car ried In splendid fashion. The right of the Eightieth division (Cronkite) had by noon cleared the Bols Jure In the face of heavy ma chine gun fire and established its line north Of Dannevoux. On its left, after an all-day fight, the , division forced Its way through the strong positions on hill 262 and reached the northern slopes of that hill. The Fourth division (Hines)^ on the left of the Eightieth, took ^ptarges and firmly established itsell! in the woods to the north. It was abreast of Nantlllols and its left was more than a mile beyond Montfaucon, but through some misinterpretation of the orders by the Third corps the oppor tunity to capture Montfaucon that day was lost. Three counter-attacks against the division during the after noon were broken up. Fifth Corps Falls $hort. In the center the Fifth corps (Cam eron). with the exception of the Nine ty-first division (Johnston) on its left, fell short of Its objectives. The Seventy-ninth division (Kuhn) in the right of the corps, toqk Malan- court, but In the open ground beyon'^’ on French Fonrth army (Gouraud), to our left on the west of Jhe Argonne foresL began Its attack half an hour later. The^’tiattle opened.; favorably. Our attack at that cattlciriv place and at corps (LiggettJ(..ma^^,gp(:|llent prog ress. The Thirty-fifth division (Tranb) cleverly captured the strong position of Vanquois and took Cheppy against stubborn opposition. Elements of t^e division reached the corps objective east of - (5harpentry, but were soon withdrawn to a line west of Very; On the left the division captured that part of Varenne^ east of the Aire river, but - was held up between Varennes and Cheppy. At this time a fresh regiment took the lead, giving a new iinp.etus to the attack, and pushed the line forward to the high ground south of Charpentry, In the Twenty-eighth division (Muir) the right brigade captured the western half of Varennes and coin- tlnued about a mile farther. The left brigade, facing the eastern spurs of the Argonne, which constituted the enemy’s chief defense of that forest, was unable to overcome, the Intense machine-guo fire frqm the vicinity of Champ Mahaut. The Seventy-seventh division (Alexander) in the difficult terrain of the Argonne made some progress. By the evening of September 27 the Fifth corps was abreast of the First and the Third on its flanks. The Sev enty-ninth division captured Montfau con the morning of SMtember 27 and on the next day Nantlllols and the Bols de Benge were phased despite determined resistance. In the Third corps the Eightieth di vision had taken the Bois de la Cote Lament after hard fighting, but at tack after attack made with dogged determination across the open space toward Brienlles-sur-Meuse was rolled back by the galling fire of the enemy from the town and its vicinity and by the artillery firing from east of the MMSe (TO BE CONTINUED) YOUR SHARE OF “DOLLAR DAY” encountei’ed considerable .opposition, and the atlvaueed elements were nof In position before Montfaucon 'u'iit.il.‘ late afternoon. The attack of the dj- vision launched against' this strong point early in t|)e evening was met by the fire of artillery and machine guns from the southern slopes of the hill, which held up further progress. The Thirty-seventh division (Farns worth), in the center of the Fifth corps, after Overcoming heavy ma chine-gun fife, pushed through the the .Bols de .;JiIontfaucon, and its at tack's in the Afternoon carried the line up to and west, of Montfaucon. The left of its UnA facing stiff opposition, cleared up the woods in its front and establlsheij itself just south of I voir.v The Nlnet.v-flrst division (Johnston) overcafne strong initial resistance and advanced rapidly to Bplnonvllle, which It entered bnt did not hold. Cros^ng ' Into the sector'of the Thirty-fifth di vision, durii^ the day It, oceupi^d.. Very. ' . . • --- i First Corps Maksp Pregrts*. On the left of the army .the First for ECONOMY SCIENTISTS havis deni- onstifated mill( ls as nourishinSf as ^ a Qusoktity of othiMr fcMd costing two «tnd three time.*, as much. That*s why drinking milk is ecortomical and necessary to your daily diet* You’H Uke Our Service JLESTEJtS DAIRY Phone 347 FRIDAY AND SATURDAY 4&5 BAUCDM’S CASH mi i m I l;Sf' i 'J y f
The News-Journal (Raeford, N.C.)
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Dec. 4, 1931, edition 1
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