My E
By <
(Copyright, 193.1, in all countries oyi
the North American Newspaper A!- |
liance. World rights rcsen'ed, I
including the Scandinavian.
Reproduction in whole or
in part prohibited.)
CHAPTER VII
As the French authorities wished
to honor our national holiday they
requested that some of our troops
parade in Paris July 4, 1917. We
were not prepared to make much of
a military* impresr.icn, as our men
were largely recruits. But to stinui*v..
r."> i. >
<uit uiuiuic uir x xeucn wameu to,
demonstrate that the Americans were
actually coining, so a battalion of!
the Sixteenth Infantry was brought
up from Saint Nazaire.
The untrained, awkward appearance
of this unit, which was accepted
as the cream of our regular army
by the French officials, no doubt
tended to confirm their belief that
it would be some time before we
should be able to organize an effec_
tiv'e army.
If they could have foreseen the)
triumph of this same battalion at the.
peak of the great center-offensive
on the field of Soissons just one year
later we might have been spared
many delays and difficulties in car-'
rying out our plans.
Troops Bring Joy to French
Nevertheless, the first appearance
of American combat troops in Paris
brought joyful acclaim from the people.
On the march the battalion was
accompanied by a great crowd, many
women forcing their way info the
ranks and swinging alone arm in arm
with the men. With wreaths about,
their necks and flowers in their hats I
and on their rifles, the column hadi
the appearance of a moving flower)
garden.
With only a semblance of a mili-1
tary formation the animated throng
pushed its way through avenues of
people to the martial strains of the
French band and the still more thrillinc
music of cheering voices. Many
dropped on their knees in reverence
as the column went by.
The battalion marched to the cemetery
where the tomb of Lafayette
is located. The ceremony there consisted
of a few speeches, the princi_
pal speaker being Brand Whitlock,
our ambassador to Belgium. I had
been asked to deliver an address but
had designated Col. G. E. Stanton
of my staff, an old army friend and
something of an orator, to speak in
my place. However, I was prevailed
upon to speak extemporaneously.
"Lafayette, We Are Here!"
It was on this occasion that utter- 1
ance was. given to an expression that :
could be born only of inspiration, one :
? ; ?
|
Vh des Ecoliers, Near Chaumon
Commander it
that will live long in history: "Lafay-j i
ette, we are here!" : '
Many have attributed this Strik- !
ing utterance to n:e, and I have of- i
ten wished it could have been mine.
But I have no recollection of saying i
anything so 3plendid. 1 am sure those I
words were spoken by Colonel Stan- 1
ton, and to him must go the ercdit 1
for so happy and felicitous a phrase.
The parade of our troops through 1
Paris doubtless fortified the morale '
of the people to a certain extent,
but we al! knew that eventually some- 1
thing very much more effective would <
have to be done.
The real question was whether the I
Allies could hold out until we were <
ready. It was clear that no halfway 1
measures on our part, would answer
and that Allied hopes lay in Ameri- 1
can military assistaace on a vast '
scale at the earliest moment.
Cables for 1,000,000 Men
The Allies thought an American
force of 500.000 men the maximum ,
that we could have in France in 1918
but in my opinion that would not be
enough to meet the situation. If we ,
could have had half a million fight- .
ing men in France in the early spring
? it would have been a different matter.
But looking ahead it was necessary
to allow from 35 to 40 per cent, for
the service? of supply, which would ;
leave out of this number only ap- i
proximately 300,000 fighting troops.
Although this would aid, we could not
be content merely to lend a helping
hand but must prepare to strike a
decisive blow.
_ While the appearance on the front
away, yet there was little doubt that'
ix we could induce allied co-operation
we should be able to (rive much
greater assistance than they believed
possible. Oar study having confirmed
the correctness of my tentative estimate
made on the Baltic, I therefore
cabled Washington, July 6, as follows
:
"Plans should contemplate sending
over at least 1,000,000 men. by
next May. . . . This estimate would
give practically half million men for
trenches. Inasmuch as question affects
all Allies whose common interests
demand that we exert maximum
military power consistent with
transport problem, suggest early
,
XPERIE
GENERAL JOHN J.
agreement, be reached among Allies?
which would provide requisite trans-{
portatioo . . . and limit sea transportation
to food and military supplies
and the exclusion of every kind of
luxury as well a-3 other supplies in
excess of immediate needs of countries
dependent upon oversea supplies."
An entry in mv diary notes: Two
of the Roosevelt boys. Theodore Jr.
anil Archie, reported; Unable to par?
ticipate himself, their father's fine
spirit is represented by his sons."
CHAPTER VIII
AS the details of our mission
abroad developed it scon became evident
that irs all thai -?
the maintenance and supply of ouv
armies as distinguished from the
purely military task, men with expert
knowledge and broad experience in
business, industry and transportation
would be needed.
In the technical branches of the
army there were many officers withj
theoretical training in special lines,
but with some notable exceptions
they generally lacked broad constructive
or administrative experience.
From the very stoic I determined to
obtain the best talent available, and
was fortunate in practically everyj
field to find able men who were anxious
to do their part.
The earliest application of the principle
was in connection with timber
and lumber procurement. The call
for lumber would be enormous, and
since it would he impossible with our 1
limited tonnage to bring a great 1
quantity across the Atlantic, more of <
it would have to he obtained in Eu- :
rope. :
A cable to the War Department s
early in July, 1917, recommended the ;
immediate organization of a forestry ;
service, consisting of sawmill units, i
to be composed of experienced )um- ;
bermen and 8,000 to 10,000 unskilled J
laborers to build roads and transport :
lumber. Special request was made ;
for the appointment of Prof. Henry ?
Graves, chief of the United Stales i
forestry service, who was then oh 1
rhe ground, as the man to take charge i
of this service. A number of other
specially qualified nien were request- i
ed as we entered t.ho task of build- 1
ing up the supply service, but as this i
was the first intimation given to the (
War Department, that such a force 1
would be needed naturally it was i
some time ..before it was actually at
?wh. S
Heavy Work for the Staff |
During: the first two months in ~
France the work imposed upon the
Pew staff officers who had accompanied
me was very heavy. After urgent
and repeated requests t was fortu- j]
nate in having at my disposal later i
f
t, Domicile of the American j *
1 France. ?
* r
n the summer a small group of men j
vhich included some ef the most a
ivillient and highly educated officers r
n our army.
In addition to those already with s
ne. the officers included in the fol- t
owing cable 1 regarded as especially (
fitted for the duties for which they \
were desired: t
"Request Robert C. Davis, adju- y
tant general, be sent these head- f
quarters eariiest date. Request Frank j
Moorman or J. 0. Manborgne be sent ^
these headquarters earliest date for y
luty as code expert. Request Samuel *j
r. Hubbard Jr., signal corps, now
here, be called to active service and ?
ordered to report to me. Request ten j
if following named officers be sent y
to report to me by second convoy l
for general staff duty: Frank R. Mc- t
Coy, George Van Horn Moseley, Ma- *
tin Craig, Alfred \V. Bjornstadt, II. 1
B. Fiske, Allen J- Grear, Paul B. .Maline,
Edgar T. Collins, Saraael R. .
GfeJives, Laurence Hatstead, Nich- !
olas \Y. Campanole, A. R. Moreno, ?
Preston Brown, LeRoy R. Eltinge [
W.. B. Burtt, Frank T. Ilines, Edward
L. Klug, J. P. Mc Adams, W. C.
Sweeney, J. B. Barnes, Kerr T. Riggs,
W. H. Winters, Wait C. Johnson, c
Stuart Heintzelraan, Upton Birnie. t
Kirby Walker, Berkley Enochs. . . . i
Having this nncleus and selecting j
the best features of the French and 1
British staff systems, a general staff t
organization was created, which effi- s
ciently met every demand made upon t
it throughout the war and which re- ]
mains today as a model for nrpsewt
and future guidance. * 'i
The question of artillery procure- 1
ment caused roe much concern. The 1
almost negligible amount tin hand 1
when we went to war consisted roost- 1
ly of field guns of the three-inch 1
type, then largely in the hands of
troops in the Philippine Islands and i
elsewhere and unavailable for issue, i
Moreover, for calibres heavier than 1
the three-inch type our ordnance de- i
partmcnt had adopted nothing v.hich i
was really up to date. i
The enormous proportion of both <
light ar.d heavy guns used by both 1
sides, the knowledge of our deficien- '
cy and the realization of the length
of time that must, lapse before wen
could manufacture and deliver them <
made it imperative that we seek oth-l1
er sources than our own to help!;
equip our armies. ' <
BBBSSggggBfiSBBBSBBBB
{$&?&ssssslSiSdSfes vs.vA?fc?
THE WATAUGA DEMOCRAT?1
:nces
PERSHING, Comir
General Pershing With Gen. Jar
Following up an intimation it wa?
learned definitely that, although not
fully supplied themselves, the French
bouid increase the output of their
factories provided they could get
steel from the United States. As it
seemed probable that We should operate
in proximity to their armies we
adopted the French types for the
Usual calibres and sought their assistance
in obtaining the guns needed,
at least for the first two years. We
secured an agreement that our troops
as they came along would be provided
with French guns and ammunition
including not only the 75s and 155s
aut 37 mm. guns and 58 mm. trench
nortars as well.
It was most fortunate that we
yere able to get these guns from the
French, as up to the end of the war
to guns of American manufacture
)f tne types used, except twentyour
eight-inch mortars and six 14nch
naval gun3 were fired in battle.
Trench guns of the three-inch and
iix-mcn mortar types, with ammnniion,
were purchased from the Brit
sh, as they Were considered supc
;or to those used by the French.
Progress of Red Cross
The Red Cross reported excellent
>rogress at this time, especially in
ts efforts to assist the French as
agreed upon with General Petain.
ts organization by Major Grayson
rt. P. Murphy for war work with our
!\vii armies was new about completed.
The establishment of canteens
;iid huts at the ports and other im ortant
points had already be^mi and
he numbers increased as fast as
teeded.
These centers of service later
maintained dispensaries and provided
*eds and bathing facilities for men
raveling: under orders or on leave.
Vhen the necessity arose the Red
;ross actively co-operated with the
medical corps in the field, contributnjr
large r;uantities of supplies and
ften additional nurses. The work
f the society*, directed from a eon
ral office in Paris, eventually emraced
practically every endeavor
nuehing the health of the armies.
CHAPTER IX
1 ielt Paris July :?C. 1907. for a
isit with Field Marshal Sir Douglas
laig, the British commander ih chief
.hose headquarters were in a'n old
hateau half hidden away in a magnificent
grove at Beldiques. I >vas
iccompanied by Colonels Havhord
nil Alvord and Captain Patton of
ay staff.
At dinner the subject of convocation
naturally turned on the ciliary
situation of the Allied armies,
iur own in particular. They were
teen to know about our army, its
irganizntion and size, and the ;>ros)ects
of our putting troops in the
ield. As our active participation deicr.ded
on many factors, such as
raining, equipment and shipping, ray
eplic-s, of course, were indefinite
ind no doubt disappointing.
In turn we asked many questions,
ind it was especially, interesting to
icar the importance of artiilery ??iliasized
by its chief, Major Genera!
3irch, who spoke of the difficulties
hey had experienced in supplying
hemselves with guns that matched
he enemy's.
Referring to their lack of artillery
n the beginning, General Birch said
here was reason to beliefe that they
lad finally attained a superiority
iver the Germans.
Real Teamwork Lacking
Sir Douglas told me some of the
letails of Nivelle's unsuccessful stack
in the spring, how it was known
ar and wide beforehand, and spoke
jarticularly of the consequent se ious
disaffection among the French
roops. Although he had placed hinilelf
under Nivelle's command for
hese operations, he had, he said,
ittle confidence in the outcome from
he start. He also commented on the
failure of the French to co-onerate
iuiiy on various occasions. His renarks
entirely confirmed the belief
'.hat I had long since held that Teal
:eamwork between the two armies
was almost totally absent.
Scarcely anything more strikingl*"
mpressed upon me our unpreparedless
than what I day during a few
sours spent with General Trenchavd
it the British flying field, where we
ivitnessed flyers doing every imaginable
3tunt, and saw planes of all
:lasses, bombing, pursuit and observation.
motors of different types and
.he thoroughly equipped repair shops.
The outstanding thing, however,
which it was gratifying to note later
on in our own aviation personnel,
wa3 the incomparable spirit and alertness
of the young officers and the
snlisted personnel. Every roan secm.
5VERY THURSDAY?BOONE, N. C.
Km'-J araWitjpilySj .{-' 0bJ??K1
n the
lander-in-Chief of the Am
wWBBW^jB^SKg-'''' : S
. Ofc SWrWB
r.es G. Harbord, His Chief of Staff.
' ' ed to be disappointed when a flight
of planes departed for the front
ij without him. t
Conferences Valuable
This visit to British headquarters
i was most instructive, as every opportunity
was given us to Study n.
timately the details of their wartime
: organization. After similar studies of
I the French system we selected from
i each those features best suited to
j perfect a well-balanced staff for our
, own army.
The cordial relations and good un|
d erst an ding established between Sir
i Douglas Haig and myself and be|
iween the corresponding members of
i our staffs and with a number of the
j leading British officers with whom
| we were later to have official deal- \
i :;:gs -proved very advantageous. In
| London, long after the Armistice ;
j Sir Douglas in on after dinner speech |
; referred to this visit, which happened <
: during a period of depression, and ,
j said that our timely appearance at
| his headquarters had aroused in them ,
j a strong feeling of hopefulness for
the future.
Meets Other Leaders
My diary at this time notes the
fed lowing:
? Paris, Thursday, July 26. '27:
Ilad breakfast yesterday at the
Crillon with [filoyd George. He is
alert and energetic and has a
i ^tllear conception of Allied problems.
Took lunch with Balfour
j^-vAvho thinks Ave have reason to
fee! easier regarding submarines.
Representatives of the various
Allies met for conference on general
situation. In the evening,
M. Ribotj the prime minister,
^ave n stjHn ^irinoK .\C i
[ attending conference.
Today attended luncheon to
Allied representatives given my
President and Mms. Pomc.ro at
the Elysee palace.
In conference this afternoon
j with Petain, Cadorna, Robertson
and Foeh at tatter's office. Discussed
mil'tary plans, talked
about tonnage possibilities and
shortage of personnel. Ail pessimistic
and reserved.
James Stillman. just returned
; from a tour of France, confirms
1 reports of serious depression.
Situation Not Hopeful
The meeting of the Allied military
leaders July 26. which was my first,
brought out little that was hopeful.
The political relations of the Allies
were touched upon in a general way.
but only so far as they might affect
the military situation. The most significant
recent event, of course, had
been the crisis in Russia. .
With reference to American assistance,
I gave in detail the situation
as to our man power, immediate
and prospective, especially in the
light of the latest plans of the department,
and laid particular emphaj
sis on the necessity of additional
j shipping. A cablegram had just been
' received in response to mine of July
! 6 irt which I had requested that at
| least a million men reach France by
i the following spring. ,
j This niessitrp inilfopHTin
j War Department foresaw a small
chance of securing the necessary
tonnage, was read to the conference <
in nart as follows:
"By using all shipping which is
now in sight for the purpose and
which will be available after month
of November, the plan proposes to
transport to France by June 15, 1918
twenty-one divisions, comprising almost
420,000 men, together with
auxiliary troops and replacement j
troops, line of communication troops, j
and others, amounting to 214,975
men, makiner a t?tal of 634,975 men."
More Tonnage Needed
Although short of my recommendations,
even this schedule could be
carried out only by a very large increase
of tonnage. The other members
of the conference were of the
opinion that if new adjustments
could be made ihere might be shipping
for nine or ten of onv drifteuvnai
before spring. So for the moment,
there did not seem to be the slightest
chance of transporting a million men
to France by the following June.
After canvassing the whole situation,
the conference expressed '.he
unanimous opinion that a defensive
role should be adopted on all secondary
fronts. The British and French
representatives hoped that the surplus
troops resulting from this
course might be available to strengthen
their armies in France and General
Cadoma, of course, thought the
I Italian armies should have their full
share.
rORLD
erican Expeditionary Foi
CHAPTER X j
About this time (July, 1917) disturbing
reports wore submitted to]
me confidentially by one of our na-,
val officers sent by Admiral Simsfrom
London. Calculations based up-:
on tonnage losses for May, June ami
July seemed to confirm the conclusions
of a month previous that there'
would soon be insufficient allied ship-!
ping left to bring over an American
army of required strength, and That;
the Allies would find it difficult to
keep up tbeiv food supply froir. over
seas. The data presented by the na
val officer proved that if this rate:
of destruction could not be reduced!
the war would be lost before we could
fire a shot.
This report was certainly most pes-)
simistic, but it did not dispel nsv iibh-i
r: -i ?
Aiuence in cfio success of the clan
that had beer tested and was about
to be inaugurated by sealing ships
over in convoys under the protection!
of naval vessels. Additional destroyers
requested by Admiral Sims had
by this time largely increased such
craft in European waters and as a!
result the activities of submarines'
had been somewhat diminished for
July as compared with April.
Yet fur the time being ship contraction
in British yards continued]
below losses and our shipping hoan i
at home had scarcely stopped wran-j
gling over materials and types. AH
these facts caused everybody to realize
the extreme urgency of speed.1
and that in turn gave some hope that
the prospects might soon become;
brighter.
Spies Get Sailing Dates
The success of submarine warfare j
had been largely dependent upon advance
knowledge concerning movements
of vessels. As there was no
doubt that the saliing dates of much
of our shipping reached Germany
through spies, one way to reduce the
danger would be tc close such sources
of information.
In the beginning the practice by
our War Department of transmitting
secret information was extremely
loose. The data regarding sailings
was, of course, sent to my headquarters,
but at the same time, or often
before, it was also given to both the
French and. British--military., attaches
and missions in Washington. They
immediately transmitted the information
by cable to their respective governments,
with the result rtvat if "c_
Dally became almost commop knowledge.
V >!!>( Rut
there were ether sources of
information possessed by the enemy.
One message intercepted by the
French, sent ironi some wireless station
in Spain to the German general
staff, announced the arrival of sev
General Pershing 1
eral American vessels at Nantes and
of 10,000 American soldiers at StXazaire,
and also gave the routes
taken by our transports.
Another* evidently intended for
submarines, reported the departure
of a convoy of transports from New
York. These and similar facts were
cabled at once to Admiral Sims and
to Washington.
leadership Big Problem
Probably the most important factor
in building up an aggressive a.
is the selection of leaders. Without
efficient leadership the finest of soldiers
may suffer defeat by inferior
forces skillfully handled.
The following was my recommendation
to Secretary of War Baker:
"My observation of British and
French armies and most exacting arduous
service conditions at the front
fully convince me that only officers
in full mental and physical vigor
should be .sent here. Contrary course
means certain inefficiency in our
service and possible later humiliation
vjl oxiScers concerned. Cieneral officers
must undergo extreme effort, in
personal supervision of operations in
trenches. Very few British or French
division commanders over forty-five
or brigadiers over forty.
"We have too much at stake to
risk inefficiency through mental or
physical defects. Strongly. recommend
conditions be fully considered
in making high appointments and
suggest that no officer of whatever
rank bo fni* active service,
who is not strong and robust in every
particular. Officers selected for appointment
general officer of line
should be those with experience in
actively commanding troops. Officers
not fulfilling above conditions
can be usefully employed at home
training troops."
These recommendations were not
altogether followed at home. In fact
very little effort seems to have been
made at selection, so that some officers
without ambition or initiative,
whose inefficiency should have been'
well known, and others whose age1
and physical condition were 3uch as
to disqualify them for strenuous see
vice, were given important assignments.
Most of them were known to m?
and not a few w.hc, under the rule
of seniority, were commanders of
regiments and departments, had
lacked the energy even to train their
commands or themselves in battle exercises,
where favorable opportune,
had teen afforded.
The policy of the War Department
from beginning to end seemed to be
to appoint officers to the higher
grade, according to seniority, with
the intention of weeding out the inefficient
later on. This appears to
have beer, the department's idea of
selection and the result was practically
110 selection at all. After t
| appointment of such officers it was
; a slow process to eliminate them.
In the Training Area
The First Division was now v.c"
I settled in its training area in the
; region of Gondreeoui-t. south of Ear[
!e-Duc- The troops of the division
i had already established friendly rei
lations with the French peasantry
and had quickly adapted themselves
I to their new mode of life.
As the natural consequence cf the
| financial condition of the frugal
French provincial, he was wont to
profit by the presence of the British
and ourselves, and the open-handed
payday habits of the Americans
served to givf. some encouragement
to this inclination. As a result some
coolness grew up later between our
men and their early friends.
In ali history I do not believe there
has ever been an army on foreign
soil so considerate and observant of
the rights and interests of the people.
The peasant class made a strong appeal
to every man in the army. Their
simplicity, their love of the soil and
the long hours of work in the fields
by the old men and women and young
boys and gills remained the constant
admiration of our soldiers.
I am inclined to think, however,
that the excellent behavior of the
men in the first contingent, their
rather unmilitary appearance in illfitting
uniforms and their apparent
lack fo formal discipline created the
impression in the minds of French
officials that ihey were too kindhearted
to become aggressive fighting
troops.
At ibe conclusion of my inspection
of various places Chaumont was selected
as the bsct site for our general
headquarters. It was on our line
of communications to the fro-- and
ccifirany placed as to probable sectors
of our operations The fine
stone regimental barracks became
our headquarters and we were abie
to obtain ample billeting accommodations
in houses for all except the
' ^ '' y i ' ^^
nspecting Poilus.
enlisted mc-n, who,were provided wUh^^r-f||l
temporary barracks.
2n the next instalment the American
chief tells more about the A.
E. F. training and billeting areas.
BLIGHT
By RUTH BCWKiIN
I see the trees on every Kill
AH brown and dead with subtle
blight;
I never know disease is there
Until it leaves a barren sight.
There stand?, the trunk with doty
limbs?
A tree that once was tall and
straight.
But now it sways, a tott'ring wreck,
And cure for it is all too late.
* * *
Arid all around I see the wrecks
Of human life. The blisrht of sin
Has swept across the human heart,
Has burned it out and entered in.
The barren heart3 and blighted lives
Cry out for help; sin l-kes its toll:
"Is there no balm in Gilead?"
And "no physician" for the soul?
And then I seem to see the hands
Of Him who waikea by Galilee
Stretched forth to heal, and hear Hirn
say,
"The Great Physician, I am He."
.... ^*~
This notice was posted on a pleasure
boat belonging to a certain
steamship company;
"The chairs in the cabins are for
ladies. Gentlemen are requested not
to make use of them tiil the ladies
are seated."
Read the AcU?They Ar* Messenger*
of Thrift 1
fe . *